[extropy-chat] Re: Identity and becoming a Great Old One

[Rafal Smigrodzki]

On 1/26/06, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky <sentience at pobox.com> wrote:

> 1:  A finite computer has only a finite number of possible states.  In
> the long run, then, you *must* either die (not do any processing past a
> finite number of operations), go into an infinite loop (also implying no
> further processing), or grow beyond any finite bound.  Those are your
> only three options, no matter the physics.  Being human forever isn't on
> the list.  That is not a moral judgment, it's an unarguable mathematical
> fact.  In the long run - the really long run - humanity isn't an option.
>
### Is being human (in the sense of having a certain threshold number
of similarities to myself) really unavoidably a finite process? The
answer depends crucially on the type of properties that constitute
being human as opposed to an Old One - I would contend that if you
choose the right definition of yourself, you could become infinite
without losing it.

In fact, although I have insufficient data, I surmise that the current
essence of Smigrodzkism is compatible with infinity.

The first component of this essence is that for a device to be
legitimately classified as an instance of myself it has to contain a
certain finite amount of information that describes my current
memories, without limitation on the total amount of information
contained within the device - and it appears that this doesn't force
the device into finitude.

The second component of the essence is a stipulation that in
situations analogous to my current circumstances the device must make
certain choices identically to my current instance, or its versions
that have better information about outcomes of actions, including a
version possessing full and certain information about outcomes of
actions (choices of versions with more information trump the choices
of versions with less information). Not all choices must be identical,
only some choices in some situations, and on of the points of
reference is, as I said, a hypothetical, omniscient version of myself,
which is itself an infinite being. Thus, the second part of the
essence not only does not limit my future self but even requires an
infinite being for the definition.

I think it is then reasonable to conclude that being Rafal is not
necessarily a finite process.

Rafal