A view on cryonics (was Re: [extropy-chat] Bad Forecasts!)

[Brett Paatsch]

Rafal Smigrodzki" <rafal at smigrodzki.org>

> Brett Paatsch wrote:
>
> >Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >> Thus, the concept of "identity" is
> >>in fact a whole slew of related but distinct concepts, with
> >>different properties and referents.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >I've no problem with this but it doesn't seem relevant here. As
> >Slawomir Paliwoda says in his excellent post on Personal Identity,
> >"personal identity depends on a mind powered by the brain which is
> >a physical object, and like all other objects, it can and should be
> >subject to scientific investigation."
> >
> >And ....  "once we agree that, in science,  there's only one correct
> >explanation for something at the exclusion of other theories, we can
> >say that there can only be one explanation/description of personal
> >identity that is true and all other theories are false."
> >
> >
> ### Now, this is news to me: do you think that Euclid's parallel axiom
> is true? False? Neither? Non-scientific?

I think it is true. I'd hold it to be true until such time as I was shown
that it was false.  Is it scientific? I can't see that it is scientific. I
think that some things can be true without being scientific. I think
that to practice science requires understanding some things at a more
fundamental level than science because if we don't we can't do
science.  Among these things, as chance would have it, is the notion
of what identity is.  That A is A. That A is not anything that is not
A.  I don't think a person can practice the scientific method without
understanding contingency. One needs to be able to formulate a
hypothesis that is intelligible and falsifiable.

People can use words in different ways and they can and do misuse
them sometimes. Identity may mean different things in other contexts.
But for the purpose of this discussion (and consideration of cryonics
generally) I think we need to ground personal identity somewhere
quite carefully. We can so ground it, it is possible, and it behoves us
to if we want to be exact and scientific in our explanations. If we
don't we just argue past each other. I presume we both have at least
some interest in persuasion. Certainly cryonics doesn't need any more
linguistic saddle-lead to slow down its acceptance.

I think Slawomir's notion of identity (Personal Identity) is better than
yours. Not because it is his, but because it sets the bar the highest and
you can understand it too. You can define a lesser requirement than
the maintenance of full Personal Identity as still being desirable and
of value to you and too your taste just as easily. You can coin another
word that is less confusing.

> Or more: since the taste of rocquefort depends on chemical interactions,
> which are subject to scientific investigation, what is the correct taste
> of rocquefort?

So far as I know taste cannot be conveyed between subjects directly.

So far as I know to explain taste scientifically we'd probably have to
look at those chemical interactions.

 > Generally, science doesn't necessarily produce exclusive
> either/or results, and doesn't directly make normative statements.

The point is we can explore a subject systematically and scientifically
if we chose to, and historically I think we'd agree approaching things
scientifically is useful, but we preclude the possibility of doing it
jointly if we cannot agree on the meaning of a some key words.

Logic and reason are more fundamental than science. So too is
the ability to coin words.

> The statement:
> "I like the idea of having a self-similar material structure in the
> future" is normative, and its normative content *may not* be subject to
> verification - just as the normative content of your statement "I don't
> care about having self-similar material structures in the future, except
> if produced by continuity (of sorts) with my present structure".

By normative I'm assuming you mean statements that express
preferences or norms but not truths.

> ------------------------------------
>
> >
> >
> >>I accept that your (Brett Paatch's) identity is what you say, since
> >>this is what is produced by the processes in your brain (and my
> >>meta-rule for such definitions is that they are produced by the
> >>brains in a self-referential manner) . It's a fact, albeit a fact
> >>pertaining only to Brett Paatsch. Now, my own, Rafal's  identity
> >>is defined differently. It is also a fact. Although the definitions
> >>are different, they are not contradictory - they apply to different
> >>objects, just like the varied definitions of an "original" in the art
> >>world. Even though your definition of self is different from mine
> >>(not even analogous), I do not think you are mistaken - merely
> >>different.  Do you see the point?
> >>
> >>
> >
> >Yes, I understand what your saying, but I think that you have
> >gone off on a tangent. You are taking us away from a discussion
> >on cryonics and of the obstacles cryonics would inevitably have
> >to overcome to be of interest to people like you and I. That is
> >people that currently have our sense of self located in our brains.
> >
> >
> ### No, I am not going off at a tangent - because I am not
> like you. My sense of self is not "located" in my brain, it's located
> in my personality-defining information-like structures.

So you sense of self is located in your personality-defining
information-like structures which are in turn located in ............

