[extropy-chat] FWD [fantasticreality] Feral Cities

[Terry W. Colvin]

This was sent to me this morning.


-Mike
-----------------------------------

Feral cities - The New Strategic Environment

Naval War College Review, Autumn, 2003 by Richard J. Norton


Imagine a great metropolis covering hundreds of square miles. Once a 
vital component in a national economy, this sprawling urban environment 
is now a vast collection of blighted buildings, an immense petri dish of 
both ancient and new diseases, a territory where the rule of law has 
long been replaced by near anarchy in which the only security available 
is that which is attained through brute power. (1) Such cities have been 
routinely imagined in apocalyptic movies and in certain science-fiction 
genres, where they are often portrayed as gigantic versions of T. S. 
Eliot's Rat's Alley. (2) Yet this city would still be globally 
connected. It would possess at least a modicum of commercial linkages, 
and some of its inhabitants would have access to the world's most modern 
communication and computing technologies. It would, in effect, be a 
feral city.
Admittedly, the very term "feral city" is both provocative and 
controversial. Yet this description has been chosen advisedly. The feral 
city may be a phenomenon that never takes place, yet its emergence 
should not be dismissed as impossible. The phrase also suggests, at 
least faintly, the nature of what may become one of the more difficult 
security challenges of the new century.

Over the past decade or so a great deal of scholarly attention has been 
paid to the phenomenon of failing states. (3) Nor has this pursuit been 
undertaken solely by the academic community. Government leaders and 
military commanders as well as directors of nongovernmental 
organizations and intergovernmental bodies have attempted to deal with 
faltering, failing, and failed states. Involvement by the United States 
in such matters has run the gamut from expressions of concern to 
cautious humanitarian assistance to full-fledged military intervention. 
In contrast, however, there has been a significant lack of concern for 
the potential emergence of failed cities. This is somewhat surprising, 
as the feral city may prove as common a feature of the global landscape 
of the first decade of the twenty-first century as the faltering, 
failing, or failed state was in the last decade of the twentieth. While 
it may be premature to suggest that a truly feral city--with the 
possible exception of Mogadishu--can be found anywhere on the globe 
today, indicators point to a day, not so distant, when such examples 
will be easily found.
This article first seeks to define a feral city. It then describes such 
a city's attributes and suggests why the issue is worth international 
attention. A possible methodology to identify cities that have the 
potential to become feral will then be presented. Finally, the potential 
impact of feral cities on the U.S. military, and the U.S. Navy 
specifically, will be discussed.

DEFINITION AND ATTRIBUTES
The putative "feral city" is (or would be) a metropolis with a 
population of more than a million people in a state the government of 
which has lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city's 
boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater international 
system. (4)
In a feral city social services are all but nonexistent, and the vast 
majority of the city's occupants have no access to even the most basic 
health or security assistance. There is no social safety net. Human 
security is for the most part a matter of individual initiative. Yet a 
feral city does not descend into complete, random chaos. Some elements, 
be they criminals, armed resistance groups, clans, tribes, or 
neighborhood associations, exert various degrees of control over 
portions of the city. Intercity, city-state, and even international 
commercial transactions occur, but corruption, avarice, and violence are 
their hallmarks. A feral city experiences massive levels of disease and 
creates enough pollution to qualify as an international environmental 
disaster zone. Most feral cities would suffer from massive urban 
hypertrophy, covering vast expanses of land. The city's structures range 
from once-great buildings symbolic of state power to the meanest 
shantytowns and slums. Yet even under these conditions, these cities 
continue to grow, and the majority of occupants do not voluntarily 
leave. (5)

Feral cities would exert an almost magnetic influence on terrorist 
organizations. Such megalopolises will provide exceptionally safe havens 
for armed resistance groups, especially those having cultural affinity 
with at least one sizable segment of the city's population. The efficacy 
and portability of the most modern computing and communication systems 
allow the activities of a worldwide terrorist, criminal, or predatory 
and corrupt commercial network to be coordinated and directed with 
equipment easily obtained on the open market and packed into a minivan. 
The vast size of a feral city, with its buildings, other structures, and 
subterranean spaces, would offer nearly perfect protection from overhead 
sensors, whether satellites or unmanned aerial vehicles. The city's 
population represents for such entities a ready source of recruits and a 
built-in intelligence network. Collecting human intelligence against 
them in this environment is likely to be a daunting task. Should the 
city contain airport or seaport facilities, such an organization would 
be able to import and export a variety of items. The feral city 
environment will actually make it easier for an armed resistance group 
that does not already have connections with criminal organizations to 
make them. The linkage between such groups, once thought to be rather 
unlikely, is now so commonplace as to elicit no comment.
WHAT'S NEW?

