[extropy-chat] In defense of moral relativism

[Giu1i0 Pri5c0]

I believe one should help old ladies to cross the street.

But I don't think I can justify this in terms of any absolute,
objective, or whatever morality.
The universe, as we presently know and understand it, does not seem to
care about old ladies. Others may say, well the old lady is past
reproductive age and probably has nothing left to contribute to the
biological or memetic evolution of the human race. She is consuming or
holding resources that should be given to younger generations. Her
flat should be given to a younger person who can still have children
or develop breakthrough ideas. The money of her pension should be put
to a productive use. Ergo, the moral thing to do is NOT helping her to
cross the street: the sooner she is killed by a car, the better.

I think this is bullshit. Can I prove that it is bullshit in terms of
any absolute, objective, or whatever morality? No. Do I lose any sleep
on not being able to prove it? Definitely no. I just don't care. I
have chosen to help old ladies to cross the street, and to hold
kindness to others as a basic value. It is a choice, not something
that I can (or want to) prove.

To make an analogy, there is no "correct" geometry. 3D geometries in
which the 3D space of physics is equivalent to a plane (high school
Euclidean geometry), or a sphere, or a saddle, or a torus, or even
stranger things, have equal citizen rights in the world of mathematics
and asking which one is correct makes no sense. One may ask which one
corresponds to the physical world, but modern science is beginning to
uncover that even this question makes little sense. Different
geometries are "the best" in different situations - Euclidean geometry
is the best to design a bridge, but Riemannian geometry is the best to
study a black hole. The key concept is not truth, or correctness, but
usefulness: the useful question to ask is not what is the true
geometry, but what is the most useful geometry for a given
application.

I think the same can be said of morals: don't ask what is the right
thing to do, ask what is the best thing to do. Of course then you will
have to accept values as a given (otherwise, best for what?), but I
don't see anything bad with this.

Eliezer asks, "How do you rally people to fight for the idea that
nothing is worth fighting for?". But moral relativism does not say
that nothing is worth fighting for. It simply acknowledges that "worth
fighting for" is a value judgment which depends on many factors and
may vary according to circumstances. You still fight for your ideas,
but acknowledging that you are fighting for your ideas and not for The
Truth. Then perhaps you can keep things in perspective and avoid
committing atrocities in defense of your ideas.

This is, indeed, the main reason why I don't like the very concepts of
absolute truth, or objective morality: the "I Am The Champion Of The
Truth" stance leads to gassing people for thinking different.

In summary, I think Pope Benedict was right to identify moral
relativism as the worse enemy of the Church's dogmatic, inflexible and
intolerant approach to morality, and that we should openly support
moral relativism.