> ----------------------------
>
> > You are currently located in
> >your brain just as I am. Your aspirations for cryonics will have
> >to deal with that.  A cryonics procedure that goes hunting
> >about the room to pick up astral travelling selves is unlike to
> >be of interest to either of us.
> >
> >
> >
> ###  Yes, my personality-defining information is inscribed in my brain,
> currently. My aspirations for cryonics deal with this excellently.

...........your brain.  You simply positied another layer of containment
where I omitted the middle container. You foot is in your shoe even
if it is also in your sock that is in your shoe.

> ---------------------------------------
>
>
> >>In other words, you are a universalist, believing that a
> >>single definition of self (your own) is the only correct one
> >>("all members of the species homo sapiens have their sense
> >>of self....."), while I am a pluralist, letting everyone decide
> >>where their own (and only their own) identities lie.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >You've split my sentence in the middle when you quote me
> >above. I'd said "all members of the species homo sapiens have
> >their sense of self inherent in the structure of their cellular brain".
> >That is not me defining a self concept. That is me pointing out
> >that whatever our self concepts are they are *located* if we
> >are homo sapiens in our brain structure.
> >
> >
> ### I don't know how you can claim that a concept is
> "located" anywhere. A concept may be written down in a
> particular book, or be embodied in a patented machine,
> but the word "located" should only be used for
> material objects.

Well we are talking about the self concept which is a special
case,  but even so wouldn't you agree that all concepts that
you comprehend (as opposed to their representations) you
comprehend in you brain?

Concepts are represented symbolically in books and interpreted
in the brain would be how I'd look at it.

> Let me quote your full paragraph to which I referred above: "I do think
> all members of the species homo sapiens have their sense of self
> inherent in the structure of their cellular brain. I think that it is a
> mistake to think that someone who is now a homo sapiens can be
> abstracted out of their cellular substrate and yet somehow continue to
> exist as disembodied pattern and then to be re-instantiated again. I
> think that the self is lost in the process."
>
> In other words, you say that for all humans, sense of self is "inherent"
> in the brain and is inevitably lost during transfer of information. The
> use of the universal qualifier makes it sound like a definition,
> insisting that for all humans, whatever is transferred
> ("re-instantiated") cannot be self.

"Sense of self" does looks and sound sloppy in retrospect. I should
have just said self. But the self is a process (not a mere pattern)
taking place within the brain-space - I don't claim to know exactly
what it is - only that it, some part of your objective cellular substrate
effectively results in a subjective experience of a self for you.

I think that you'd agree that all humans self concepts currently reside
in their head (more specifically in their brain)- notwithstanding that you
think that may not continue to hold true in the future.

> -----------------------------------
>
>
> >>If you mean "functioning without any material substrate", then no,
> >>of course not.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >Ok. So you think you would cease to exist as "you" while you exist
> >only as a dataset of information for building you at a later date?
> >
> >
> ### What do you mean by "exist"? I would exist as static information,
> I would not exist as a conscious information processor.
>
> --------------------------------
>
> >Sort of cake - recipe -cake. While your a recipe your not a cake.
> >
> >
> ### Yes, sure, I have no problem with existing as a recipe.
> I am both a  recipe and a cake at this time (I can be used as source
> of information for making copies and I keep processing information
> at the same time), in the future I might temporarily exist as a recipe
>only, and then resume normal functioning.

At THIS time I suspect the best copies of you you could make would
involve genomic information.  Children.

> ------------------------------------
>
> >>> <>### Let me ask you something: do you think that it could be in
> >>> principle
> >>> possible to analyze the material structure of your brain, and use the
> >>> information to make a brain which would behave in a way consistent
> >>> (similar enough) with you (e.g. identify pictures of your mother as
"My
> >>> mother", or on seeing things you like say it likes them, etc.etc.)?
> >>
> >
> >It might be. In principle. It might be possible to create what Slawomir
> >Paliwoda calls a perfect clone.  I wouldn't think that perfect clone was
> >me. And I don't think that clone could be created because I don't think
> >the information to create it could be gathered to the requisite
resolution
> >without destroying the original me in the process.
> >
> >
> ### No, I didn't ask about the "perfect clone" - I merely asked about a
> copy which would behave consistently with you (have largely the same
> responses to the same stimuli as you do). The exact level of similarity
> here might be as low as that sufficient to fool all the persons you know
> into believing the copy is actually you.
>
> Whether making such a copy can be achieved without disassembly of
> you is not relevant to the question. And yes, I already know you wouldn't
> see  the clone as "you".
>
> ------------------------------------------

"Nature" "produced" me. There was nothing magical or spiritual in the
production process.  A living exact copy of my brain would think exactly
like me. It would have a subjective experience of being me. Obviously.