But is not much of this true of certain troubled urban areas of today 
and of the past? It is certainly true that cities have long bred 
diseases. Criminal gangs have often held sway over vast stretches of 
urban landscape and slums; "projects" and shantytowns have long been 
part of the cityscape. Nor is urban pollution anything new--London was 
environmentally toxic in the 1960s. So what is different about "feral 
cities"?

The most notable difference is that where the police forces of the state 
have sometimes opted not to enforce the rule of law in certain urban 
localities, in a feral city these forces will not be able to do so. 
Should the feral city be of special importance--for example, a major 
seaport or airport--the state might find it easier to negotiate power 
and profit-sharing arrangements with city power centers to ensure that 
facilities important to state survival continue to operate. For a weak 
state government, the ability of the feral city to resist the police 
forces of the state may make such negotiations the only option. In some 
countries, especially those facing massive development challenges, even 
the military would be unequal to imposing legal order on a feral city. 
In other, more developed states it might be possible to use military 
force to subdue a feral city, but the cost would be extremely high, and 
the operation would be more likely to leave behind a field of rubble 
than a reclaimed and functioning population center.
Other forms of state control and influence in a feral city would also be 
weak, and to an unparalleled degree. In a feral city, the state's writ 
does not run. In fact, state and international authorities would be 
massively ignorant of the true nature of the power structures, 
population, and activities within a feral city.

Yet another difference will be the level and nature of the security 
threat posed by a feral city. Traditionally, problems of urban decay and 
associated issues, such as crime, have been seen as domestic issues best 
dealt with by internal security or police forces. That will no longer be 
an option.

REASONS FOR CONCERN
Indeed, the majority of threats posed by a feral city would be viewed as 
both nontraditional and transnational by most people currently involved 
with national security. Chief among the nontraditional threats are the 
potential for pandemics and massive environmental degradation, and the 
near certainty that feral cities will serve as major transshipment 
points for all manner of illicit commodities.
As has been noted, city-born pandemics are not new. Yet the toxic 
environment of a feral city potentially poses uniquely severe threats. A 
new illness or a strain of an existing disease could easily breed and 
mutate without detection in a feral city. Since feral cities would not 
be hermetically sealed, it is quite easy to envision a deadly and 
dangerously virulent epidemic originating from such places. As of this 
writing, the SARS outbreak of 2003 seems to offer an example of a city 
(Guangdong, China) serving as a pathogen incubator and point of origin 
of an intercontinental epidemic. (6) In the case of SARS, the existence 
of the disease was rapidly identified, the origin was speedily traced, 
and a medical offensive was quickly mounted. Had such a disease 
originated in a feral city, it is likely that this process would have 
been much more complicated and taken a great deal more time. As it is, 
numerous diseases that had been believed under control have recently 
mutated into much more drug-resistant and virulent forms.
Globally, large cities are already placing significant environmental 
stress on their local and regional environments, and nowhere are these 
problems more pronounced than in coastal metropolises. A feral 
city--with minimal or no sanitation facilities, a complete absence of 
environmental controls, and a massive population--would be in effect a 
toxic-waste dump, poisoning coastal waters, watersheds, and river 
systems throughout their hinterlands. (7)

Major cities containing ports or airfields are already trying to contend 
with black-market activity that ranges from evading legal fees, dues, or 
taxes to trafficking in illegal and banned materials. Black marketeers 
in a feral city would have carte blanche to ship or receive such 
materials to or from a global audience. (8)
As serious as these transnational issues are, another threat is 
potentially far more dangerous. The anarchic allure of the feral city 
for criminal and terrorist groups has already been discussed. The 
combination of large profits from criminal activity and the increasing 
availability of all families of weapons might make it possible for 
relatively small groups to acquire Weapons of mass destruction. A 
terrorist group in a feral city with access to world markets, especially 
if it can directly ship material by air or sea, might launch an all but 
untraceable attack from its urban haven.



