[extropy-chat] effing

[gts]

On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 16:42:33 -0500, Brent Allsop <allsop at extropy.org>  
wrote:

>> Is the red quale a phenomenal property of red light (in which case it  
>> is universal)? Or is it a property of the neural correlates of seeing  
>> red (in which case it may be different for each person)?

> ...you could put a person in room with no light, stimulate his visual  
> cortex appropriately - and he will experience red.

I take this to mean you think red is a phenomenal property of the neural  
correlates of seeing red, which leaves open the question of how we can  
ever know if A sees red like B sees it. I suspect brains are as unique as  
fingerprints.

But if the red quale is a property of red objects, or in Locke's terms a  
secondary quality of red objects, then there is something we can call the  
"absolute red quale". Our job would then be a matter of duplicating that  
quale in two or more people.

>> Locke called them "secondary qualities". (Same thing, Brent?)
>
> No, people like Locke and so many others that worked so hard to argue  
> about direct perception and such were just idiots

John Locke was an idiot? :) Actually I think his thoughts on this subject  
might be helpful.

>  qualia do not "operate in a special way on our senses."

That was not his meaning. Locke meant that objects with secondary  
qualities "operate in a special way on our senses" i.e., that secondary  
qualities of objects produce qualia.

For example "whiteness" is not an *intrinsic* or *primary* quality of  
snow. After all snow is made of clear water and ice.

But white is still a quality of snow, because snow *looks* white. Locke  
calls that a secondary quality of snow.

He viewed secondary qualities (and tertiary qualities, not very relevant  
here) as *powers* of objects. Secondary qualities are the powers of  
objects to produce qualia in the experience of an observer. If they exist  
in any absolute sense then maybe true effing would be possible.

-gts