[extropy-chat] Many worlds and Hugh Everett

[scerir]

From: "Giu1i0 Pri5c0"

> Of course this must be a brick-like approximation, perhaps consciousness
> is a property of the complete wavefunction that does not allow itself to
> be associated to a specific projection.

Suppose that the "universal" quantum state can be expressed as gigantic
sum of tensor products of states of subsystems.

If a measurement with a probabilistic outcome is undertaken, the world
splits into several worlds, and each possible outcome of the observations
appears in the fraction of the new worlds given by the quantum-mechanical
probability of that outcome.

If we define two kinds of reality (as E.P.Wigner did, and Descartes also
did) the first kind of reality would be the immediate content of the
subject's consciousness, and it is "absolute" in the sense of not
depending upon inference from anything other than itself, in contrast
with all instances of the second kind of reality.

Suppose that in the "universal" quantum state expressed as gigantic
sum of tensor products of states of subsystems there is a term which
correctly describes an item of consciousness of the subject reading a
pointer (of some apparatus). This term represents an instance of the 
first kind of reality (as defined above).

The problem is now that the terms, in the sum of tensor products of 
states of subsystems, which attributes a different sensation 
to the subject, fails to represent this reality. 

Consequently, the enormous set of different worlds designated by the 
terms, in the sum of tensor products of states of subsystems, cannot 
have the same ontological standing. 

We can reformulate the above Wigner's argument about (and against) MWI
in different terms. That is to say, the question is left unanswered
why in any measurement an observer finds himself in one, and not in
other branches. Is MWI perhaps introducing a large-scale indeterminism
which moreover includes the observer himself?

s.