GOING FERAL
Throughout history, major cities have endured massive challenges without 
"going feral." How could it be determined that a city is at risk of 
becoming feral? What indicators might give warning? Is a warning system 
possible?
The answer is yes. This article offers just such a model, a taxonomy 
consisting of twelve sets of measurements, grouped into four main 
categories. (9) In it, measurements representing a healthy city are 
"green," those that would suggest cause for concern are "yellow," and 
those that indicate danger, a potentially feral condition, "red." In the 
table below, the upper blocks in each category (column) represent 
positive or healthy conditions, those at the bottom unhealthy ones.
The first category assesses the ability of the state to govern the city. 
A city "in the green" has a healthy, stable government--though not 
necessarily a democratically elected one. A democratic city leadership 
is perhaps the most desirable, but some cities governed by authoritarian 
regimes could be at extremely low risk of becoming feral. City 
governments "in the green" would be able to enact effective legislation, 
direct resources, and control events in all parts of the city at all 
times. (10) A yellow indication would indicate that city government 
enjoyed such authority only in portions of the city, producing what 
might be called "patchwork" governance, or that it exerted authority 
only during the day--"diurnal" governance. State authorities would be 
unable to govern a "red" city at all, or would govern in name only. (11) 
An entity within the city claiming to be an official representative of 
the state would simply be another actor competing for resources and power.
The second category involves the city's economy. Cities "in the green" 
would enjoy a productive mix of foreign investment, service and 
manufacturing activities, and a robust tax base. Cities afforded a 
"yellow" rating would have ceased to attract substantial foreign 
investment, be marked by decaying or heavily subsidized industrial 
facilities, and suffer from ever-growing deficits. Cities "in the red" 
would have no governmental tax base. Any industrial activity within 
their boundaries would be limited to subsistence-level manufacturing and 
trade or to illegal trafficking--in smuggled materials, weapons, drugs, 
and so on.

The third category is focused on city services. Cities with a "green" 
rating would not only have a complete array of essential services but 
would provide public education and cultural facilities to their 
populations. These services would be available to all sectors without 
distinction or bias. Cities with a yellow rating would be lacking in 
providing education and cultural opportunities but would be able to 
maintain minimal levels of public health and sanitation. Trash pickup, 
ambulance service, and access to hospitals would all exist. Such a 
city's water supply would pass minimum safety standards. In contrast, 
cities in the "red" zone would be unable to supply more than 
intermittent power and water, some not even that.
Security is the subject of the fourth category. "Green" cities, while 
obviously not crime free, would be well regulated by professional, 
ethical police forces, able to respond quickly to a wide spectrum of 
threats. "Yellow" cities would be marked by extremely high crime rates, 
disregard of whole families of "minor crimes" due to lack of police 
resources, and criminal elements capable of serious confrontations. A 
"yellow" city's police force would have little regard for individual 
rights or legal constraints. In a "red" city, the police force has 
failed altogether or has become merely another armed group seeking power 
and wealth. Citizens must provide for their own protection, perhaps by 
hiring independent security personnel or paying protection to criminal 
organizations.
A special, overarching consideration is corruption. Cities "in the 
green" are relatively corruption free. Scandals are rare enough to be 
newsworthy, and when corruption is uncovered, self-policing mechanisms 
effectively deal with it. Corruption in cities "in the yellow" would be 
much worse, extending to every level of the city administration. In 
yellow cities, "patchwork" patterns might reflect which portions of the 
city were able to buy security and services and which were not. As for 
"red" cities, it would be less useful to speak of government corruption 
than of criminal and individual opportunism, which would he unconstrained.


