[extropy-chat] Re: cryonics (was: Science and Fools)

Slawomir Paliwoda velvethum at hotmail.com
Sat Mar 26 23:25:38 UTC 2005


Brett wrote:
> We can lose cells and still have enough to sustain a sense of self
> but we can't lose too many of any particular sort of cell.

(Excuse my use of concepts and terms presented in my previous post.)

Self is a unique trajectory of a unique pattern of mind-producing activity 
of matter in space and time.

I like to think of the unique trajectory of matter that implements original 
instance of mind structure (pattern of mind-producing activity of matter in 
space-time) as a "container" for possibly infinite number of types of mind 
structure. I also like to think of mind structure as playing the role of a 
"liquid" in a complete liquid-in-a-container analogy.

The loss of cells affects only mind structure. Unique trajectory of matter 
that implements that mind structure is orthogonal to the loss. In other 
words, even though we poured some liquid out, the container still exists and 
holds the liquid. But does self survive? The answer depends, among other 
things, on the degree to which the pattern of activity of mind-producing 
matter has been altered (this is what I think Hal Finney is talking about).

We should care more about pattern of activity (mind structure) than pattern 
of neurons (brain structure) because mind structure offers far superior map 
of what mind is than brain structure.

Even though brain structure is subject to constant alterations, the 
essential mind structure is the same which is why our selves are preserved 
from the time we fall asleep to when we wake up. This is where it would be 
appropriate to mention something about tolerance and thresholds, concepts 
that deal with measuring whether self is preserved during alterations to its 
mind structure, but I fear this particular aspect of identity theory is too 
complicated for presentation on a mailing list. Let's just say for now that 
the degree to which mind structure gets altered during sleep or when we lose 
small amount of neuronal connections isn't significant enough to affect 
identity of mind structure.

Slawomir 



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