[extropy-chat] Survival tangent (was Just curious, it's not natural!)

[Randall Randall]

Lee Corbin wrote:

> Heartland writes
>
> > [Jeffrey wrote]
> >>  Lee writes:
> >>  "But people can be in two places at once, even though it seems  
> uncanny
> >> to our evolutionarily derived notions of self. Nonetheless, once  
> forking
> >> is a possibility (either after uploading or, less plausibly, via  
> teleporters
> >> and copying machines), people will have to accustom themselves  
> to the
> >> idea."
> >
> > Jeffrey [wrote]:
> > "Personally, I'm not ready to reject Slawomir's ideas and  
> conceptions. But, in this
> > particular example, I agree with you Lee. That the intricate  
> weave of
> > *consciousness* of a person can effectively "exist" at two places  
> simultaneously.
>
> Right, Jeffrey, but we'll still have to convince Heartland   :-)     
> I love pincer
> attacks.  John Clark is coming at him from the north while we hammer
> away from the west

Well, Mr. Clark isn't so much debating or arguing as ridiculing, which
may be fun for those who already agree with him, but doesn't do much
to explain his position to those who don't.  There is no phrasing of
an idea so clear that no separate stupid idea cannot be assumed to have
been meant by it.

> > But these two streams of data are merely components in a single  
> instance of mind. I
> > suspect that when Lee says that, "people can be in two places at  
> once," he means
> > that, "people can *see* two places at once" which is certainly  
> possible, as you
> > say.
>
> No---I did mean *being*.  Now, first, please understand that these are
> two totally and completely separate physical processes with absolutely
> no knowledge of each other.

In which case, you appear to have conceded the point to Heartland. ;)

Of course, you're arguing that two distinct and completely separate  
processes
can nevertheless be the same "person", but that's just a matter of  
definition,
really.  I don't think that Heartland would argue (and *I* certainly  
wouldn't)
against the point that two copies of him would each be *a* Heartland,  
but only
the idea that they're somehow the same process.

> > Two unconnected instances of mind
> > cannot be a single instance of mind.
>
> Yes, but the concept of *person* that you dispute includes the
> proposition that you are the same person you were ten years ago
> even though we are speaking of two minds, two brains, two
> spatial locations, and two temporal locations. But still *one* person.

If and only if one process.  In the view that the process is the person,
other processes with bit-for-bit similar values, beliefs, memories,  
habits,
and so forth, are simply instances of a very restricted *type* of  
person.

Since we only have one person of each type (in this sense) to date, the
distinction between the type of person and the person themselves is  
often
lost in these discussions.

--
Randall Randall <randall at randallsquared.com>
"You don't help someone by looking at their list of options and
  eliminating the one they chose!" -- David Henderson