[extropy-chat] Cryonics and uploading

[John K Clark]

"Heartland" <velvethum at hotmail.com>

> In my view they would have two separate *lives*
> even if both minds experienced exactly the same POV.

Ah, this is obviously some strange use of the word "separate"  that I wasn't
previously aware of.

> If the original got killed in front of the perfect copy, the original
> would not witness his own death through the eyes of the copy.

As I've said many many times before the 2 "perfect" copies are no longer
even close to being perfect, one is going through a traumatic experience and
one is not.

> I did put myself in copy's place and wrote earlier that I could be a copy
> while my original might be dead.

I'd send condolences that the person you remember being yesterday is dead,
but I wouldn't know where to send them, I don't know who the injured party
is. It's certainly not you, you're doing fine, you didn't even know you were
a copy until I told you. Nor can I find anything the you of yesterday has to
complain about, somebody who remembers being him survived and his thoughts
and feelings continued on without a hitch. What more can you want out of
immortality?

> you say that POV of the original and the copy would be the same, then why
> do you admit that original would be jealous?

If two brains are identical then they are doing the same thing, if they are
doing the same thing they are producing the same mind. In your thought
experiment the two brains are no longer identical, they are doing different
things, they are producing different minds, they have diverged. Is that
really difficult to understand?

>And that's where we differ.

You believe that nature can recycle all the atoms in your body every month
or so but if nanotechnology were to try to do the same thing something would
be missing, that something can only be a unique soul. Our fundamental
difference is that I don't believe in souls and although you may call it
something else, you do.

    John K Clark