A view on cryonics (was Re: [extropy-chat] Bad Forecasts!)

[Brett Paatsch]

Eliezer Yudkowsky wrote:


> Slawomir Paliwoda wrote:
> >
> > Suppose the location of any mind in the future is recorded using 4
> > parameters (x,y,z,t). At the moment of creation, my clone's mind will
> > necessarily occupy a different location than my original mind.
Therefore, I
> > will be able to prove my originality by presenting a log detailing
> > locations of my mind in space and time, which will show different values
for
> > x, y, z, and t from the values of someone who claims to be me. As long
as I
> > can show that the set of space-time position parameters for any two
minds
> > never share the same exact values, I will always be able to prove
identity
> > of any mind.
>
> This definition is trivial to deflate.  Just suppose that we interlace two
> sets of neurons and synapses, neither interconnected with the other, but
> both occupying the same volume of space.

I don't want to be rude in interjecting, but I'll do it anyway because I
like the
idea that a good idea can catch on because its a good idea. So I want to see
if I can work within Slawomir system to rebut the challenges.

I think the rebuttal to this is trivial. They are not actually occupying the
same space simply by being interlaced. Interlace the fingers of your
two hands and each hand including fingers each still has its own space
- the space beneath the skin.

>  Better yet, suppose that we run
> two minds on the same neurons, the neurons having time-sharing registers
> that swap between the two identities twenty times per second.  How does
> your spatial algorithm distinguish between these two minds?

Its not only a spatial algorithm. Its a space-time one. Different minds
would
exist only for so long as they occupy the substrate uninterrupted (ie,
between
the switching periods). This is a quirky situation but then the scenario
Eliezer
is proposing is quirky.

> Try to solve this problem and you will instantly be entangled in defining
> continuity of computation, which is, of course, what uploading and
> splitting is all about.

I see no problem.

> I would also be interested in hearing how you deal with many-worlds
theory,
> under which "you" are constantly branching into different volumes of
> quantum configuration space, even as you remain in what an observer in a
> certain exactly right frame of reference would deem to be the "same"
> spatial location.

I will leave this one for Slawomir, I don't regard many-worlds theory as
something that needs to be accomodated or is worth accomodating.

Many-worlds theory looks like new age nonsense to me. As if William
of Occam ideas never existed in the worlds of many-worlders.

Brett