[extropy-chat] "Dead Time" of the Brain.

[John K Clark]

"Heartland" <velvet977 at hotmail.com>

> it occurred to me that minds are not information.

It's true, minds are not information, at least that's not all they are; to
make a mind you also need matter and energy. However atoms and energy are
generic so they can't give us originality so it must be the information; if
it's not information then it must be the soul just like the TV evangelists
say. But I'm not a big fan of TV evangelists so I don't believe in souls.

> Life is a subjective experience

OK.

 >of being in the present moment.

Redundant. "The present moment" is subjective.

> Whenever an instance of that experience ends

Let's change the word "ends" to "stops".

> this resulting state becomes [..] what is currently considered as "death"

That is a contradiction. If a mind objectively stops for a million years and
then starts up again right where it left off what does it matter to the
mind? You and I both agree that subjectivity is what's all important and
subjectively nothing has stopped at all, his mind has been sailing along
continuously without a hitch, the only thing he may notice is that the
external world has made a very sudden jump, but that's the world's problem
not his.

>"Mind object consists of all matter but only that matter which is presently
> and actively involved in energy exchanges that produce the mind
> (e.g. electrons streaming down synapses).

The only thing worse than trying to give individuality to atoms is trying to
give individuality to electrons.

> Brain object consists of all nonessential matter that merely "contains"
> that energy exchange process

You distinction between "brain object" and "mind objects" makes no sense.
Zero. Far from being "nonessential" if that energy is not contained the mind
will not work.  And at the atomic level all interactions must involve an
exchange process of some sort, an exchange of energy or charge or mass or
spin. And if it doesn't involve an interaction there is no point in even
talking about it.

> our present subjective experience is indeed a copy's
> llusion. I hate this.

I don't see why you would hate this, I think it's wonderful. Your copy's
"illusion" has served you very well your entire life, so I don't see why
you'd suddenly become dissatisfied at the "illusion" your Cryonicly
revived body produces.

Put it another way, suppose just suppose tour subjective experience
were NOT a copy's illusion, how would you be better off? For the
life of me I can't think of any reason you would be.

  John K Clark