[extropy-chat] Popper and QT

[gts]

"This problem of a *propensity interpretation of probability* arose out of  
my interest in Quantum Theory. It is usually believed that Quantum Theory  
has to be interpreted statistically, and no doubt statistics is essential  
for its empirical tests. But this is a point where, I believe, the dangers  
of the testability theory of meaning become clear. Although the tests of  
the theory are statistical, and although the theory (say, Shroedinger's  
equation) may imply statistical consequences, it need not have statistical  
meaning: and one can give examples of objective propensities (which are  
something like generalized forces) and of fields of propensities, which  
can be measured by statistical methods without themselves being  
statistical.

... Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen have published an interesting  
thought-experiment which can be substituted for my example, although their  
tendency (which is deterministic) is quite different from mine. Einstein's  
belief in determinism (which I had occasion to discuss with him) is, I  
believe, unfounded, and also unfortunate..."

-Karl Popper, _Conjectures and Refutations_, pg 80

"On Popper's view, propensities are not inherent in individual things,  
rather “they are relational properties of the experimental arrangement –  
of the conditions we intend to keep constant during repetition” (1959, 37;  
emphasis added).  The same experimental arrangement, or system, can be  
characterized in different ways: “Take the tossing of a penny: it may have  
been thrown 9 feet up.  Shall we say or shall we not say that this  
experiment is repeated if the penny is thrown to a height of 10 feet?”  
(1967, 38).  Here Popper's question is rhetorical; we might choose to say  
that it is the same experiment, or we might choose to say that it is a  
different experiment.  Either way is equally correct and equally  
objective.  On this kind of view, we could describe populations at many  
(perhaps infinitely many) different levels of description, being more or  
less specific (including greater or fewer causal factors), and the  
resulting probabilities would each be objective, in the sense described  
earlier – they would capture reality.

Interpretations of Probability in Evolutionary Theory
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001088/00/millstein.doc

-gts