[extropy-chat] Re: cryonics (was: Science and Fools)
Slawomir Paliwoda
velvethum at hotmail.com
Sat Mar 26 23:25:38 UTC 2005
Brett wrote:
> We can lose cells and still have enough to sustain a sense of self
> but we can't lose too many of any particular sort of cell.
(Excuse my use of concepts and terms presented in my previous post.)
Self is a unique trajectory of a unique pattern of mind-producing activity
of matter in space and time.
I like to think of the unique trajectory of matter that implements original
instance of mind structure (pattern of mind-producing activity of matter in
space-time) as a "container" for possibly infinite number of types of mind
structure. I also like to think of mind structure as playing the role of a
"liquid" in a complete liquid-in-a-container analogy.
The loss of cells affects only mind structure. Unique trajectory of matter
that implements that mind structure is orthogonal to the loss. In other
words, even though we poured some liquid out, the container still exists and
holds the liquid. But does self survive? The answer depends, among other
things, on the degree to which the pattern of activity of mind-producing
matter has been altered (this is what I think Hal Finney is talking about).
We should care more about pattern of activity (mind structure) than pattern
of neurons (brain structure) because mind structure offers far superior map
of what mind is than brain structure.
Even though brain structure is subject to constant alterations, the
essential mind structure is the same which is why our selves are preserved
from the time we fall asleep to when we wake up. This is where it would be
appropriate to mention something about tolerance and thresholds, concepts
that deal with measuring whether self is preserved during alterations to its
mind structure, but I fear this particular aspect of identity theory is too
complicated for presentation on a mailing list. Let's just say for now that
the degree to which mind structure gets altered during sleep or when we lose
small amount of neuronal connections isn't significant enough to affect
identity of mind structure.
Slawomir
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