CITY "MOSAICS"
The picture of a city that emerges is a mosaic, and like an artist's 
mosaic it can be expected to contain more than one color. Some healthy 
cities function with remarkable degrees of corruption. Others, robust 
and vital in many ways, suffer from appalling levels of criminal 
activity. Even a city with multiple "red" categories is not necessarily 
feral--yet. It is the overall pattern and whether that pattern is 
improving or deteriorating over time that give the overall diagnosis.
It is important to remember a diagnostic tool such as this merely 
produces a "snapshot" and is therefore of limited utility unless 
supported by trend analysis. "Patchwork" and "diurnal" situations can 
exist in all the categories; an urban center with an overall red 
rating--that is, a feral city--might boast a tiny enclave where "green" 
conditions prevail; quite healthy cities experience cycles of decline 
and improvement. Another caution concerns the categories themselves. 
Although useful indicators of a city's health, the boundaries are not 
clearly defined but can be expected to blur.
The Healthy City: New York. To some it would seem that New York is an 
odd example of a "green" city. One hears and recalls stories of 
corruption, police brutality, crime, pollution, neighborhoods that 
resemble war zones, and the like. Yet by objective indicators (and 
certainly in the opinion of the majority of its citizens) New York is a 
healthy city and in no risk of "going feral." Its police force is well 
regulated, well educated, and responsive. The city is a hub of national 
and international investment. It generates substantial revenues and has 
a stable tax base. It provides a remarkable scope of services, including 
a wide range of educational and cultural opportunities. Does this 
favorable evaluation mean that the rich are not treated differently from 
the poor, that services and infrastructure are uniformly well 
maintained, or that there are no disparities of economic opportunity or 
race? Absolutely not. Yet despite such problems New York remains a 
viable municipality.

The Yellow Zone: Mexico City. This sprawling megalopolis of more than 
twenty million continues to increase in size and population every year. 
It is one of the largest urban concentrations in the world. As the seat 
of the Mexican government, it receives a great deal of state attention. 
However, Mexico City is now described as an urban nightmare. (12)

Mexico City's air is so polluted that it is routinely rated medically as 
unfit to breathe. There are square miles of slums, often without sewage 
or running water. Law and order is breaking down at an accelerating 
rate. Serious crime has doubled over the past three to four years; it is 
estimated that 15.5 million assaults now occur every year in Mexico 
City. Car-jacking and taxi-jacking have reached such epidemic 
proportions that visitors are now officially warned not to use the cabs. 
The Mexico City police department has ninety-one thousand officers--more 
men than the Canadian army--but graft and corruption on the force are 
rampant and on the rise. According to Mexican senator Adolfo Zinser, 
police officers themselves directly contribute to the city's crime 
statistics: "In the morning they are a policeman. In the afternoon 
they're crooks" The city's judicial system is equally corrupt. Not 
surprisingly, these aspects of life in Mexico City have reduced the 
willingness of foreign investors to send money or representatives there. 
(13)
Johannesburg; On a Knife Edge. As in many South African cities, police 
in Johannesburg are waging a desperate war for control of their city, 
and it is not clear whether they will win. Though relatively small in 
size, with only 2.9 million official residents, Johannesburg 
nevertheless experiences more than five thousand murders a year and at 
least twice as many rapes. Over the last several years investors and 
major industry have fled the city. Many of the major buildings of the 
Central Business District have been abandoned and are now home to 
squatters. The South African National Stock Exchange has been removed to 
Sandton--a safer northern suburb. Police forces admit they do not 
control large areas of the city; official advisories warn against 
driving on certain thoroughfares. At night residents are advised to 
remain in their homes. Tourism has dried up, and conventions, once an 
important source of revenue, are now hosted elsewhere in the country.

The city also suffers from high rates of air pollution, primarily from 
vehicle exhaust but also from the use of open fires and coal for cooking 
and heating. Johannesburg's two rivers are also considered unsafe, 
primarily because of untreated human waste and chemicals leaching from 
piles of mining dross. Mining has also contaminated much of the soil in 
the vicinity.


