[extropy-chat] In defense of moral standards (Was: In defense of moral relativism)

Jeff Medina analyticphilosophy at gmail.com
Wed May 4 23:15:38 UTC 2005

1. The context of the quote you provided indicates he's talking about
morality. E.g., "moral relativism does not say [...]"; "It [moral
relativism] simply acknowledges [...]"; "I don't like the very
concepts of absolute truth, or objective morality" (contrast this last
snippet with the multiple references to "absolute or objective
morality" in earlier posts by various discussion participants... but
see 2 for an alternative if you don't feel like interpreting 'absolute
truth' as 'absolute moral truth' based on the context.)

2. Opposition to absolute truth, on at least one plausible reading
(epistemological, rather than metaphysical), is something you yourself
readily and vigorously defend. It is the equivalent of assigning a
probability or credence of 1 to a proposition, and known variously by
such terms as "epistemological infallibilism," "faith," and "unbridled
While it's possible the alternative reading (that Giulio is opposing
the idea of absolute metaphysical truth, or absolute physical reality)
is what was meant, that seems such an obvious intellectual error to me
that, based on Giulio's evidenced comprehension of other issues in the
past, I give him the benefit of the doubt as to which interpretation
he intended.

Jeffrey A. Medina
Research Fellow, Institute for Ethics & Emerging Technologies:
Volunteer Coordinator, Singularity Institute for Artificial
Intelligence: http://www.singinst.org/
Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, University of London:

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