It cannot be built imo - but that's not what your asking.

To everyone else my subjective is inaccessable. To others I present
as a perceptual pattern because they experience me as an other.
To others any sufficiently good copy might as well be the orginal.
And the same would hold for me. ie. I could not tell a sufficiently
good copy of anyone else from the original as I don't have
access to anyone elses subjective. That would hold true of my
closest relationships with other people. They always present
to me through my senses and so not as processes but as patterns
like a series of discrete snapshots.

> >>But, if you agree that a sufficiently
> >>advanced technology could produce such a brain, then you
> >>cannot say we disagree about facts.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >I can conceed the possibility, but I don't find it worth giving
> >a lot of thought too, given that I realise I would not be my
> >"perfect clone". And there are plenty of other 'facts' yet for
> >us to disagree over.
> >
> >
> ### Great! You agree that the disagreement is about value
> - you "don't find it worth giving a lot of thought to"! This is
> the point - you are not interested in having such a clone,
> but I am.

I understand that. I'm glad it seems to make you happy. I value
my life. I value myself. You and I can both use the word I and
conceive of ourselves as selves but our criteria for self survival
is different. I can't settle for yours but I can see why it appeals
to you.

Clone not a good enough word though, the quality of the copy
you are interested in is considerable better than a genetic clone
even though it would be a separate and new identity like a
clone would be.  A new word needs coining if you don't like
"perfect clone", 'til then I'll stick with "perfect clone".

> -----------------------------------------------
>
> >
> >
> >>Both you and me would agree that it is physically possible
> >>to make copies of our brains that would act similarly to the
> >>originals. The only difference is that I am sufficiently satisfied
> >>with/enthusiastic about the prospect of having such a copy
> >>in the future that I am willing to pay for cryonics (and yes, I
> >>even value this situation equally with "survival" by
> >>spatiotemporal continuity of cells), while a copy of you
> >>would not elicit sufficient interest from you.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >I get what you are saying. But your right I wouldn't be sufficently
> >satisified or enthusiastic. To me you are excepting that you
> >will die (be materially decomposed and cease as a process) but
> >are taking consolation that something just like you will be
> >brought back to life (recomposed  and started as a process via
> >means which you conceed you do not in detail understand).
> >
> >Your diverting limited resources from solving problems or
> >overcoming limits in your current you-process in order to endow
> >life to some future you-process. Even though the current and
> >future you-processes will not overlap in time.  Correct?
> >
> >
> ### Yes, exactly! This is indeed the case, whether you call
> dying-and-recomposing, or and I call it "survival", this is indeed the
case.
>
> In the future (e.g. after my premature death in an explosion of a liquid
> nitrogen tank :)  my recomposed copy may contact you, and while
> acknowledging that by your definition I am dead and he is somebody else,
> he tells you he remembers from a first-person perspective our present
> discussion, and that life is great, he's been boozin' an' humpin' like
> in the old times. Ain't cryonics great, or what?
> ---------------------------------

If it turns out like that way I'll say I'm happy for you.

I'll also be quite pleasantly surprised (to say the least) that I'm still
around for you to tell me so, having not myself gone through the
process.

> >
> >
> >In fairness, why should anyone want to provide numbers or technical
> >analysis? What is in it for them? To do that they'd have to take on a
> >burden at some opportunity cost of time.  If you had laid out numbers
> >and technical analysis in detail yourself then they might do you the
service
> >of checking and perhaps correcting any errors etc.
> >
> >
> ### Opinions of scientists are valuable only insofar as they rely on
> superior knowledge and technical analysis. Without these, scientist's
> opinions about a subject (e.g. rocquefort or cryonics) are not any more
> significant than the opinions of carpenters or business executives.

> The technical analysis must be disclosed for verification, or else it's
> reasonable to infer that the opinion is groundless (based on ignorance).

Thats a possible reason. Another is that they can't be bothered. Another,
less likely or frequent, I suspect, is that some people may choose not to
disillusion others. Yet another is that some scientific types may be prefer
that an inferior sort of cryonics outcome not be held up in even principle
as satsifactory when it falls short of continuing the mind-process.

Haven't you ever decided not to bother correcting someone with a
religious or superstitious world view not because you couldn't but
because you had better things to do with your time than to try to talk
someone out of what to them is a pleasing fastasy world?

