[extropy-chat] the self identity quest – summation to Bradbury, Wallace and Jef

[david ish shalom]

Robert Bradbury write: ….. I am willing to go on record, as stating that
info-identity is a legitimate process of preserving oneself.  Most people
considering "identity" are doing so in an information constrained world (i.e.
it is impossible to copy oneself).  But this will not always be the case.  A
copy of information imprinted on 3 lbs of wet matter will not always be
"unique". So David's choice of selling point aside one has to deal with 1 =
1 = 1... and you can apply it to the left of or to the right of as selling
points but you still have to get back to "is it identical".  I have no
problem with
people treating copies of Robert as if they were Robert. surrogates (copies)
filling in for = substituting - me.  In particular I would like to know
*who* would be so presumptuous as to claim knowing when I have been replaced
by one of my copies and how they would know  such.
Robert through your inspiration and others here, I could  have come to
phrase this new angle, and this is also a kind of summation to the
discussion about identity capture and reanimation from my point of view:
info-resurrection can be defined as minimal and maximal option. Firstly,  on
its minimal viewpoint INRES is an impressive virtual statue of
oneself, as Russel
Wallace phrased it: "metaphorical immortality through one's works - that's a
familiar enough
concept. Sort of the digital equivalent of getting a statue of yourself But
the thing about statues is, they get done because people think they look
cool. So go ahead and create a digital monument to yourself, and do it in
such a way that it looks cool - nice site layout and suchlike. Then point
people to it and say "wouldn't you like one of these for yourself?" Russel
this is a fantastic vision which I wholeheartedly adopt,

Yet I would add  your view  is the minimal option.  mine is the maximal
option that  it is going to be your true virtual immortality, So why not
support it anyway, even if  you don't think it will be totally your self
identity, - and see my work  http://davidishalom1.googlepages.com/home  for
the contrary  -  yet, even if you are not sure about that, even if you don't
believe that it will be you, who will wake up,  nevertheless, why not
capture your personality and create vivid and convincing simulation of
yourself, someone/s who talk like you, think like you – and million times
faster as well – look like you – only your improved and enhanced you in the
cyber space; and as Jef holds be your true and full agent, and even if you
don't think it will be you, surely it will be your mind child, and since we
inclined to wish good to our genetic children, isn't it time we originate,
create, and wish all the best to our mind children, to our mind clone?

Yet as is mentioned in my work about info-resurrection (my site is  cleaned
from yellowish highlights thanks to some advice here)  only after emergence
of really intelligent AI next decade, we will be able to run these vivid and
convincing simulation about ourselves, probably more than one simulation
synchronously, vivid and convincing avatar/s of ourselves, and this will
gain huge popularity in the Net, while everyone will have his virtual self
there –self agent/s, according to Jef Allbright theory -  not only to live,
experience and evolve, but to exercise improving fidelity and identification
of oneself with your virtual self. At this stage, I am not talking yet about
conscious personalized AI of yourself, but as long as you continue to live,
the intimacy and identification between you and your virtual you, your true
and complete agent, in the cyberspace is just growing, later conscious
artificial intelligence will emerging, until one day if you exidentally die
phisically– and hopefully that will never happen :)-  than instantly you
wake up as your info-resurrected self or at least your mind clone.

To Jef Allbright, your theory  of agency as the source of personal identity
" namely that multiple agents (can be said to) share the same personal
identity to the extent that they (are observed to) act on behalf of a
particular entity".  is a thoughtful ingenuity no doubt. I tend to adopt
this theory of "agency" to my eclectic repertoire of theories of the self
identity, and I will integrate parts of your text here as well as Alice's
story in my website: http://davidishalom1.googlepages.com/home all
represented under your name for sure. I would advise you to check Joe Strout
Fuzzy experience theory of the self - a summary in my site - since it is
complementary to your theory. Yet I would suggest that  your "agency theory
of the self" is strongly contributing to representing the self from the
outside point of view and maybe only partly so from the inside qualia- "is
it me who will wake up" point of view - yet I have to delve on this more -
and from this respect, maybe Max Mores The Diachronic Self, come better for
our rescue. Further I would suggest that all these theories of the self are
complimentary and all of them, including yours give credence to the identity
capture feasibility.  Why so?  you state  "… If we extend the concept of
agency, we see the agent taking on more and more resemblance to the
principle, in terms of knowing the principle's values, beliefs and memories
and being able to choose and take action in all such respects" and this
parallel to what I mentioned above   "only after emergence of really
intelligent AI next decade, we will be able to run these vivid and
convincing simulation about ourselves to their fullest, probably more than
only one simulation synchronously, vivid and convincing avatar/s of
ourselves, and this will gain huge popularity in the Net, while everyone
will have his virtual self there – self agent/s, doing his work and
representing him there according to Jef Allbright -  not only to live,
experience and evolve,  and represent us there, but to exercise improving
fidelity and identification of oneself with your virtual self, your virtual
agent. Moreover, who is my true and complete agent as you hold? This is
something that can surely be captured, mainly more thoroughly with next
decade personalized AI but even now for large extent. I would dare to say
that Jef Allbright's "Agency Theory of the Self" do give more credence to
the identity capture option and to the info-resurrection strategy.

