[extropy-chat] I keep asking myself...

[Heartland]

> "Heartland" <velvet977 at hotmail.com>
>
>> That's the other way around. Subjectively you wouldn't feel alive, while
>> objectively others would have to agree that you are alive.
>
> How do you know? Who did you ask? The copy of you is convinced you're the
> same person you always were, you remembers being you yesterday and you
> didn't even know you were a copy until I told you 30 seconds ago; all
> your friends say you're the same old you, and the you of yesterday is of
> course unavailable to answer questions. Subjectively the man who claims
> to be you thinks and feels he is you, objectively your friends think it is
> you, so how do you know it is not you? Did you see it in a dream?

Let me ask you this. How many threads of subjective experience are you running now? 
I would expect you say "one," because otherwise I would see no reason to continue 
this exchange. So if there can be only one *instance* of subjective experience then 
what if future doctors create not one but two copies of "you" from your vitrified 
brain. Now, assuming a belief that only a single thread of original subjective 
experience continues after revival, which copy that thread jumps to?


>
>> It's the trajectory of your mind hardware in time and space that actually
>> gives you individuality.
>
> The individual space time trajectories of every atom in your body? The
> individual space time trajectories of  atoms that get completely recycled
> ever few weeks? Millions of atoms in your body right now were once part of
> Julius Caesar's body, does that make you Caesar? There is nothing unique
> about that mind hardware, so how can it give individuality to you?

As I said before, it's the *trajectory* that gives you individuality, not mind 
hardware.


>> It's going to be very hard for people to accept the fact that anytime
>> their mind stops they die.
>
> Tell me, do you think in general whenever anything stops it is imposable to
> start it up again, of is it something about minds that makes it true? If so
> then  just what is that "something"?

Of course it's possible to restart a process. But the whole point is that it would 
then be a different *instance* of that *type* of process.

My argument is that the only requirement necessary to continue living is 
preservation of the instance of mind process while a conventional belief is that 
it's enough to just preserve the type of mind process to keep living.

> And I asked this question before but you ignored it, if you ever need major
> surgery you would refuse a general anesthetic? Would you tell the surgeons
> to cut quickly and just bight down on a stick? After all, under a general
> anesthetic there is no mind, your brain is no more conscious than your
> liver.

That question is irrelevant to this discussion. You're asking me a personal 
question. But if you are curious I'll just say that if I were you I would cut down 
on frivolous surgery. In the event that you require a procedure, which is 
absolutely necessary to keep your "type" of mind process alive that might involve 
mind stopping, there is no way out. Your instance of mind process would die either 
from mind stopping caused by anesthetic or mind stopping caused by natural death. 
What can I say, we live in barbaric times.


>> I guarantee you that you can find not a single paradox that could make
>> this logic break down.
>
> I'm pleased I have a guarantee, please direct me to your claims department.
>
>  John K Clark

If you want to show I'm wrong then the burden of proof is on you.

S.