> ---------------------------------------
>
>
> >
> >
> >> Therefore, I am justified in treating
> >>scientific detractors of cryonics as ignorant, since if they knew any
> >>scientific arguments, they would have used them.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >That is a non sequitor. People generally need a reason to do
> >work that your not paying then to do, they don't normally
>> need a reason to avoid working for nothing.
> >
> >
> ### Some scientists offer unsolicited opinions about cryonics without
> facts and numbers - why? Nobody is paying them to do so.

As you say or imply above scientists are not only scientists they are also
people. Sometimes people do give opinions. Some scientists may speak
against cryonics because they see it as pseudo-science (their good students
will decide for themselves anyway), and something to warn the public
against.  Some may like the sound of their voices. Some may be religious
and see cryonics as a competitive meme.

Ultimately criticism is what scientists should do though. Better criticism
is better. But any criticism even the gratuitous frivolous nasty stuff sends
a  counterbalanceing message of "don't believe" out.  The human
tendancy to believe rather than think stuff through is so strong that having
people (especially people perceived even wrongly to be authorities) say
they don't believe or being scornful can be sound-bites that some
others hear.

> --------------------------------
>
> >>### Well, here is how I imagine cryonics might work for me:
> >>
> >>Cryonic vitrification very soon after death (a few hours, hopefully a
> >>few minutes) will preserve the brain structure down to the level of
> >>synapses, with intact synaptic protein levels (which define the synaptic
> >>strength), and the levels of other proteins, including transcription
> >>factors in the nucleus, and most RNA and protein in the cytoplasm and
> >>the ECM.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >Minutes vs hours?
> >
> ### There is some mild ultrastructural damage within 20 minutes of warm
> ischemia (mitochondrial swelling), and after 24 hours there is visible
> retraction of a significant number of synapses. Therefore, loss of
> personality-defining information occurs somewhere during that time,
> probably no less than 5-6 hours. Anything less than 30 minutes should be
> perfectly safe, based on imaging of vitrified samples.
>
> ---------------------------------
>
> > Death as determined how?
> >
> ### By cessation of heartbeat.

Some folks might prefer to have a doctor react for a defibrillator in
that circumstances as a first choice. Others might think CPR would
be worth a first try.

So 30 minutes after cessation of heartbeat, cryonics vitrification
commences. How long does the vitrification process take? Or
was that in your 30 minutes?

> -------------------------------
>
> > Vitrification how?
> >
> ### Using Alcor's current procedure.

Okay but I've read some of Fahy's stuff. There is problems with the
vitrification process too. It can cause damage in its own right. I don't
know that I know Alcor's current procedure but I doubt it has
advanced a great deal since 1993.

> ------------------------------
>
> > Down to (and including the synapses I presume) - you'd want
> > your memories. To capture you personal synapse pattern you'd
> >need nanoscale resolution.
> >
> ### The resolution provided by a near-field scanning optical
> microscope is more than sufficient (goes down to 32 nm) to image
> synapses (500 - > 5000 nm). A confocal scanning microscope
> has lower resolution but still sufficient to image synapses (and
> even actin filaments).

>From memory the pores in an cells nucleus can be as narrow
as 15 nanometres and yet things like retinoic acids and the steroid
hormones are small enough to pass through them.

Liposomes can be as small as 25 nm.

I'm just curious - what do you think the diametre of a lipid
membrane in an organelle is?

>
> -----------------------------------------
>
> > As you know neurons are not nicely rounded cells like one
> >might find in a high school text book - they are more like tree or root
> >structures and the structure matters.
> >
> ### I do not get my information about neurons from high school
> textbooks.
>
> -------------------------------
>
> >  Proteins levels alone won't do
> >it you need to know where the proteins (and not just the proteins)
> >were when they were in their natural state.
> >
> >
> ### This is why you need to use a confocal or near-field
> scanning microscope, as described.

One microscope? how long do you imagine your scanning is going
to take to finish ?

>Non-proteinaceous
> molecular species can also be detected by antibodies.

Antibodies in solution? Or are these machine-phase antibodies?

> In the
> unlikely case of nucleic acids assays being necessary, oligonucleotide
> in situ hybridization can be used (FISH). You can actually see
> single molecules in a regular microscope in this way.

miRNAs?

>
> ----------------------------------
>
> >
> >That evaporate layers of tissue at what temperature?
> >
> ### Up to 10 000 kelvin, same as in a commercial lasik or other tissue
> machining system.

