[extropy-chat] Survival tangent (was Just curious, it's not natural!)

[Lee Corbin]

Jef writes

> While I know of many who have asserted that one is effectively defined
> or distinguished by ones values, beliefs and memories, I know of no one
> (other than you) who has said that this implies values, beliefs and
> memories could be independently distributed as you say.

But to some extent, values, beliefs, and memories *can* be independently
distributed, in the sense of being distributed among a set of causally
independent running processes.  The case of physical duplicates, or
near physical duplicates, is what of course I have in mind.  (I realize
that some have already stated this.)

But we have to consider sliding scales. If your own VBM overlap to
a tremendous extent those of "another person", then it seems to me
that indeed to that same extend you are that other person. Of course,
infinite care is required here to avoid begging the question of what a
"person" is.

That is, I mean that two physically distinct and causally separate processes
ought to be regarded as the same person under the right circumstances.
(Heartland, of course, regards this as absolutely contrary to what is meant
by a "person", who he invariably sees as totally incapable of being in two
places at once.)

But people can be in two places at once,  even though it seems uncanny 
to our evolutionarily derived notions of self.  Nonetheless, once forking
is a possibility (either after uploading or, less plausibly, via teleporters
and copying machines), people will have to accustom themselves to the
idea.

And if that's true, then sliding scales can apply:  there could be two
separately running instances X and Y such that I am logically compelled
to identify with X to about a 20% level and Y to about a 60% level.
(Concrete cases might be my own selves at ages 5 and 15 respectively,
and future tech could allow contemporaneous execution.)

Heartland or Jef writes (the attribution isn't so easy for some reason)

>> (1)  Note that this is logically consistent with what many of us have 
>> been saying; that there can be a gradient of personal identity and 
>> that there can be duplicates of personal identity.

That is so, whoever wrote it.

> But that's just like saying that 1 can also mean 2 or that "blue sky"
> can sometimes be red. The words imply certain conditions you must follow
> when assigning the referents. If you violate these conditions you're
> just end up using a wrong referent for a word and, consequently, should
> be using a different word. So, for example, there's no such thing as
> "duplicates of personal identity" or a "gradient of personal identity"
> just like there's no such thing as "two originals" or "23% of being
> pregnant."

Well, blue skies can indeed contain shades of red, and just why aren't
there "duplicates of personal identity"?  I may be missing your logical
point.  Also, why can't there be a "gradient of personal identity"?
Surely one is a lot more the same person one was at age 15 than
one was at age 5.  What worries me about survival in particular is
that as it stands I am alas turning into someone else slowly but surely.
But more of than later, in a different response I hope.

Lee