[extropy-chat] silent night
Harvey Newstrom
mail at HarveyNewstrom.com
Thu Dec 23 19:19:14 UTC 2004
On Dec 23, 2004, at 4:38 AM, Samantha Atkins wrote:
> The neurosecurity stuff is interesting. If my brain is relatively
> open to would-be neuro-hackers isn't their brain and intention, much
> less action possibly obvious and capable of raising alarm? This gets
> into issues of privacy inside our very heads which is another can of
> worms. I sure as hell would not want some corporate CIO wonk
> deciding what patches to put in my brain just because I am doing some
> work for their corporation! I especially would not want them or
> anyone else trying to draw rough analogies to guide actions on my head
> and capabilities from a much simpler and far less complex and delicate
> set of current security scenarios. The suggested "solutions" here
> aren't even terribly workable at rather coarse granularities of
> software components. VPN for the brain is one of the more
> shudderingly hideous ideas I've contemplated in a while.
This is why I am focussing my career on IT security. I believe that
this is a prerequisite to all future technologies such as AI, robotics,
nanotech, VR, space travel, biotech, neurotech, mega-scale engineering,
etc. Besides just making technology a possibility, we also need to
make sure it has effectiveness, efficiency, reliability, compliance,
confidentiality, integrity and availability. This is as vital as
reproducing scientific experiments, testing medicines or checking
mathematical calculations. Without these assurances, the technology is
still in the unverified experimental stage.
My entire career is spent finding flaws in technology that designers
and implementors don't know are there. They build systems to do what
they want, and usually have no idea how they can fail or be hacked in
radically unexpected ways. The failure rates of technology is
increasing as complexity is increasing. Until we learn to control
technology better, the future technologies will become overwhelmed by
complexity issues at a scale not seen today. Future tech requires
speed, reliability and flexibility that is just not available in
previous technologies. Even today, the biggest threats to our
computers are crashes, vulnerabilities, and deliberate attacks. The
alleged capability of the technology is the least of our concerns.
I am a professional paranoid and skeptic. I get paid to tell people
how things can go wrong or be made to go wrong. This is not quite the
same thing as being a pessimist. I actually have to prove my claims,
and then develop countermeasures to prevent such problems.
--
Harvey Newstrom <HarveyNewstrom.com>
CISSP, ISSAP, ISSMP, CISA, CISM, IAM, IBMCP, GSEC
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