[extropy-chat] Evidence for the self surviving brain disassembly?

[Brett Paatsch]

Eugen Leitl wrote:

[Aside: I saw the link on the organ vitrification work by Fahy et al
you posted  - I had seen it before. Thanks for the link.

To the extent that a desire to enable cryonics gets work done
in the vitrification of organs (that might help in transplanting etc) and
that would otherwise not have gotten done that's to cryonics credit.

I want to respond to this now in case I can't get back to it for
a while. The nano-assembler thread *might* be diverting]

[Brett]
> > If the continuation of my self (my very life) depended on it, like
> > in cryonics for instance, I'd be pretty uncomfortable assuming
> > that all the matter that makes up my living brain could be replaced
> > in one go with a mere copy to someone else's level of satisfaction.

[Eugene]
> I don't understand where "mere copy" comes from.

I don't regard eqivalence and identity as the same thing in this case.

Others that have a limited view of me based on their perceptions
(which I see as their limits not mine) might conceivably be able to
think they can replace me (or any other to them) with a copy.  

Similarly, my understanding of who Eugene is, is based on my
disconnected relationship with Eugene. To me, you, Eugene 
are an other not a self. 

Someone might be able to masquerade as you to me. They
would have a lot more trouble masqueradeing as you to you
or as me to me.

I don't know if they would quite as much trouble masquerading
as you to you as they would me to me.

>  "Can't tell from the original" is good enough for external observers.

Yes. Even very poor substitutes can fool some external observers. 

>  "Can't tell myself" + "can't tell from the original, external observers"
> + "can't tell from deep level rich operational fingerprint" should be
>  good enough for anybody.

As a somebody I am not convinced. 

[Brett]
> > Why shouldn't I be uncomfortable? I don't think of myself as merely
> > what other people perceive me to be. What evidence is there that I
> or any homo sapiens can survive the complete disassembly of their
> brain?

> An anser to that should be in the FAQ.

Max More sort of addresses some of this in his doctoral dissertation.

> Briefly, animals can be shut down for about one hour, and resume
> cleanly.

Reason posted me this item from Charles Platt 
http://www.fightaging.org/archives/000044.php


In cold water drowning (which is biologically interesting) the

same physical brain is inhabited by the subject before and 

after the near drowning. The atoms are not just functionally

eqivalent they are substantially the same. The brain structure

isn't a copy replacing the original it is the original.

Were I to experience cold water drowning and to be revived

an hour later I'd have no doubt that I was the same self.


> That info is encoded in the physical system.

I'm not sure encoded is the right word. 

> Isomorphic substitution results in the same system, given 
> pattern identity.

I am not sold on "pattern identity". 

> Pattern identity follows from measurable observations
> (quantum identity).

I don't follow. 

Regards,
Brett Paatsch