[extropy-chat] A third extropic path

[Jef Allbright]

On 12/18/05, Robert Bradbury <robert.bradbury at gmail.com> wrote:

>  One of the reasons I consider myself to be an "extropian" is because I
> consider there to be relatively inherent value in the information which
> involved in the exploration of the phase space of reality, existence, life,
> etc.

We might need to distinguish information from data, and organization
from complexity.

> The development of the laws of science, the exploration of the
> universe we (in theory) live in, the forms of "life" it may support, etc.
> all fall within the exploration of the phase space.  IMO, there is less
> value in the rediscovery of phase space which has already been explored and
> more value in extending the boundaries of the known phase space or
> discovering completely unknown phase space.  This can be viewed as an
> information science axiom -- "more bits are good".

As long as the additional bit provide significant additional utility,
and acknowledging that there is a cost/benefit tradeoff, however
small.

Fundamental question: In general, what is the relative value of
archived information compared to new leading edge information, given
negligible storage cost but significant constraints on processing
capacity?  I suspect that data that is not organized and utilized
fairly soon will tend to vanish like raindrops in a flood, recoverable
in principle but never in practice.

> This can then be
> extended when one gets into subjective analysis to -- "better bits are even
> *more* good".  But the question, as recent political discussions suggest is
> *who* defines "better?"

What is "better" is certainly subjective, but those elements which are
valued over a greater scope of subjective agents, types of
interactions, and greater span of time, tend to be seen as
increasingly "good" as they approach objective status.

> I have tended to use survival/preservation of the
> bits as an overall priority in my life with the value judgements of the
> usefullness of bits to be something to be determined in the future in
> specific environmental instances [1].

This thinking appears to be incomplete or ambiguous, since actions
taken in the present imply a value judgment in the present.  (I'm
probably nit-picking here, since I understand you necessarily have an
a priori estimate of the general overall value of this data, based on
your expectations that some portion of it will eventually become
useful information.)

>  I will try to make this brief but it really involves a complex analysis.
> Historically one may view longevity, lifespan extension, etc. as wanting to
> preserve "currently active" bits.

Preserve bits, or grow from them? (Red Queen principle.)

> There is of course the survival instinct
> (genetic program) at work in each individual in this.  In fact the
> biochemistry involved seems to suggest that if one does not keep it active
> one gradually may lose the bits (e.g. use it or lose it).  Cryonics has
> traditionally largely been viewed as a transitory state (i.e. one preserves
> the bits until one can return them to an active state).
>
>  Now, this raises the question of a third option -- "Would you be willing to
> bequeth your bits but retain your 'self'?"

This is problematic, since "examining" the bits is actually a form of
processing them, and the difference between actually "running the
consciousness" of that stored brain and merely "processing the
information" stored within diminishes as the knowledge, thoughts,
insights, values of the stored self are transferred to a new dynamic
medium (the examiner) whose future actions are now determined to some
extent by what has been transferred.

>
>  I.e. One would preserve the bits within a brain, allow them to be available
> for perusal, etc. but never allow/enable the reactivation of the individual
> "consciousness".  With cryonics and nanobot enabled selective information
> extraction and/or uploading this should be possible.  This would to some
> extent satisfy the wishes of the people outlined above in that they would
> never know/experience the perceptions of their love ones and never again
> experience the pain of the loss of friends but at the same time preserve
> their knowledge (bits) which at this time cannot effectively be "outloaded".
>
>  This has interesting bearing on capital punishment perspectives -- i.e. one
> preserves the knowledge of an individual but never allows them to "run" off
> of it again (i.e. one is "suspended" permanently).

This could be very practical, given the forfeiture of individual
rights implied in such a situation, and the advantages to society of
examining the previously hidden information bearing on issues of
concern to society at large.

>
>  Now, where this tends to get interesting from my perspective involves the
> question of the extent to which one can "backtrack".  If I have the DNA of
> RJB, and I have the frozen brain contents of RJB, and I have written, audio,
> video and individual subjective impressions of RJB *and* I have a lot of CPU
> cycles and bit storage at my disposal -- how difficult is it *really*(?) to
> resurrect RjB?  Even if one does not "run" the best approximation a cryonic
> reanimation can produce it would seem that one could backtrack from the
> public information to "me".  (This thought line is in part due to the fact
> that they are currently putting Cave Bears, Wooly Mammoths and Neanderthals
> back together -- and we are very far from the limits physics and simulations
> would seem to allow.)  If one knocks out one or more components of the above
> list one simply gets a less accurate resurrection.  But you can consider
> this to be kind of an extended Turing Test -- how many components and to
> what extent would they have to be removed before one knows it is *not* RjB.
>
>  So it begs some questions... Should we bring Sasha back?  And if so, to
> what extent?

So it becomes a moral question, and all questions of morality are
decided by the living.

We can see that, in general, greater information (about ourselves and
about how things work) leads to better decision-making and better
results.  For this reason, it would seem that reasonable people would
tend to want to leave the benefit of their knowledge and wisdom for
others to use, even if they chose to die, or otherwise abandon or
change the form of their consciousness beyond the likelihood of future
contact.  This would be considered "reasonable" since one would do so
with the expectation that others would do the same, to the general
benefit of all.

On the other hand, it can be demonstrated that self-determination is a
fundamental moral good (in order to be able to freely decide about
anything) so if--no matter how irrational it may seem--an agent
decided to terminate itself with the intention of being irretrievable,
it seems that such a wish should be respected, if the living
understood that such wish was well considered and "freely" made. 
["Freely" is understood to mean within the conventional context of
valid free will, and not intended to provoke the argument over
determinism and free-will.]

And now, to your specific question -- and I'll repeat, moral decisions
are necessarily made by the living -- a reasonable person might be
likely to assess Sasha's state at the time of his decision as one of
great pain and lacking the freedom to alleviate it, therefore his
decision was not made "freely" as conventionally understood. 
Therefore, the "right" thing to do would be to revive him to a
pain-free state and give him another chance to decide.

This discussion opens the floodgate to a wide range of speculation,
but I hope I have stayed close to the intent of your post.

- Jef