Like those of many states and cities in Africa, Johannesburg's problems 
are exacerbated by the AIDS epidemic. Nationally it is feared the number 
of infected persons may reach as high as 20 percent of the population. 
All sectors of the economy have been affected adversely by the epidemic, 
including in Johannesburg. (14)
Although Mexico City and Johannesburg clearly qualify for "yellow" and 
"red" status, respectively, it would be premature to predict that either 
of these urban centers will inevitably become feral. Police corruption 
has been an aspect of Mexico City life for decades; further, the recent 
transition from one political party to two and a downswing in the state 
economy may be having a temporarily adverse influence on the city. In 
the case of Johannesburg, the South African government has most 
definitely not given up on attempts to revive what was once an 
industrial and economic showplace. In both Mexico and South Africa there 
are dedicated men and women who are determined to eliminate corruption, 
clean the environment, and better the lives of the people. Yet a note of 
caution is appropriate, for in neither example is the trend in a 
positive direction.
Further--and it should come as no surprise--massive cities in the 
developing world are at far greater risk of becoming feral than those in 
more developed states. Not only are support networks in such regions 
much less robust, but as a potentially feral city grows, it consumes 
progressively more resources. (15) Efforts to meet its growing needs 
often no more than maintain the status quo or, more often, merely slow 
the rate of decay of government control and essential services. All this 
in turn reduces the resources that can be applied to other portions of 
the country, and it may well increase the speed of urban hypertrophy. 
However, even such developed states as Brazil face the threat of feral 
cities. For example, in March 2003 criminal cartels controlled much of 
Rio de Janeiro. Rio police would not enter these areas, and in effect 
pursued toward them a policy of containment. (16)

FERAL CITIES AND THE U.S. MILITARY
Feral cities do not represent merely a sociological or urban-planning 
issue; they present unique military challenges. Their very size and 
densely built-up character make them natural havens for a variety of 
hostile nonstate actors, ranging from small cells of terrorists to large 
paramilitary forces and militias. History indicates that should such a 
group take American hostages, successful rescue is not likely. (17) 
Combat operations in such environments tend to be manpower intensive; 
limiting noncombatant casualties can be extraordinarily difficult. An 
enemy more resolute than that faced in the 2003 war with Iraq could 
inflict substantial casualties on an attacking force. The defense of the 
Warsaw ghetto in World War II suggests how effectively a conventional 
military assault can be resisted in this environment. Also, in a combat 
operation in a feral city the number of casualties from pollutants, 
toxins, and disease may well be higher than those caused by the enemy.
These environmental risks could also affect ships operating near a feral 
city. Its miles-long waterfront may offer as protected and sheltered a 
setting for antishipping weapons as any formal coastal defense site. 
Furthermore, many port cities that today, with proper security 
procedures, would be visited for fuel and other supplies will, if they 
become feral, no longer be available. This would hamper diplomatic 
efforts, reduce the U.S. Navy's ability to show the flag, and complicate 
logistics and supply for forward-deployed forces.
Feral cities, as and if they emerge, will be something new on the 
international landscape. Cities have descended into savagery in the 
past, usually as a result of war or civil conflict, and armed resistance 
groups have operated out of urban centers before. But feral cities, as 
such, will be a new phenomenon and will pose security threats on a scale 
hitherto not encountered. (18) It is questionable whether the tools, 
resources, and strategies that would be required to deal with these 
threats exist at present. But given the indications of the imminent 
emergence of feral cities, it is time to begin creating the means.

THE HEALTH OF CITIES
Government Economy


Health Enacts effective Robust. Significant
("Green") legislation, directs foreign investment.
resources, controls Provides goods and
events in all portions services. Possesses
of the city all the stabnle and adequate
time. Not corrupt. tax base.

Marginal Evxercises only Limited/no foreign
("Yellow") "patchwork" or investment. Subsi-
"diurnal" control. dized or decaying
Highly corrupt. industries and grow-
ing deficits.

Going Feral At best has negoti- Either local subsi-
("Red") ated zones of con- tence industries or
trol; at worst does industry based on il-
not exist. legal commerce.


Services Security


Health Complete range of Well regulated by
("Green") services, including professional, ethical
educational and cul- police forces. Quick
tural, available to all response to wide
city residents. spectrum of
requirements.

Marginal Can manage mini- Little regard for le-
("Yellow") mal level of public gality/human rights.
health, hospital ac- Police often matched/
cess, potable water, stymied by criminal
trash disposal. "peers."

Going Feral Intermittent to non- Nonexistent. Secu-
("Red") existent power and rity is attained
water. Those who through private
can afford ro will means or paying
privately contract. protection.


