[extropy-chat] Cryonics and uploading

[John K Clark]

Heartland <velvethum at hotmail.com> Wrote:

> Of course my copy will still like chocolate but my
> point is that the original is dead and will not
> *enjoy the feeling* of eating chocolate because
> his mind hardware is gone.

So you think the copy of you would be conscious but he just wouldn't be you,
even though he looks acts and thinks just like you, even though he remembers
being you, even though he is absolutely convinced he is you; thus you think
the original is dead. If so then you could be dead right NOW because one
nanosecond before I said "now" I made a destructive copy of you. In fact I
have been making a destructive copy of you a billion times a second for the
last year, and yet you go about your business with no difficulty. A
billionth of a second if far too short to form a conscious thought, but
nevertheless something has been conscious for the last year, something has
continued, and I think a good name for that something is "you".

> If my perfect clone and I are in the room and he starts eating chocolate
> it doesn't mean that I will automatically feel chocolate in my mouth.

Don't be silly, if one perfect clone is eating chocolate and the other is
not then they are no longer perfect.

>This is basically a natural occurence of Moravec transfer which does
>preserve life. The reason why this transfer works is that it doesn't
>destroy the original mind process. Desctructive uploading does.

Why? Both are doing the same thing both are replacing all the atoms in your
brain but you say one works and one does not. Why?

>I thought about it for a long time yesterday an my final conclusion is that
>scenario a) is unacceptable after all because the original trajectory gets
>destroyed during disassembly.

Original trajectory? All the atoms in your brain get recycled several times
a year, try to imagine the path through space time of every atom that had
ever made up your brain in your life. The time line would look like a dog's
breakfast and it would be difficult to see any continuity there. And yet
something continues.

> I would like my original brain to be fully restored and operational.

I think cryonics patients should understand that if the huge silicon brains
of the future decide to revive you they are unlikely to be superstitious
about the superiority a bag of protoplasm has over silicon and will revive
you it their own way. Giving detailed instructions on how you should be
revived is almost as pointless as setting up a trust fund so you will be
rich a century from now. They may decide to let you think you are flesh and
blood but you will really be a pattern of bits deep in the guts of a
computer.

And could somebody explain to me what "Cryonics should be preserving life,
not just identity" means, I can't make heads or tails out of it.

   John K Clark