[extropy-chat] Human Machinations

[Keith Henson]

At 02:16 AM 2/17/2006 +0000, you wrote:
>On 2/17/06, Keith Henson <<mailto:hkhenson at rogers.com>hkhenson at rogers.com> 
>wrote:
>>The paper and the model makes the case that--because economic growth got
>>ahead of population growth in Ireland--the average gain on the mechanism in
>>the population was turned down.  (I.e., a behavior switch was
>>flipped.)  With a gain of less than one, the circulating memes encouraging
>>the warriors to fight were damped till they lost motivational force and the
>>IRA went out of business.
>
>Ah, okay - population wasn't involved as a causal factor, only as a later 
>effect, but yes, economic growth in Ireland did play a role in damping 
>down the level of sectarian violence. (Damping down, not eliminating - the 
>IRA are still very much in business - but they're moving more in the 
>direction of a Mafia-style outfit these days; there isn't as much hatred 
>and killing as there was.) I suspect memetics played a larger role, though 
>it's hard to untangle the different causes for something like this.

How should I put this?   Perception of bad future prospects turn up the 
gain for xenophobic memes.  *Some* xenophobic meme will become dominate, 
like some frequency will on a microphone squeal.  Pre WWII there was a time 
when an observer in Germany would have been hard pressed to decide if 
communism or nazism would become dominate.

Point being that memes are a link between ultimate cause of war and wars or 
related social disruptions such as the IRA was engaged in.  Pre existing 
xenophobic memes, particularly "religions" are likely to be the seed 
meme.  But if people feel the need to fight, they can *always* amplify some 
kind of meme up to a "reason" to fight.  The *particular* meme the 
attackers are using is an artifact of pre existing memes and a positive 
feedback process.

snip

>>I would be *delighted* if you can find holes in the model.  Most depressing
>>work I have ever done.
>
>I know that feeling! Okay, let's see...
>
>1) Population growth only results in economic decline in a hunter-gatherer 
>economy where wealth is gathered from the environment; in an industrial 
>economy, where wealth is produced by people, higher population results in 
>higher GNP. (I'm repeating this because I think the error is contributing 
>to the lack of effective action to address Europe's current population 
>crash - but it isn't central to your model, which is really about 
>economics rather than population, so I'll move on.)

No it isn't about economics per se.  It is about a population's 
*perception* of future prospects.  People in the Stone Age who were 
sensitive to this went to war before their warriors were starving and 
became the dominate genotype.

>2) The evolutionary effect you postulate is somewhat doubtful.

First war is a species typical behavior.  That means that this behavior 
evolved, i.e., was selected for in the EEA.

>Remember the idea that noncombatants are sacrosanct is a modern one. In 
>the ancestral environment, starting a war was only a good idea if you were 
>going to win; losing could mean your entire tribe was wiped out.

That's rational.  The specifically model specifically incorporates 
psychological mechanisms that inhibit rational thinking.  I think Drew 
Westen's fMRI work has demonstrated this mechanism.  The only way this 
mechanism could have been selected is if there are situation where non 
rational thinking leads to better gene survival.  Since non rational thing 
all too often toasts your bacon, you have to invoke Hamilton's inclusive 
fitness for such a trait to evolve.

>Yes, sometimes the winners would keep the women, but not always.

As long as girls were booty enough of the time, the trait of taking insane 
risks  would survive.

>There's an example in the Old Testament where the Israelites were ordered 
>to keep only the virgin girls of a conquered people and exterminate the 
>rest; that's not a large percentage of genes surviving. There are plenty 
>of other cases where the losing tribe was wiped out to the last infant.

Infants were among the most *likely* to be killed if you look at if from 
the gene's view.

>It looks to me like a tribe faced with a food shortage, say because the 
>rain failed this year or whatever, would be better off just taking some 
>losses from starvation rather than starting a war it wasn't going to win.

Even from a rational viewpoint a weak tribe is better off 
attacking.  Because if they don't (and the ecological conditions conducive 
to war affect their neighbors) they *will be* attacked.   With the 
advantage of surprise, they might win

>I've even seen one study that found in some primitive culture - might have 
>been the Yanomamo, not sure - there was a _positive_ correlation between 
>wealth and aggressive raiding.

For the second modality to war, absolute wealth has little to do with 
it.  It is a drop in current wealth and/or poor future prospects.(First 
modality is being attacked.)

>The author's suggested explanation was that if a tribe is sufficiently 
>well off that a man's wife and children can survive without him, that 
>reduces the risk to his genes of raiding the neighbors to try to capture 
>more women, eliminate competitors or whatever.

Hmm.  Please look for this study.

>3) In historical times it doesn't seem to me that there are a lot of 
>examples supporting your theory. Rome was one of the wealthiest 
>civilizations around when it wiped out Carthage and invaded Gaul. The 
>Spanish weren't exactly short of a few bob when they launched the Armada. 
>Germany's economy was going gangbusters in 1914. Conversely, Mexico for 
>example is a lot poorer than the US; when was the last time Mexico went to war?

Sort out who started the wars.  Being attacked will always work to get into 
a war.

>In fact, the Weimar Republic is the only positive example I can think of 
>offhand, and even that one's not as simple as it looks.
>
>4) There is some empirical basis for the idea that bad economic prospects 
>encourage urban violence, but that doesn't mean they lead to war. Consider 
>that once you're past the Stone Age, the decision to go to war _is not 
>made by the common people_.

I disagree.  You only have to go back to WWII for a war that the ruling 
classes, particularly the president, wanted to get into for some time and 
they just could not do so because of the lack of public support.  Till the 
US was attacked of course.

>It's made by the ruling classes, who are exactly the group that will _not_ 
>be affected by an economic downturn. Therefore, _even if your theory is 
>correct up to this point_ we should still expect to see wars actually 
>start for reasons unrelated to economics - and that is just what we do 
>observe when we look at history.

Gak.  And I thought *my* model was depressing.  It's bad enough to have a 
model where you can at least see a way to stay out of wars even if you 
can't see a way to impose women's lib on a zillion Islamic women.

There is another theory that too many unattached men (somehow) are the 
cause of wars.  If so, China will start a war right away.  If rising income 
per capita keeps war mode shut off, we should see no wars with China unless 
some other country starts one.

Keith Henson