[extropy-chat] (offlist) RE: I keep asking myself...

[Lee Corbin]

> Which is the 'real' you? That's a non-question. They both are.

Hi Ben,

Congratulations!  You figured out the right answer to what
I used to call "The Identity Paradox" back in the '60s.

No, I'm not inviting you to become a member of a secret
cult, but sometimes these ideas about identity seem *so*
perplexing to folks that all I can do is hope that over
time more people begin to understand.

On these lists, over many, many, many, many, long years
we've had INNUMERABLE arguments about it.

Yet I take it as a good sign that no one responded to your
post!  After all, you did explain it very well. So maybe...

Nah. Many people simply do not and never will understand.
Some of them may even be so immune to understanding that
were they to branch into separate instances and then 
recombine (by merging memories), they'd *still* refuse to
believe that duplicates are selves.

For me, I just cannot imagine the hostility that most people
(would) have towards their duplicates.  It grates them in some
deep hidden way, as though their identity were being threatened
... hmm, there's a thought.  Usually when you bring up duplicates
the very first thing that occurs to people is to make slaves of
their duplicates.  (This shows you how deep the antipathy towards
regarding them as other selves goes;  they would normally never
think of enslaving even *other* people---but their copies?  Not
only are they seen as not-self, they are seen as even sub-human.

While I'm at it I might as well copy this to the list.  NO, everyone,
I don't want to get into more arguments about it. No one ever
changes his minds, as you know.

Lee

[Ben wrote]
> 
> A B <austriaaugust at yahoo.com> wrote:
> 
> > No problem. It wasn't so much a criticism, as it was a legitimate 
> > (arguably) question of mine  ;-) I have another question though 
> > (presented as an experiment). Lets say that in the future it becomes 
> > possible to reversibly preserve a human (say through improved 
> > vitrification). So I decide to be vitrified, a 'perfect' scan is made
> >  of my brain, but is stored as information only (as a giant stack of 
> > printed pages), not implemented. I'm revived from the vitrification
> > and go about my daily life (which should be pretty awesome). But,
> > alas, I get killed in an accident one hour after revival. Is it your
> > belief (or anyone elses' here) that if my mind-information later gets
> > implemented (let's say in the form of a physical replica, made of
> > real atoms - not simulated), that I will "reawaken", and it will
> > still be "me".
> > 
> > Just to save time I will provide my own answer here for the purpose 
> > of discussion. For now, I will say the answer is: yes, it will be
> > "me". But, if I choose to believe this, I don't see how that refutes
> > the "hive-mind" idea. It would seem to support it even. The only way
> > it would seem to refute the hive-mind idea, would be with the
> > assertion that: for some reason, I can only experience *one* identity
> > at a time and not many; why would this necessarily be the case (even
> > in the absence of mind enhancements)?
> > 
> > But, you might easily be able convince me that the correct answer is:
> >  no, it will not be "me".
> 
> First, you need to decide what you mean by 'me'.
> 
> This is difficult, i know, i've thought a lot about it and had many
> discussions about it. In general, i'm a 'patternist', and think that any
> exact copy of my mind-state is really 'me'. The difficulty is in
> envisaging a number of different 'me's. Entirely separate, distinct
> 'me's, but all just as much 'me' as i am now. I picture a line, dividing
> or branching as it goes forward. Each branch is a distinct individual,
> all of them me. No mystical telepathic connection or anything. So they
> are all 'A me'. The crucial thing is, there is then no 'real me' and
> 'false me's. They are all really me, and they are all at the same time
> different people. A bit Zen, i know, but i just can't see any other way
> of looking at it that makes sense.
> 
> So, in your scenario, the you that was vitrified, revived and repaired,
> then later died, is one you. The other copy is also you. So 'you' do
> survive, but not the 'you' that was woken from vitrification. That one 
> is just as dead as any of us who dies at present.
> 
> Which is the 'real' you? That's a non-question. They both are.
> 
> Think of a clock. An old-fashioned one, with gears and springs, and a tick.
> Think of the tick as being 'you'. If you exactly copy the clock, they
> will both be indistinguishable, and both have the same tick. Not that
> they share the same physical tick of course, but the separate tick they
> each make is exactly the same.
> 
> And i realise that this will be an unsatisfactory answer to a lot of
> people. Sorry, but that's all i've got. I've only got a small brain.
> Thus far.
> 
> ben