[extropy-chat] The statement that there is no truth, if true, is false (Was Your Mom and the Machine)

Jef Allbright jef at jefallbright.net
Sat Apr 2 01:37:22 UTC 2005


john-c-wright at sff.net wrote:

>Mr. Allbright opines: 
>"My point was that "truth" (in scare quotes 
>because all knowledge is subjective, approximate and contingent) must be 
>grounded in the measurable evidence of our senses (and their 
>extensions), and to the extent that any observation is not thus 
>grounded, it must be discounted."
>
>  
>
<snip>

>Now, perhaps the writer in his short parenthetical simply did not have time to
>add all these lawyerly conditions and qualifications. Fair enough. But if these
>additional qualifications were meant to be implied by the writer, and we are
>supposed to assume them, then the statement should read: "Most knowledge, from
>my point of view, under certain circumstances, is subjective, approximate, and
>contingent, more or less: but there is other knowledge or other conditions where
>this is not the case, perhaps." 
>  
>
My intent is not to try to form and communicate perfectly unambiguous 
statements of truth, for such efforts are inherently futile.  My intent 
is to convey a rather novel and pragmatic way of looking at morality, 
based on a few concepts, simple in themselves, but which I haven't 
otherwise seen brought together in this way.  Three of these key 
concepts pertain to (1) nested scopes of context, (2) the non-discrete 
nature of Self, and (3) the observation that for any given context, and 
for any given Self, what "works" is considered to be good, and what 
"works" over a greater context is considered to be better.

I realized the futility of arguing beliefs long ago, when I was about 
eight years old, and idealistically and naively thought that I could 
illuminate [what appeared to me] logical inconsistencies I found in the 
Bible, and that people would thank me for freeing their minds to see 
[what I think of as] the bigger picture.  Nowadays, my intention is not 
to convince, but to perhaps plant a seed, with the hope that this may 
contribute to our mutual exploration and growth.

While attention was focused on the incompleteness of my statement that 
"all knowledge is subjective, approximate, and contingent", I'm afraid 
my main point was lost -- again due in no small part to my tersity -- 
the point being that *all* subjective input should be considered, but 
then weighted according to its [ultimately subjective] grounding in 
empirically verifiable "reality".

I did try to avoid protracted discussion of this position when I said 
this is essentially a statement of my *belief* in the scientific 
approach to knowledge.  I am aware of various philosophical approachs 
attacking this belief system, all of which can be argued endlessly.

Onward, I hope, to seed-planting.


>Stated this way, the statement cannot be used as the major premise to support
>the surrounding argument.If most but not all knowledge is subjective and
>contingent, and if there is at least some objective and absolute knowledge, then
>it does not follow that all truths must be grounded in measurable evidence of
>our senses: knowledge which is objective and absolute is true regardless of what
>the senses report. If you think you see twice two apples equal five apples,
>check your eyes, not your math. 
>
>I note in passing that the statement "all truths must be grounded in measurable
>evidence of our senses" is offered to us as an absolute and objective principle,
>and no experiment or observation is given to support it. This statement is a
>principle of Epistemology, and metaphysical statement, and no possible empirical
>test can prove or disprove it. 
>  
>
As it appears that we both agree with the previous sentence, I would 
suggest no further time and effort be spent on arguing the point.

>Ironically, all this is true about EMPIRICAL statements. They are subjective to
>the point of view of the observer; they depend on the observed data; they are
>approximate to the tolerance of the observer and his instruments.  
>
>One need only try to imagine the conditions under which self-evident statements
>are false ("Opposite angles are equal"; "Reality is real"; or "This sentence
>contains five words") to realize the logical impossibility of all knowledge
>being subjective. Any statement whose denial entails a logical contradiction is
>true under all conditions and circumstances, that is, self-evident.  Any
>statement whose affirmation entails a logical contradiction is false under all
>conditions and circumstances, that is, self-refuting. 
>  
>
It can be demonstrated and argued that any of the above "self-evident" 
examples may be contingent.  This can be argued on the basis of 
expanding the domain of the problem.  It can be argued on the basis of 
expanding the domain of the Self making the judgment of the validity of 
the statement.  It can even be argued from a purely solipsist 
perspective.  I don't want to go there -- it gets ugly -- but I stand by 
my statement that we, as subsets of the natural world, do not possess 
the privledged vantage point of being able to objectively pass judgment 
on the validity of our sensory input or our processing of same.


