[extropy-chat] Human Machinations

[Keith Henson]

At 10:27 PM 2/19/2006 +0000, you wrote:
>On 2/17/06, Keith Henson <<mailto:hkhenson at rogers.com>hkhenson at rogers.com> 
>wrote:
>>Point being that memes are a link between ultimate cause of war and wars or
>>related social disruptions such as the IRA was engaged in.  Pre existing
>>xenophobic memes, particularly "religions" are likely to be the seed
>>meme.  But if people feel the need to fight, they can *always* amplify some
>>kind of meme up to a "reason" to fight.  The *particular* meme the
>>attackers are using is an artifact of pre existing memes and a positive
>>feedback process.
>
>Oh, I understand what you're saying, and I think the approach of searching 
>for explanations in evolutionary psychology makes sense. But theories need 
>to be tested against observed data, and it seems to me that when you look 
>at history, it just doesn't support that level of determinism.

EP does not support determinism.  EP and genes have to make do with 
probabilistic outcomes--which means lots of noise in the data.  As for 
history, we just don't have it where it would be really useful.   This is 
really excellent background.

Published in Anthropological Quarterly, 73.1 (2000), 20-34.
THE HUMAN MOTIVATIONAL COMPLEX :
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE CAUSES OF
HUNTER-GATHERER FIGHTING
Azar Gat
Part I: Primary Somatic and Reproductive Causes
At the centre of this study is the age-old philosophical and psychological 
inquiry into the
nature of the basic human system of motivation. Numerous lists of basic 
needs and desires
have been put together over the centuries, more or less casually or 
convincingly. The most
recent ones show little if any marked progress over the older, back to 
Thomas Hobbes's
Leviathan, 6 (e.g. Maslow 1970 [1954]; Burton 1990
)
. In the absence of an evolutionary
perspective, these lists have always had something arbitrary and trivial 
about them. They
lacked a unifying regulatory rationale that would suggest why the various 
needs and
desires came to be, or how they related to one another.

Arguing that the human motivational system as a whole should be approached from
the evolutionary perspective, this study focuses on the causes of fighting. 
It examines what
can be meaningfully referred to as the 'human state of nature', the 99.5 
percent of the
genus Homo's evolutionary history in which humans lived as 
hunter-gatherers. In this 'state
of nature' people's behaviour patterns are generally to be considered as 
evolutionarily
adaptive. They form the evolutionary inheritance that we have carried with 
us throughout
later history, when this inheritance has constantly interacted and been 
interwoven with the
human staggering cultural development. In the anthropological literature, 
the concept of
'primitive war', which makes no distinction between hunter-gatherers and 
pre-state
agriculturalists, is commonly used to describe 'original', pre-state, 
warfare. While this
category has some value, in evolutionary terms it lumps together the 
aboriginal condition
of all humans with a quite recent cultural innovation. Thus, this study 
will give priority to
the evidence from hunter-gatherers' warfare, which reflects the vast 
time-span of the
evolution-shaped 'human state of nature'. Evidence from primitive 
agriculturalists will only
be cited in support, where there is good reason to believe that they show 
little significant
change from hunter-gatherers.
The causes of 'primitive warfare' remain a puzzle in anthropology, with 
explanations
ranging from the materialist to cultural and psychological ('sheer pugnacity').
1
In recent
years, the discussion has been largely dominated by what has been presented 
as a
controversy between the evolutionist and cultural-materialist theories.

snip (read it all)

http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:Qj9DZVvPBOsJ:cniss.wustl.edu/workshoppapers/gatpres1.pdf+hunter+gatherer+azar+gat&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=5

>> >Remember the idea that noncombatants are sacrosanct is a modern one. In
>> >the ancestral environment, starting a war was only a good idea if you were
>> >going to win; losing could mean your entire tribe was wiped out.
>>
>>That's rational.  The specifically model specifically incorporates
>>psychological mechanisms that inhibit rational thinking.  I think Drew
>>Westen's fMRI work has demonstrated this mechanism.  The only way this
>>mechanism could have been selected is if there are situation where non
>>rational thinking leads to better gene survival.  Since non rational thing
>>all too often toasts your bacon, you have to invoke Hamilton's inclusive
>>fitness for such a trait to evolve.
>
>By "starting a war was only a good idea if you were going to win", I don't 
>mean our ancestors necessarily made rational calculations along these 
>lines. I mean getting your tribe wiped out was bad for inclusive fitness, 
>therefore genes that encouraged imprudent attacks would tend to be 
>eliminated from the population.

That's true.  But an what is "imprudent" changes with the conditions.  When 
the other choices were worse, war was not "imprudent" even if you chances 
were poor.

>>As long as girls were booty enough of the time, the trait of taking insane
>>risks  would survive.
>
>Not compared to having the tribe survive!

Tribes often *don't* survive.  "These estimates range from less than 1% to 
just over 30% per generation (Soltis et al. 1995)."

snip

>>Even from a rational viewpoint a weak tribe is better off
>>attacking.  Because if they don't (and the ecological conditions conducive
>>to war affect their neighbors) they *will be* attacked.   With the
>>advantage of surprise, they might win
>
>Surprise isn't generally a war-winner. If it was, you wouldn't want to 
>wait for hard times to launch your surprise attack.