 Jef, I was laughing like anything  from your "he had been accused of a plot
to blow up an asteroid belonging to the Bush family and had therefore been
charged with terrorism under penalty of death." And much impressed by your
imaginative plot and illuminative abilities".

 I look forward to your thoughtful comments.
David

Jef Allbright "Agency theory of the self"

I will propose that a more encompassing concept of personal identity can be
based on agency, namely that multiple agents (can be said to) share the same
personal identity to the extent that they (are observed to) act
on behalf of a particular entity.    ….This is agency, but to a very limited
extent relative to what promises to be possible with future technologies. If
we extend the concept of agency, we see the agent taking on more and more
resemblance to the principle, in terms of knowing the principle's values,
beliefs and memories and being able to
choose and take action in all such respects…

Consider the following scenarios:

#1 With the intention of increasing my working bandwidth, I step into
the duplicator box. A short time later two agents acting on behalf of
the entity known (by everyone including himself) as Jef go to work.
They happen to be physically (and thus functionally) the same as the
original so the results are coincidentally the same as the patternist
view.

#2 With the intention of increasing my working bandwidth I step into the
duplicator box. To avoid some confusion, I set the controls so that one
copy will have blue skin, but be identical in all other respects.  The
two agents of Jef go to work.  Would the patternist say they are not the
same personal identity since there's an obvious physical difference?
>From the point of view of agency, it's the same personal identity, but
with different skin colors. If Jef's skin color were to change would we
say he's a different person?

#3 With the intention of temporarily increasing my working bandwidth I
step into the duplicator box.  To avoid confusion and dispute later on,
I set the controls such that one copy will have blue skin and will also
not feel hunger or boredom, and incidentally it will die within a short
time (maybe due to not eating.)  From the patternist point of view there
are two different persons physically, functionally, and in terms of
values.  From the point of view of agency it's two of Jef, with one of
them significantly modified.  If Jef were in the hospital with a skin
condition and a brain anomaly that caused lack of boredom would we say
it isn't Jef?  Note that the functions and actions of someone in
hospital may be severely modified but they continue to act solely and
entirely on behalf of the same entity.

#4 With the intention of contributing to the worthwhile social cause of
asteroid mining, but not being able to send my firstborn son, I step
into the duplicator box.



 I send my duplicate off as a free agent to
contribute to the cause, knowing that he will get a good pension and I
probably won't ever see him again. The patternist view would insist that
I was sending myself.  The agency point of view would say I was sending
a different person with an extremely strong resemblance, carrying my
knowledge and skills.  Note that if I had in fact sent my son, no one
would think of doubting that he was ultimately a free agent, even though
I was the sole direct cause of his enlistment.


#5 Ten years after sending said free agent to the asteroid mines, he
returns, informs me that he was converted to patternist thinking while
away, and now claims equal share of my property, my projects and my
wife.  A patternist might claim (I remember Lee claiming this) that he
would in fact be me, and I should be happy to have doubled my runtime
and gladly find a way to share.

#6 A few days later, I learn that the real reason he returned from the
asteroid mines is that he had been accused of a plot to blow up an
asteroid belonging to the Bush family and had therefore been charged
with terrorism under penalty of death.  Under patternist thinking,
should I turn myself in, or under agent-based thinking, should I tell
him he's in big trouble and might consider making a large political
contribution while in hiding?

#7 *Remember *Alice*?  Under patternist thinking according to Lee, she died
at some point even though someone continued on with her property, her
relationships, and her name.  Under agent-based personal identity,
there's no question that we should see the 86 year old woman as a late
instantiation of the entity known to all, including herself, as *Alice.
*Furthermore, fifty years later, we would gladly interact with her
variants and doubles exactly as if they were *Alice* in various alternate
forms and places.



*
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