I meant the temperature of the tissue :-)  Heat causes movement.

You've opted for a destructive just get the information don't worry
about saving the atoms approach I note.

>
> ----------------------------
>
> > How do you stop
> >the tissue below the surface layer from heating up and information
getting
> >lost before you determine it?
> >
> >
> ### Using very short laser pulses of the correct frequency. Published
> data describe no visible ultrastructural damage beyond a few hundred
> nanometers with conventional lasik, and that is much less than the depth
> of focus for a scanning confocal microscope.

I doubt that there is a lot of relevant published data. Do you have a link?
I'd have thought there might be a variety of frequencies.

A few hundred nanometres would seem to way to be way too much
damage.

>
> --------------------------------------
>
> >3D reconstruction onto what substrate?
> >
> ### 3D computational model.

How can you tell that your model works? Its a model. Where
do you get your mapping algorithm?

>
> --------------------------------
>
> >Surely not the same sort of organic substrate as originally - how
> > would you put it together without it decomposing. And if on
> > some other substrate how would you translate
> >the infromation from the first substrate (unique info remember as
> > memories
> >can't be templated out) onto another substrate?
> >
> >
> ### What do you mean by "templated out"?

Using a generic template of what would be typical when you can't
determine what was actually there.
>
> -------------------
>
> >
> >
> >>All the above steps use existing technologies, and reasonable extensions
> >>of them (e.g. the antibodies to all important molecules are not yet
> >>available, but will be once the molecules are cataloged).
> >>
> >>
> >
> >You don't say how you will do important steps. You don't talk about
> >algorithms
> >for storing information,
> >
> ### Algorithms? The intermediate scan data can be stored as any other
> form of digital imaging data.

Your going to take nanoscale photos? How?

>
> ----------------------------------
>
>
> > for translation that information into something
> >that
> >could be ported to another sunstrate.
> >
> >
> ### Explain?

In Merkles paper he was going to try and store the locations of
species of molecules and where they were found. But that information'
would not tell you where to put the molecules to form Rafals personal
memories on another substrate unless exactly the same sort of substrate
spatially and materially was used.

There would be problems trying to create an organic brain of the same
stuff as yours without it decomposing while it was being put together.


> ------------------------
>
> >Do you break the brain sized stating material down into smaller pieces?
> >
> >
> ### Do you mean if I work on the whole brain or first cut it up? No,
> this method would not require prior dissection.

That places some rather substantial limits on how much surface area
you have access to for scanning, which in turn adds to how long its
going to take you to scan.


>
> -----------------------
>
> >How do you prevent loss of info due to cracking?
> >
> ### Since nanoscale information about the structure of the crack
> surfaces would be available, the cracked surfaces can be apposed in the
> 3D model, just like freeze-fractured cell surfaces can be matched in the
> freeze-fracture scanning electron microscope.


>
> ------------------------------------------
>
> > How do you move
> >pieces around?
> >
> >
> >
> ### Pieces?

I did not think you'd try and work on the brain in one piece.

> ------------------------
>
> >>Then a sufficiently powerful computer will construct a neural network
> >>replicating the connectivity pattern and the synaptic strengths, as well
> >>as the rules of modification of the synaptic strengths in the course of
> >>information processing, producing a device which will be behaviorally
> >>sufficiently similar to me as to satisfy my desires regarding future
> >>states of the world (to silence critics I don't even need to say that I
> >>have been "reincarnated" or "brought back to life", or "survived", or
> >>any such rigmarole - I only say that both I today and the device in the
> >>future are satisfied with this particular outcome, and consider the
> >>cryonics money well-spent).
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >>Does this describe a sufficiently developed idea?
> >>
> >>
> >
> >No. It really, really doesn't. If you want numbers and technical analysis
> >in a critique (see your statement above) then you'd have to do a lot more
> >work yourself. And before you can put numbers on things you have to
> >do more than just name a few potential tools.
> >
> ### Wait - you wanted to have an outline of "how cryonics might work for
> me", to prevent misunderstandings and ambiguities, and not discuss an
> idea so insufficiently developed that it would start mutating under
> analysis, like a religious concept (at least this is how I read your
> question).

Yeah I know. But we can't do it like this its too time inefficient. If you
are genuine in wanting to get an answer with high confidence to the question
can cryonics realistically work for you or not then I think you'll need to
find or write a paper of your own.

