[extropy-chat] "Dead Time" of the Brain

[A B]

Hi Heartland,
   
  I think you present a very good and intuitive argument. However, I think John K Clark may have been on to something when he said that subjectively *he* would still feel alive. I can show this by using some math.
   
  First, here are some basic parameters of a typical human brain:
   
  Total Number of Neurons: ~100 Billion
  Upper Limit on Firing Rate: ~1000 Hz (Thanks Martin and Stirling)
  Planck Time Interval: ~ 10^ -43 Seconds
   
  What a human would call the "present moment" in which they live represents a span of Time. Time itself can be divided down to a very small interval, at least as small as a single Planck Interval. Therefore, even if the firing of all the neurons occurred at different, uniformly staggered times, there is a period between the firings of any two (arbitrarily chosen) neurons which represents the passage of a substantial number of Planck Intervals. In essence, what this means is that a normal, functioning brain is actually continually alternating between a functional and a completely non-functional state (like "on" and "off"). Here is the calculation:
   
  1 Second / 1000 Firings / 100 Billion Neurons = ...
  = ~ 10 ^ -14 Second = span in which not a single neuron anywhere in the brain is 
     firing.
   
  10 ^ -14 Second / 10 ^ -43 Second (one Planck Interval) =...
  = *At Least* ~ 10 ^ 29 Planck Intervals between the firings of any two (random) 
     neurons.
   
  This 10 ^ 29 Planck Intervals represents the "off" condition or "Dead Time" and is unavoidable. Yet, I do retain the sense of living even despite this. This seems consistent with what we can observe. I do not experience the me who lived 5 minutes ago. Is he dead? ... Maybe, but *I* am still alive. If I go for a run down the street and look back, is there an infinite string of "old" Jeffrey's behind me? I should hope not. They are probably "dead", but *I* haven't died.
   
  You might be able to show that an interval of time in great excess of 10 ^ 29 Planck Intervals *would* constitute the permanent death of the original person (all else being equal). I myself don't have the requisite knowledge to address that formally, but my early guess is that the span of "Dead Time" may be irrelevant to the survival of the original person, provided that the pattern of atoms is preserved with sufficient fidelity. 
   
  Also keep in mind that even in a vitrified brain, the atoms themselves are still jumping around and performing calculations (arguably useless ones but calculations nonetheless). And one can only guess what kind of 24/7 party the electrons are still throwing :-)
   
  I would be extremely dissatisfied though if my Cryonics provider decided to upload my mind and destroy the original vitrified brain. In that case, I would definitely be suspicious that the original *me* had died permanently (if I was capable of suspicion that is).
   
  Best Wishes, 
   
  Jeffrey Herrlich
   
  ps: Sorry if I've just restated what someone else has already presented in the archives. I have only so many Planck Intervals to work with. Sorry Spike, couldn't wait any longer - too excited I guess.

Heartland <velvet977 at hotmail.com> wrote:
  "Heartland" 

> A revived person would obviously *feel* similar
> to what people feel after waking up

John K Clark wrote:
And that's all I'm interested in, I want to *feel* alive. You can tell me
tell you're blue in the face that objectively I'm dead but if subjectively I
feel alive then I am.

That's the other way around. Subjectively you wouldn't feel alive, while 
objectively others would have to agree that you are alive.

> It's the other created instance that will but you
> will "feel" eternal nothingness instead.

John K Clark:
Even at a cutting edge place like the Extropian List your conventional ideas
that you are an object and atoms give you individuality are agreed with by
the majority of list members, and in the general population a similar naïve
world view is shared by 99% of the people in our culture. And 99% are wrong.

That's not my view at all. Atoms certainly don't give you individuality and neither 
does memory. It's the trajectory of your mind hardware in time and space that 
actually gives you individuality. That view is actually too "cutting edge" even for 
most transhumanists.


> What you feel is a copy's illusion.

John K Clark:
But you said it yourself, "you feel". And there is nothing wrong with
illusions, they are a perfectly reputable subjective experience. And there
is nothing wrong with copies either.

But the problem is that only some other person of your *type*, not your original 
*instance*, would feel that illusion. It's perfectly alright for you to think that 
subjective experience of your original instance will magically reappear once you 
get revived but it's simply not true.

> Anytime mind process stops running a person dies.

So I guess if you ever need major surgery you would refuse a general
anesthetic. What would you do, tell the surgeons to cut quickly and just
bight down on a stick? After all, under a general anesthetic there is no
mind, your brain is no more conscious than your liver.

John K Clark

It's going to be very hard for people to accept the fact that anytime their mind 
stops they die. It's counterintuitive and that's why people reject this view 
automatically. For years it was that same inability to overcome that instinct that 
prevented me from extrapolating the theory to its logical conclusion. But once you 
accept that a person dies when his mind process stops I guarantee you that you can 
find not a single paradox that could make this logic break down.

S.

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