A view on cryonics (was Re: [extropy-chat] Bad Forecasts!)

[John K Clark]

"Slawomir Paliwoda" <velvethum at hotmail.com>

> Identity doesn't evaporate even when mind process stops.

Sometimes that is true.

> Pausing process' activity is not the same as
> destroying it.

Dropping a brain in a vat of liquid nitrogen will certainly pause its
activity, but if we are very lucky it will not destroy it.

> I want people  to think about identity from the perspective
> of subjective experience rather  than from the perspective
> of memories and personalities.

Your memories and that bundle of mental abilities and emotions we call
personality are subjective experience and they are the only part of me that
I really want to survive; I don’t much care if my left big toe survives or
not.

> The error in your reasoning is the phrase "instantly swapped
> the location of  you and the copy". You can't just "instantly"
> swap matter in space-time.

I said “instantly” just for simplicity, my thought experiment does not
require it; I can take as much time as I want to  swap every atom in your
body with the original Slawomir Paliwoda standing next to you. There is no
way my making such a switch can make the slightest difference either
objectively or subjectively and there is no way you can tell if I really did
anything at all because one hydrogen atom is identical to another.

> will carve a unique trajectory in space-time. Because there can
> only be one and only one such trajectory, it is possible to
> track the identity of any object.

That “unique trajectory” is more like a dog’s breakfast because all the
atoms in your body and brain are in a constant flux, you are quite literally
not the man you were a year ago.

> Suppose the location of any mind in the future is recorded using 4
> parameters (x,y,z,t).

That is one of your errors right there, asking for the coordinates of a mind
is like asking where “red” is or “fast” or “big”.  A brain may or may not
have a unique location (it could be distributed) but the mind does not, it
might not even know or need to know anything about the brain that is
producing it.

> Threrefore, I will be able to prove my originality by presenting
> the log detailing locations of my mind in space and time,

I’m not saying you can’t devise a thought experiment where you can determine
who is the original and who is the copy, I’m saying you can also devise ones
where you can not.

Thought experiment:

You and the original (or you and the copy, hard to say) are standing next to
each other. I flip a coin and then take out my Magnum 44 and shoot one of
you in the head. I then bring out a sealed envelope containing the only log
that can prove definitely who was the copy and who was the original and hand
it to  the one I did not shoot. You (the survivor) feel fine happy and
healthy, you feel just like you remember feeling in the past, so do you open
the envelope or burn it? And if you open it and find you are the copy is
there any reason to be distressed?

> My point is that two *different* objects cannot occupy
>the same location in space and time.

That’s only true of things that obey The Pauli Exclusion Principle and not
everything does.  Two different photons of light can occupy the same
location in space and time, but it doesn’t really matter because mind is not
an object.

John K Clark     jonkc at att.net