[extropy-chat] I keep asking myself...

[A B]

Hi Hal,
   
  I suppose I meant the question in the non-semantic sense; I meant it in the substantive/factual sense. I guess, the opinion I was trying to present, in a round-about way, was that the identity (the *me*) must reside as something additional to *strictly* the 'pattern' of mind-information (although I think this is also a critical component). Because if the 'pattern' was entirely sufficient to establish identity/me, then I would expect to wake as a hive-mind once several perfect copies were made of my vitrified brain. But, I agree, the hive-mind seems very unlikely; this is why I think that the 'pattern' isn't the *whole* story behind identity or *me-ness*. 
   
  And to backtrack a little, my belief that the hive-mind effect would not occur, is why I would consider the mistreatment of "copies" as unethical - because, although the copy looks and acts and perhaps thinks just like me, it is not a real component of my own mind (what would be the hive-mind) and so should be regarded as a separate conscious life that should be respected, IMO.
   
  I don't have a clue how this could be proven scientifically. But, I could throw out some ideas that I have no buisness talking about (due to lack of knowledge) :-) Perhaps a truly 'perfect' copy is physically impossible because of quantum effects. Or, perhaps a 'perfect' copy requires extra information such as the relative positioning of all of the atomic particles composing a brain with respect to all the other particles throughout the universe (which I would think would not be recreatable due to the universe's expansion, and more quantum effects). I know that my brain is constantly turning over its physical components, so each moment I suppose I could be regarded as a new person (albeit, one who retains the *me-ness*), but perhaps this effect can't physically be reproduced down to the scale of Plank space and time. Maybe the physical changes my brain undergoes following one Plank scale of time would be sufficient to distinguish myself from a 'perfect' copy. I guess if
 this were true, identity could be described as "pattern-thread" dependent. But I'm just grasping at straws here.
   
  Best Wishes,
   
  Jeffrey Herrlich
   
   Hal Finney <hal at finney.org> wrote:
  Jeffrey Herlich (A B) writes):
> I have another question though (presented as an experiment). Lets say
> that in the future it becomes possible to reversibly preserve a human
> (say through improved vitrification). So I decide to be vitrified, a
> 'perfect' scan is made of my brain, but is stored as information only
> (as a giant stack of printed pages), not implemented. I'm revived
> from the vitrification and go about my daily life (which should be
> pretty awesome). But, alas, I get killed in an accident one hour
> after revival. Is it your belief (or anyone elses' here) that if my
> mind-information later gets implemented (let's say in the form of a
> physical replica, made of real atoms - not simulated), that I will
> "reawaken", and it will still be "me".

I think it's instructive that you put "me" in quotes. This suggests
that you think it might be just a matter of semantics and definitions.
The question of whether it will still be "me" depends on how we define the
word "me". If we define it in a restrictive sense, then no, it will not
be me. If we define it in an expansive sense, then yes, it will be me.

But is the end of the issue? Is it just a matter of semantics, of
words and definitions? Or is this a real, substantive question about
the nature of the world?

In other words, is it a *factual* question whether this kind of revival
is still me? Could we imagine a world, or a kind of consciousness,
where it is true, and alternatively, a world where it is not true?
Is it something that perhaps would be amenable to experimentation?

These are rhetorical questions because I am trying to emphasize that
there are two very different, incompatible directions that can be pursued
in analyzing this issue. One treats the question as a factual one and
attempts to discover the truth about whether doing this or that makes
it still be "me". The other treats the question as a semantic one and
suggests that there is no true fact of the matter, and that you can define
"me" any way you want and get the corresponding answer.

If it is just a semantic question, then there's not much point in arguing
about it. People can pretty much use words the way they want.

If you do want to argue about it (as many people do) then you might
want to think about whether you could first get past the hurdle of
showing that the question is indeed substantive and not just semantic.
Are there any experiments that could be done (even thought experiments)
that would help to reveal the true facts of the matter? Can you even
define the question in an operational or scientific way, relating it to
measurable (or at least observable) properties of the world?

I'd suggest that this is a good first step - make sure the question is
real before spending inordinate amounts of time trying to answer it.

Hal
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