[extropy-chat] How to bring down repressive regimes...

[Steve Davies]

----- Original Message -----
From: "paul.bridger" <paul.bridger at paradise.net.nz>
To: "ExI chat list" <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Saturday, June 26, 2004 9:46 AM
Subject: Re: [extropy-chat] How to bring down repressive regimes...


> Chris Phoenix wrote:
> > Michael "Matus" <matus at matus1976.com> wrote:
> >> While I am no utilitarian and don't endorse Robert's suggestion, his
> >> motivation is to prevent as many deaths as possible (or more accurately
> >> prevent as many human-year losses as possible) while everyone else's
> >> motivation appears to be to avoiding having to make tough decisions
> >> about things which may have drastic consequences.  What would his
> >> critics have suggested Eisenhower do to end WWII?  Let the Japanese
> >> mainland alone?
>
> > Perhaps a military historian can explain what would have happened if we
> > had tried just that.  Blockade the island, maybe with some bombing, then
> > wait until their economy collapsed.  Granted, it hasn't worked on Cuba,
> > and it didn't work on Iraq, and North Korea is still defiant.  So maybe
> > it wouldn't have resulted in a modernized and cooperative Japan.  But
> > would it have been an unworkable strategy from a military point of view?
> >   Could we have implemented such a plan back in the 40's?
>
> http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/Slaughter_WBlum.html
>
> This article asserts that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nukings were not
> anything to do with the end of WWII, but were actually the first phase of
the
> cold war.
>
> In other words, Japan was defeated (and had actively attempted to
capitulate)
> well before the nukes were dropped.
>
> Paul Bridger

That's not strictly true. The Japanese government and high command was still
divided before the Hiroshima bomb and the the Tokyo firebombing. After that
they did indeed decide to surrender and made approaches, so the Nagasaki
bomb was not 'neccesary'. I don't myself think that impressing the Russians
was the principal motive. It may have been but there isn't enough clear
evidence to come to a definite conclusion about that. Was there an
alternative to invading Japan in 1945? Sure, they could have done what was
done to Germany in 1918-19, allow an armistice and keep up the blockade
until it was impossible for Japan to renew the war. However it was that
historical precedent and its consequences that probably persuaded them not
to go down that route  - there were no 'good' options available really.
Plus, Japan still occupied large areas of SE asia and the British army was
due to attack the Malayan peninsula and Singapore. Most military historians
think now that Mountbatten and his staff had made such a pigs ear of the
planning that there would have been very heavy casualties.