[extropy-chat] Science and Fools (was: unidirectional thrust)

[Hal Finney]

Brett writes:
> I guess I'm saying, I think that we'd each acknowledge we have an
> *interest* in avoiding dying and in finding out if that is possible via some
> particular way or other. And I think that we'd each have an interest in
> making the truth on such questions as "can cryonics work?" better
> *known* (if such is possible) than they currently are. I don't mean that
> any of us are fanatical about our positions. I think none of us are 
> fanatical.

Fair enough.

> I'm wondering if you can see that there is no point to trying to answer the
> question unless at least two of us, one from either side of the proposition
> would be willing to accept the decision of a judging organisation.
>
> My purpose here is somewhat "meta".  I'm interested in using cryonics
> as an example, and some slightly known to me different positions on it
> (yours, Robins, Damien's) as a sort of test to see if people whom I think
> respect each other yet hold different views can even in principle come
> up with a judgeable betting procedure on something like this.

I think what you're saying is, the disagreement is not so much about the
probability that a cryonics revivee could pass some such objective test.
The disagreement is more fundamental, and is about the very nature of
the cryonics question - is it one which can be answered by an objective
test even in principle?

With this kind of difference, you could imagine two people who would
agree about every objective, third-party-measurable experiment that could
be made regarding the issue; yet they would still have a disagreement
about what was going on, a disagreement which would lead to their taking
different actions.

If this is what you're getting at, I agree that these kinds of differences
do exist among people.  It's not just questions of the philosophy of
consciousness, as in this case, but we also see such disagreements
on matters of religion and spirituality.  Damien has pointed to
sophisticated versions of religion which don't require miracles in
the sense of exceptions to the laws of physics, but which nevertheless
recognize a role for a divine presence.  A believer in such a religion
might agree with an atheist on every question of measurement in the
physical world, yet they could have serious disagreements that would
lead to very different actions.

One way to analyze this situation is in the context of decision theory.
Decision theory says that we make decisions to maximize the expected
utility of the resulting world.  Utility is a measure of how much we
like the outcome, and expected utility is a probabilistic, weighted
average over the possible outcomes of our actions and the utility of
each such outcome.  We take the action which is most likely to lead
to the outcome with the best utility, averaged over all the possible
outcomes of our actions.

In this context, a disagreement of this type is one where the parties
agree about the physical facts, they agree about the probabilities,
but they have different utility functions.  They differ on how happy
they are with various outcomes.  It is these differences of utility,
rather than disagreements on facts, which lead to different actions.

The question then becomes, are these differences of utility estimates
something to worry about, and to try to resolve?  Or are they purely
matters of taste, aspects of our individuality where we should welcome
differences?

Reason is a tool.  It is a means to an end, not an end in itself.  Reason
helps you to estimate the probabilities and to improve understanding
about the world.  It guides you to the truth.  But what you do with
that truth is up to you.  Reason can help you achieve your goals, but it
does not create your goals, any more than a mathematical system creates
its own axioms.  Your utility function, your preferences, your tastes,
exist outside of the framework of reason.  Differences in these matters
are not factual disagreements, and should not lead to the same kinds of
questions and concerns as when people apply reason differently.

Hal