[extropy-chat] Blackford on enhancement
Damien Broderick
thespike at satx.rr.com
Sat Jul 8 16:37:21 UTC 2006
My friend Russell Blackford, a polymath currently finishing his
second PhD, eloquently makes some points about the philosophical
underpinnings of the ethics of genetic enhancement, at his blog
http://metamagician3000.blogspot.com/ (June 15 entry; be encouraged
to comment there.)
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LeRoy Walters and Julie Gage Palmer's The Ethics of Human Gene
Therapy (1997) includes one of the best discussions of the prospect
of genetic enhancement that I've encountered to date. I've been
rereading this over the past few days, and found this passage which
really says it all, and highlights the difference between people who
broadly favour changing human nature, and human capacities, and those
who "don't get it". Here is what they say (it deserves quoting at some length):
"... a particular perspective on human nature clearly underlies our
moral judgments about genetic enhancement. We are dissatisfied with
and critical of certain aspects of the human condition as we see it
reflected in the world around us and as we experience it. In the
physical sphere, we regard disease and disability as evils that
should be overcome as quickly and efficiently as possible. In the
intellectual and moral sphere we have also identified serious
problems that should be addressed in multiple ways, one of which is
the judicious use of genetic technologies. We think that a certain
dissatisfaction with human nature as it has developed and as we have
inherited it is a prerequisite for intervention to improve human
nature. Also implicit in the notion of genetic enhancement is a
dynamic rather than a static view of human nature. While there are
historical and evolutionary reasons for human nature's being as it
is, we do not view the human race as being fated to accept the
current state of affairs. Rather, we accept the possibility of change
in human nature and have tried to argue for the ethical acceptability
of certain kinds of planned changes in the characteristics of future
human beings. In our view, such genetic enhancements are an important
part of the overall task of attempting to provide a better life and a
better world to our descendants." (page 133)
Unusually for me, I find I totally agree with this passage. Note that
nothing here denies that we might, in practice, need to be very
cautious about attempting genetic enhancement, or that there might be
practical and ethical problems that are crucial barriers to
particular experiments. The focus of the passage is on the big
picture: that we do not have to take human nature as we find it.
I often make the point that we can never entirely step out of our own
nature. This applies at both the individual level and the species
level. If, for example, I am dissatisfied with some aspect of my own
personality, and find it a barrier to achieving my goals, that is
because it conflicts with desires that are themselves a product of my
personality. As it happens, I am rather shy in social situations, a
trait which I find annoying and frustrating - other aspects of my
personality would better suited if I were less self-conscious and
wary of others, a bit more extroverted, more relaxed about how others
see me, and even able to be a bit more "pushy", etc., without
embarrassment and the awkwardness that can go with it. However, all
this is a problem only because it conflicts with the desires I
actually have (although I find it difficult, I actually want to be
gregarious and find social occasions energising, rather than
emotionally draining, and to have the advantages of finding it easy
to "network", and so on). I don't wish to jettison my entire
personality and start again, just tweak aspects that don't fit well
with my conscious desires - desires to be a certain way and to do,
and enjoy, certain things.
There is no standard entirely external to us by which we are
compelled to make changes to ourselves, but nor have our natures (as
individuals or as a species) been designed for perfect harmony. At
the individual level, we are the products of the genetic lottery and
more-or-less chance occurrences in the process of socialisation as
we've individually encountered it. There is no reason why our
abilities and personalities should be expected to line up neatly with
our desires or purposes. At the level of the species, we are a
product of biological evolution that had no conscious goal. We have
simply inherited genes that happened to confer more reproductive
fitness than did their rivals in the environment of human
evolutionary adaptedness. There is no reason to believe that they
were the best genes for our ancestors' conscious happiness, let alone
that they are best for our conscious pursuit of happiness, or
whatever other conscious desires we have, in modern environments.
What we must concede is that it will be difficult to improve on what
evolution has given us - not because we are perfectly designed by its
processes but because we still have so much to learn about ourselves.
For example, the underlying biological bases of our social nature
need to be understood in much more depth before we take action that
might hinder their operation. Accordingly, I am all for proceeding
with caution and accepting that we may not see much change to human
nature in our own lifetimes.
That acknowledged, it remains to be emphasised that we are conscious
beings whose desires, purposes, and values go far beyond, and may
even conflict with, reproductive fitness and with some aspects of our
natures that once served it. If there is a genuine choice between
maintaining our evolved physical and psychological nature as it is
and tweaking it to something more conducive to getting what we
consciously want for ourselves, then I'm all for doing the tweaking.
On that point of principle, I am in good company with Walters and Palmer.
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