NOTES
(1.) I am indebted to my colleague Dr. James Miskel for the "petri dish" 
analogy.
(2.) Thomas Stern Eliot, "The Wasteland," in The New Oxford Book of 
English Verses: 1250-1950, ed. Helen Gardner (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), p. 881.
(3.) See, for example, James F. Miskel and Richard J. Norton, "Spotting 
Trouble: Identifying Faltering and Failing States," Naval War College 
Review 50, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 79-91.
(4.) Perhaps the most arbitrary component of this definition is the 
selection of a million inhabitants as a defining characteristic of a 
feral city. An earlier approach to this issue focused on megacities, 
cities with more than ten million inhabitants. However, subsequent 
research indicated that much smaller cities could also become feral, and 
so the population threshold was reduced. For more information on 
concepts of urbanization see Stanley D. Brunn, Jack P. Williams, and 
Donald J. Zeigler, Cities of the World: World Regional Urban Development 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 5-14.
(5.) Such a pattern is already visible today. See Brunn, Williams, and 
Zeigler, chap. 1.
(6.) "China Criticized for Dragging Feet on Outbreak," News in Science, 
7 April 2003, p. 1.
(7.) The issue of pollution stemming from coastal cities is well 
documented. For example, see chapter two of United Nations Environmental 
Program, Global Environmental Outlook--2000 (London: Earthscan, 2001).

(8.) The profits involved in such enterprises can be staggering. For 
example, the profits from smuggled cigarettes in 1997 were estimated to 
be as high as sixteen billion dollars a year. Among the identified major 
smuggling centers were Naples, Italy; Hong Kong; and Bogota, Colombia. 
Raymond Bonner and Christopher Drew, "Cigarette Makers Are Seen as 
Aiding Rise in Smuggling," New York Times, 26 August 1997, C1.
(9.) A similar approach was used in Miskel and Norton, cited above, for 
developing a taxonomy for identifying failing states.
(10.) This is not to imply that such a city would be 100 percent 
law-abiding or that incidents of government failure could not be found. 
But these conditions would be the exception and not the rule.
(11.) Not that this would present no complications. It is likely that 
states containing a feral city would not acknowledge a loss of 
sovereignty over the metropolis, even if this were patently the case. 
Such claims could pose a significant obstacle to collective 
international action.
(12.) Transcript, PBS Newshour, "Taming Mexico City," 12 January 1999, 
available at www.Pbs <http://www.Pbs> 
.org/newshour/bb/latin_American/jan-jun99/ mexico [accessed 15 June 2003].
(13.) Compiled from a variety of sources, most notably "Taming Mexico 
City," News Hour with Jim Lehrer, transcript, 12 January 1999.
(14.) Compiled from a variety of sources, including BBC reports.
(15.) Brunn, Williams, and Zeigler, p. 37.
(16.) Interview, Dr. Peter Liotta, with the author, Newport, R.I., 14 
April 2003.
(17.) While the recent successful rescue of Army Private First Class 
Jessica Lynch during the 2003 Iraq War demonstrates that success in such 
operations is not impossible, U.S. experiences with hostages in Iran, 
Lebanon, and Somalia would suggest failure is a more likely outcome.
(18.) It is predicted that 60 percent of the world's population will 
live in an urban environment by the year 2030, as opposed to 47 percent 
in 2000. Furthermore, the majority of this growth will occur in less 
developed countries, especially in coastal South Asia. More than 
fifty-eight cities will boast populations of more than five million 
people. Brunn, williams, and Zeigler, pp. 9-11.
Dr. Norton holds an undergraduate degree from Tulane University and a 
Ph.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy. Before retiring as a commander in the U.S. Navy he served 
extensively a t sea in cruisers and destroyers and in a variety of 
political-military billets ashore. He is now a professor of national 
security affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department of 
the Naval War College.

COPYRIGHT 2003 U.S. Naval War College
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

__,_._,___

-- 
"Only a zit on the wart on the heinie of progress." Copyright 1992, Frank Rice


Terry W. Colvin, Sierra Vista, Arizona (USA) < fortean1 at mindspring.com >
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