Do that and I'll attack it for you. I am willing to spend time attacking
the best cryonics paper around if I can talk with the author directly and
I think the author is genuinely wanting to get at the truth.

> The outline I gave suffices to define my proposed cryonics
> approach. Now, if are you ready to give me a technical critique yourself
> , tell me which additional data do you need, and which numbers that I
> provided above and below do you disagree with.

I'm not ready because your not ready.

Have you read Merkles Molecular Repair of the Brain?  If you do you
would get some ideas on some other engineering problems.

There is an Alchor publication called Cryonics Reaching for Tomorrow
4th Edn, published around December 1993, in that there is an Appendix
B, written by Greg Fahy "primarily out of intellectual curiosity in response
to Dr Ralph Merkles paper "The Molecular Repair of the Brain".

Fahy calls his paper  at Appendix B "A 'Realistic' Scenario for Repair".

There is little point me reading Fahy or even Merkles paper and then
using them to act like a smart alec in critiquing you. If Fahy was writting
to this list it might be worth my critiquing his paper because at least
then I could have a discussion to justify my effort. At present with
respect you are not outlining enough for me to critique seriously.

I'd recommend you get a hold of it if you haven't already.
I only have it in hardcopy and its wider than A4 so it wont fax particularly
easily.

I think cryonics will not and cannot work. I am willing to take some
reasonable steps to persuade you and to put myself to the test against
someone who can defend developed ideas but I don't want to have
to make the pro case as well as refute it. That takes way too much
time.

 ---------------------------
>
> >
> >You haven't really engaged with *any* key "how to" engineering
> > problems
> >at all.
> >
> ### I engaged:
>
> - how to freeze
>
> - how to collect information
>
> and I hinted at how the information could be used. What other key
> engineering problems do you see here?
>
> -----------------------------------
>
> >>I could come up with some ballpark
> >>estimates of the file sizes, numbers of antibodies, speed of laser
> >>machining, but these are all mere technical details (nothing that would
> >>be unreasonably expensive or time-consuming, as far as I can tell).
> >>
> >>
> >
> >"as far as I can tell" is a very big statement. Unless you wade into the
> >problem space with a serious engineering frame of mind you aren't even
> >starting to think about the sort of engineering problems that you'd have
> >to solve.
> >
> >
> ### OK, you have about 1700 cubic centimeters of tissue (actually less
> if you can find methods for substituting generic information for some
> subcortical brain areas not involved in personal episodic memories, the
> main type of memories I want to have analyzed). At a resolution of 50
> cubic nanometers (more than sufficient to show synapses) there would be
> 13.6 x 10^12 voxels. The imaging procedure would need to reliably image
> probably no less than 70% of synaptic connections (given the known
> redundancy of the brain, but Anders could perhaps give us more details),
> and estimate the synaptic strengths to within 10% of their true values
> (there is some degree of drift of synaptic strengths in the living
> brain, which means you don't need to be very precise in measuring, but
> exactly how much you can drift and still get largely the same behavioral
> effects is unknown). The range of values for synaptic strength should
> not be significantly above 8-bit depth. Given that there are many
> hundreds of types of synapses, the actual number of bits per voxel might
> be as high 20 to 25. Some of the data would be needed to describe
> cellular membranous structures, as well as post-translationally modified
> proteins. All in all the uncompressed image of the structural substrate
> of personality might be on the order of 10^20 bit. This is only a few
> thousand petabytes, not an unreasonable data volume to work on in 20
> years from now. The computing capacity needed to transform this
> uncompressed image into a functionally equivalent neural network
> simulation is quite large by today's standards, but given the estimates
> of Moravec, the processing power needed to actually run the neural
> network is unlikely to be many orders of magnitude more than 100
> teraflops/s, a capacity available even now.
>
> Criticize technically now, please : )

Not now.

But if you write a paper yourself I will undertake to discuss yours
with you. If you get Fahy's and/or Merkles and adapt them enough
to make them your own. Same deal.  If you put yours on the net
I'd be happy to attack it on the net. Attack it with a view to shaking
the truth out so that we could both see what the truth is.

>From my point of view Slawomir has made his case. The sort of
pattern preserving but not process preserving cryonics your aiming
at wouldn't interest me anyway in itself. But I am interested because
of the implications for nanomedicine. I've already explored this space
to a fair extent and I'd be happy to get some proper closure for my
efforts by nailing a bad cryonics meme once and for all.

But the quick sketch your putting up isn't substantive enough for
me to feel like I've dealt with the meme at its strongest.

Regards,
Brett