[extropy-chat] Re: intelligent design homework

[Robert Lindauer]

ben wrote:

> >On a completely unrelated topic:
> You bring up this 'necessary being' stuff, and it seems to be based on 
> some very dodgy logic:
>
> "Why are there necessary beings?
>
> Consider the possibility that it's true that "nothing exists".
> Then there exists the truth of that statement, consequently,
> necessarily, something exists."
>
> Well, this is obviously not true, so the rest of it is pretty 
> meaningless:
>
> "Consider the possibility that it's true that "nothing exists".
> Then there exists ... "
>
> Nothing!
>
> If it's true that nothing exists, then nothing exists, nothing to 
> produce the statement, therefore no statement, no truth of it, nothing.
>
> Of course, it's *not* true that nothing exists, so any 'consequences' 
> that could be derived from the fact of nothing existing (consequences 
> which couldn't, by definition, exist anwyay), are not relevant.
>
> In fact, i think it's fair to say that there is *no* possibility that 
> "nothing exists", and that's as far as any consideration of the matter 
> can go.


Quite exactly right, you seem to have gotten the jist of the argument.  
The assumtion that there -could be- nothing can be proved false by 
reductio ad absurdum.  Hence, necessarily, something exists.

> All you have here is one of those paradoxical sentences, along the 
> lines of "everything i say is a lie". It can't be true.


Exactly.

> Effectively, it's a useless statement.


No, it just isn't used always the way you expect.  It's obviously a very 
useful sentence.

> Any philosophical system built upon it is completely illusory.


The tradition of proof by reduction is at the heart of mathematics.  If 
you wish to throw all of mathematics out the window at the same time, be 
my guest.

> The only sense i can make of this is that it's a (very bad) attempt to 
> rationalise a preconceived idea that lacks any logical basis. This is 
> supported by the question "Why are there necessary beings?". It 
> presupposes that there are such things, and that such a question makes 
> any sense in the first place.


No, the proof that there are necessary beings comes from the fact that 
the supposition that there is nothing is contradictory, hence, 
necessarily, something exists.  Those things that exists -necessarily- 
we call necessary beings.

The posing of the question "why are their necessary beings?" has two 
inflections.  One is a causal question which I've called a category 
error - like asking why there is a number one (in fact, there's one 
right there).  The other is a demand for proof which is given.

>
> >God is a necessary being, not contingent.  Your question is a 
> category error like: "what causes there to be a number six?"


>
> The question "what causes there to be a number six" is a perfectly 
> valid question with a perfectly good answer. We invented it, because 
> it's useful.


That's one common answer, but it doesn't jibe with quite a lot of 
mathematics.  In fact, as I understand it, very few mathematicians are 
philosophically anti-realist.  This would be akin to the anti-realist 
interpretation in physics - "there are no sub-atomic particles" is like 
"there are no numbers" (what you appear to be referring to are numerals 
or something that we in fact -did- create). 

Think of it this way.  Say there is a specific frequency of light that 
you're interested in talking about.  Try to specify which frequency of 
light and consequently what you're talking about without using 
number-properties of the object you're trying to describe.  There's 
actually an admirable attempt at this by Hartry Field, but his success 
is rather doubtful as a program.  The upshot - no numbers, no physics 
either.

>
> The number six is an abstraction, not a thing in itself. It's a mental 
> tool (part of one, anyway) for understanding the world.


Everything is something.   The distinction between a "thing" and a "not 
a thing-in-itself" is arbitrary.  And anyway, this is as likely to be 
true as the hypothesis that there is no such thing as solidity or 
visibility or the color blue.

> This reminds me of an old episode of Dr Who, where somebody builds a 
> machine that can generate the maths that 'underlies all reality', so 
> therefore can produce any kind of reality. Even as a kid, it was 
> obvious to me that this was rubbish, because maths *models* reality, 
> it doesn't 'underlie' it in any real way, any more than a map produces 
> the territory it represents.


Maps are real and in order for them to be useful they must pick out real 
properties of real things in the real world.  Numerals are like maps - 
they are obviously real.  The real properties in the real world (e.g. 
their numerical properties) are like the geography that the map describes.

>
> You may argue that i'm confusing the map with the territory, that 
> 'sixness' existed before somebody invented the number. 'Sixness' 
> doesn't mean anything on it's own, though. 'Six rocks' does, but 'six' 
> doesn't.


3 + 5 = 8 -2 = 6

I agree with you that numbers only make sense inasmuch as they are 
considered as possible properties of real things, but this just means 
that they're properties of real things, and consequently themselves 
real.  Just like the hardness of the sidewalk.

> In other words, rocks existed, then somebody came along and counted 
> six of them, thus creating sixness, *in his head*.


So there aren't really 6 rocks?

> That's the only place sixness exists.


But what about the rocks, aren't there six of them?

> I think this is a fundamental problem for a lot of people, who confuse 
> what's in their head with what's not. This is probably how you get 
> gods in the first place. So, in that sense, i would agree with you, 
> that 'god' is in the same category as 'six'.


Well, if numbers are -in your head- in that sense, then I daresay every 
concept we use to describe reality can be whisked away equally well, 
leaving you with an entire world 'in your head'. 

Robbie Lindauer