[extropy-chat] Maximising Human Potential : Education : Toys

[Damien Broderick]

At 03:58 PM 5/24/2004 -0700, Adrian wrote:



> > Ahem. For a different opinion, perhaps consult Bob
> > Herbert's view:
> >
> >
>http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/24/opinion/24HERB.html?th
>
>I don't see how this addresses the issue of Iraqis
>policing themselves, except in indirect senses (like
>how leaving them with a functioning government would
>be one of the preconditions for pulling out).

Try this one, then:


The myth of the reluctant occupier

May 24, 2004


Iraq is a strategic prize in the Arab world with huge reserves of oil. 
America will stay put, writes Scott Burchill.

First there was the "grave danger" (in the words of President Bush) posed 
by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, which failed to materialise.

Then there were the Baghdad/al-Qaeda links that couldn't be established.

Then along came the democratisation rationale. To replace the threat of 
non-existent weapons of mass destruction, a humanitarian argument was 
invoked that proved difficult to sustain with more than 10,000 innocent 
civilians killed by invading and occupying forces.

And far from confronting terrorists in situ as promised, Iraq has became a 
recruiting ground for a proliferating collection of anti-Western militants.

Now a new orthodoxy is shaping comment and analysis about events in Iraq. 
Let's call it the "reluctant occupier myth".

Having removed Saddam and his cohorts from power and set Iraq on a path 
towards democracy, the US is now preparing to leave - the "Vietnamisation" 
of Iraq. It will find a smooth way out by returning sovereignty to a new 
Iraqi administration, initially on July 1 through the auspices of the UN 
and then early next year through democratic elections. Coalition forces, 
which don't want to be in Iraq a day longer than is necessary to "finish 
the job", will stay on for a time to "maintain" security, but only at the 
pleasure of a new interim government in Baghdad.

It is difficult to see what could be more obvious than that the US is 
desperately trying to stay in Iraq - and specifically, in charge in Iraq.

Despite disingenuous claims that coalition troops would leave if asked to 
by a new Iraqi authority after July 1, US Secretary of State Colin Powell 
got closer to the truth when he stated on April 26 that "I hope they (the 
Iraqi people) will understand that in order for this government to get up 
and running - to be effective - some of its sovereignty will have to be 
given back (to Washington)".

So, coalition troops will stay on regardless. After all, what was the point 
of invading in the first place if they were going to get out?

Washington wants others (the United Nations) to share the burden of 
political reconstruction and rebuilding infrastructure, but it has no 
intention of relinquishing real control of the country to anyone, including 
New York or the Iraqi people.

As a strategic prize in the heart of the Arab world with the world's 
second-largest known reserves of oil, a client regime in Baghdad would be 
of inestimable value to the US.

However, it is having difficulty finding a Vichy government willing to 
follow Washington's orders, because of the domestic risks that 
collaborators always face.

The US is keen to hand over the "nasties", such as local policing and law 
and order to indigenous control, because this will reduce coalition losses.

On the other hand, the lucrative gains of economic sovereignty - including 
control of the oil industry, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, 
and opening up the economy to foreign investment and ownership - will not 
be matters for the discretion of a post-Saddam administration.

The world's largest embassy, which Washington intends to build in Baghdad, 
would not be necessary if Iraqis were going to genuinely regain control of 
their country. It will be a constant reminder that full sovereignty, 
including economic and political independence, will not be returned to them.

The US has lost the war politically. Its occupation of Iraq is the cause of 
regional instability and unremitting violence. Its preference for 
unilateralism and contempt for the UN, its reluctance to consult with 
long-standing friends, and its failure to reconcile its global ambitions 
with the limits of its power has undermined the alliance system upon which 
its foreign policy has rested since 1947.

According to the war historian Gabriel Kolko, the strength and influence of 
the US in the post-World War II period has "largely rested on its ability 
to convince other nations that it was to their vital interests to see 
America prevail in its global role".

The false pretexts used to justify the war in Iraq and the revelations of 
prison brutality have cost Washington considerable moral authority among 
its allies in Europe and friends in the Middle East.

America has never been more militarily powerful but has also never felt 
less secure. It now confronts this paradox in a much less friendly and 
respectful world.

Dr Scott Burchill is a lecturer in international relations at Deakin 
University.
<mailto:burchill at deakin.edu.au>burchill at deakin.edu.au

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/05/23/1085250865579.html?from=storylhs