[extropy-chat] Qualia Bet

[Jef Allbright]

On 12/25/05, gts <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Sun, 25 Dec 2005 15:52:44 -0500, Jef Allbright <jef at jefallbright.net>
> wrote:
>
> >> The answer to Chalmers' question is "Nobody knows." I suppose we should
> >> just leave it at that.
> >
> > It may indeed be wise to "just leave it at that" with regard to email
> > discussion, but in the larger context of increasing scientific
> > knowledge it's a puzzle worth solving because this understanding
> > creates a new bridge toward greater understanding.
>
> I'm glad to see you appreciate the problem, Jef. I was thinking perhaps
> it's time to put this thread to bed, but I agree it is an extremely
> important question, with relevance to strong AI.
>
> Can we build machines capable of real subjective emotion and experience?
> Or are we limited to building nothing more than glorified unconscious
> calculators with only the outward appearance of consciousness?
>
> What is the trick to making matter become aware? Or is all matter already
> fundamentally aware as I speculate?
>
> > There is a simple and obvious answer to Chalmers' "hard problem", but
> > it is so non-intuitive, and so lacking support within the culture and
> > the language that many people just can't widen back enough to resolve
> > the apparent paradox.
>
> I'm listening.

I've tried and failed repeatedly to convey this understanding in the
space of one or several emails.  Others such as Daniel Dennett and 
Thomas Metzinger have written clearly and extensively at a popular
level of comprehensibility, but I have observed very few examples of
people "switching camps" and getting that "aha" of more encompassing
understanding -- that the subjective experience is more coherently
understood as a result of the workings of the system, not a mysterious
intrinsic quality of the system or its parts -- and that this
understanding enriches, rather than diminishes those who understand
it, facilitating further steps along the road of illusion and paradox
including the nature of "self", "free will", "morality" and then
onward to more effective forms of social decision-making.

I suspect a better approach to conveying this understanding would be
as a succession of puzzles, each one apparantly paradoxical at first
sight, but resolving with the comprehension of a more encompassing
context within which the parts are seen to fit.  I'm considering
proceeding with this approach, but currently lack sufficient time
beyond that for career and family.

- Jef