>He says: "Note that I am being pragmatic by not postulating a universal morality
>." but then continues in a mental exercise where he himself displays the moral
>values of truthfulness, prudence and philosophical integrity, even (if he fears
>dispute) courage. Whether he is intellectually convinced that there is an
>objective morality or not, he, and all other people who honestly discuss this
>question, ACT as if there is an objective morality. At may be that, from the
>God's eye view, there is no such thing as an objective morality, but if all
>rational minds are required to make the categorical assumption that such a thing
>exists even to engage in the effort of disputing it, then, for all practical
>purposes, morality is objective.
>
Strangely, there's a mix of misunderstandings here [in my opinion] 
including an inversion of one of my points. I'll try to respond to them 
in the order in which they appear.

John C. Wright says:
"Whether he is intellectually convinced that there is an objective morality or not, he, and all other people who honestly discuss this question, ACT as if there is an objective morality."

I'm glad you see my behavior as moral, because it confirms that my efforts to behave morally are perceivably working. But I don't see this as reflecting the existence of an objective morality, in fact some of my moral beliefs contradict those of a large portion of the population.  For example, I don't see homosexuality as being "wrong" in the traditional sense.  I don't see abortion as "wrong" in the traditional sense.  I may argue that these behaviors may be bad to the extent that they "don't work" in a given context, but I certainly don't see that they can be considered good or bad in an objective sense [meaning apparent to all observers].  I don't see that I'm acting as if there's an objective morality, but I certainly see that I'm acting as if some behaviors work better than other behaviors.

John C. Wright says:
"At may be that, from the God's eye view, there is no such thing as an objective morality..."

On the contrary, I argue that from the God's eye view, morality is in fact objective.  However this ultimate view is only approachable, but not obtainable.



> 
>
>I note also that writers on morality cannot invent a new moral code any more
>than they can invent a new primary color. Moral debate consists of arguing which
>of competing principles should be given greater weight, or in coming up with
>novel arguments to support moral maxims which are themselves as old as time. 
>
My theory doesn't provide absolute moral answers, but it claims that 
there is a rational basis for finding increasingly moral answers.

>  
>
>Mr. Allbright says: "I say that we can all agree that what works over a wider
>context is better than what works over a narrower context." 
>
>I am tempted to agree, but I wonder if I know what I am agreeing to. We can all
>agree on formal grounds to define "better" to mean "works better", but we must
>be very skeptical of each other's definition of "works better." Works better for
>whom?
>
Works better for Self.  "Better" is inherently subjective [meaning 
dependent on the observer].  Self means that with which one identifies.  
One may be acting as an individual, or as a family, or as a team, but in 
any case, what is "good" is what works for that Self.  The Self couldn't 
possibly have value judgments any other way.

> Works better with what end in mind?
>  
>
Anything that subjectively promotes Self.  I tend to call this Growth, 
but it's a bit misleading appropriation of a common word and I need to 
think of a better way to encapsulate the concept.  At the core is the 
idea that Self is a structure and from the subjective point of view of 
Self, anything that is good will increase the complexity of the 
structure in a way that extends Self.  [I apologize.  This last is 
probably terse to the point of meaninglessness, and I've run out of time 
to write for the next few days due to travel.]

<snip>

>"A greater and more likely near-term danger is that a human individual or group 
>will utilize the superhuman cognitive power of such a machine for immoral
>purposes (purposes that may appear to work for his own relatively narrow
>context, but don't work well over a larger context of actors, interactions, or
>time.)  Our best defense in such a scenario will be the wide dispersal of such
>intelligence amplification in the service of the broader population."
>
>I agree with this in principle, but would tend to emphasize moral maturity over
>intellectual augmentation. 
>  
>
Just a brief comment for now, perhaps more later.  I see us achieving 
moral maturity by developing and practicing principles of cooperative 
interaction, which, as the context increases (in terms of the actors, 
the complexity of the interactions between them, and the quantity of 
interactions (time)), leads us to doing things that work, over 
ever-increasing contexts, and that, we will increasingly agree, is good.

I apologize for rushing through this at this time.

- Jef
http://www.jefallbright.net




More information about the extropy-chat mailing list