It only has to be a war winner enough of the time.

There is a description by Steven LeBlanc of a dawn attack on corn farmers 
you might want to read.

>> >The author's suggested explanation was that if a tribe is sufficiently
>> >well off that a man's wife and children can survive without him, that
>> >reduces the risk to his genes of raiding the neighbors to try to capture
>> >more women, eliminate competitors or whatever.
>>
>>Hmm.  Please look for this study.
>
>It was on paper rather than the Internet, and many years ago, so I've no 
>idea where to look.
>
>Wait, I think I know where I might have seen the reference: a book called 
>'Demonic Males: Apes and the Origin of Human Violence'. Don't mind the 
>tabloid style title, it's written by a pair of serious scholars, one of 
>the best works on evolutionary psychology I've come across.
>
>> >3) In historical times it doesn't seem to me that there are a lot of
>> >examples supporting your theory. Rome was one of the wealthiest
>> >civilizations around when it wiped out Carthage and invaded Gaul. The
>> >Spanish weren't exactly short of a few bob when they launched the Armada.
>> >Germany's economy was going gangbusters in 1914. Conversely, Mexico for
>> >example is a lot poorer than the US; when was the last time Mexico went 
>> to war?
>>
>>Sort out who started the wars.  Being attacked will always work to get into
>>a war.
>
>Most of my reading of history was awhile ago, and didn't generally include 
>graphs of per capita GNP of the belligerents in the years leading up to 
>any given war, but I definitely don't remember low or declining GNP being 
>correlated with starting wars. If you have data to the contrary, by all 
>means show it.

Huge research job.  And it probably is not the most important element 
anyway.  It is the average population *expectation* on how bright the 
prospects for the future are that flips the gain on xenophobic memes.  I 
first figured as you did, and the America civil war didn't fit, times were 
ok.  But when you considered the aftermath, it was clear that they had 
reason to fear for a bleak future.

After Lincoln was elected, it was fairly clear that one way or the other 
slavery was going.  That was a $30 billion dollar hit on the south's 
"capital," and people could see it coming.  (Don't take this as advocating 
anything!)

>And what about the counterexamples like Mexico and Latin America 
>generally, poor countries where lots of people have bad economic 
>prospects, and which by and large haven't been starting wars?

Again consider *relative.* Mexico has an escape valve that has bled off 
millions of people.  Not to mention that those areas have had wars, lots of 
them.  And the Falkland war is simply classic.  War is something our remote 
ancestors did only when the other prospects were worse.

The effects of technology have made prospects more look better than they 
otherwise would everywhere.  It is hard to say if this is justified or 
not.  Clearly we can't sustain those prospects without additional advances.

>> >4) There is some empirical basis for the idea that bad economic prospects
>> >encourage urban violence, but that doesn't mean they lead to war. Consider
>> >that once you're past the Stone Age, the decision to go to war _is not
>> >made by the common people_.
>>
>>I disagree.  You only have to go back to WWII for a war that the ruling
>>classes, particularly the president, wanted to get into for some time and
>>they just could not do so because of the lack of public support.  Till the
>>US was attacked of course.
>
>I'll grant you that's a counterexample to my idea that the decision isn't 
>usually made by the common people, but it's also a counterexample to your 
>theory: the US had been through the Depression! By your theory, they 
>should have been all out to fight someone in the 1930s.

As I make the case it isn't so much the absolute level or India would be in 
continuos war.  I don't know how people viewed their prospect in the 
Depression.  Missed that one, but it could probably be dug out of the 
history of the time.  But don't forget, this tendency toward wars is only 
probabilistic.  And who would you fight?  As the Germans did, they split 
out a groups (Jews, and others) and killed most of them.  The US had 
similar traits at the time which didn't go far.

>> >It's made by the ruling classes, who are exactly the group that will _not_
>> >be affected by an economic downturn. Therefore, _even if your theory is
>> >correct up to this point_ we should still expect to see wars actually
>> >start for reasons unrelated to economics - and that is just what we do
>> >observe when we look at history.
>>
>>Gak.  And I thought *my* model was depressing.  It's bad enough to have a
>>model where you can at least see a way to stay out of wars even if you
>>can't see a way to impose women's lib on a zillion Islamic women.
>
>Well, I don't think there is a single general solution to the problem of 
>discouraging war - if there was, the job of the Nobel Peace Prize 
>committee, not to mention life itself, would be easier than it is! I think 
>there are lots of things that can be done that are helpful, but no guarantees.

"A single general solution to the problem" is my claim.  Population growth 
less than economic growth *everywhere* and you won't have problems with wars.

>>There is another theory that too many unattached men (somehow) are the
>>cause of wars.  If so, China will start a war right away.  If rising income
>>per capita keeps war mode shut off, we should see no wars with China unless
>>some other country starts one.
>
>I'm inclined to think we'll see no war with China because their leadership 
>is calm and rational enough to realize they've more to lose than to gain by it.

That's true, but *why* is their leadership calm and rational?   It is 
because there is a low level of circulating xenophobic memes and they have 
not been attacked.  Bad prospects building up xenophobic memes *or* being 
attacked and you no longer have rational leaders.  You can make a case that 
contributed to the foolishness of the US in recent times.

Keith

>- Russell
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