[extropy-chat] Survival tangent.

Ian Goddard iamgoddard at yahoo.com
Mon Nov 6 22:48:51 UTC 2006


John K Clark wrote:

>> Why should properties of a mind/self resemble 
>> quantum properties of electrons?
>
> A mind does not have the quantum properties of an 
> electron, but a brain does.


 Have all quantum properties that defy macroscopic
behaviors been observed in atoms or their components
when they're embedded in some material? It seems all
(of the little) I've read on QM involves atoms or
their components separated from any atomic grouping,
as, for example, electrons or photons flying across
'open' space. So I've wondered if nonlocal behavior is
a potential result of being separated from some atomic
grouping, and so when atoms are bound together, such
nonlocality may not be the case.

 Delving into QM is one of those things that sits too
long on my back burner. I've made some preliminary
study of quantum logic, which looks like the best
place to start... and I'll get back to it asap. ;^)



>> But I see no reason to assume that the self of the 
>> original brain would be somehow connected to its 
>> copy.
>
> In thought experiments people always take the part 
> of the original, but try being the copy. Yesterday 
> I copied you and then instantly destroyed the
> original. Do you feel dead?  You still remember 
> being you yesterday and last year and when you were 
> nine, you can see no discontinuity between yesterday
> and today. You had no last thought so you have no 
> reason to complain,. And if I didn't tell you I'd 
> made the copy you'd never had known anything 
> unusual had happened. What more do you expect from 
> survival? It's true I can't ask the you of 
> yesterday his opinion on the matter, but that is
> ALWAYS true even without my pesky copying.


 I agree that the copy living on would be satisfied
that it survived and was 'me'. Maybe too, in line with
your argument, every time I go into deep sleep, the
'I' of before dies, and a new 'I' emerges upon waking
up. Notice that the logical identity analyses I posted
may run into trouble with respect to any person over
time. Today I have properties I lacked yesterday, does
that mean I'm not that Ian? Personal identity may call
upon a dynamic intensional model of identity, rather
than the static one I proposed.

 Consider deep sleep further. It would seem that each
time I'm in deep sleep, 'I' cease to exist, or exist
only as the potential of being reanimated when the
brain wakes up. So suppose the neuro-electric signal
to 'wake up' was rerouted into a perfect copy of my
brain exactly as it was when I went to sleep. Will 'I'
wake up? 

 Or suppose a copy brain was attached to me like:
http://www.nicolaas.net/dvorak/future/zaphod.jpg and
suppose one or both could be active. Do 'I' exist in
two locations? Hmmm... I'm still inclined to answer
both questions with 'no'. It just seems to me that
each brain (or brain copy) is its own machine. Even if
the output of each is indistinguishable to an
observer, they're still distinguishable in that
they're two machines (hearkening back to Leibniz's
Law). Perhaps analogies can be found that blur that
line more... what about if half of my brain was a copy
of half removed... ? Then I'd see the whole as one
'me'. But then suppose the remaining half was replaced
is a copy of that half too. Then what? 

 Perhaps better still (and someone's probably already
raised this). Just suppose for the sake of argument
that it's possible that as each brain cell died during
normal aging, a copy is put in its place. Now keep
supposing until no carbon-based cell is left. Well,
what we have is in effect a copy of a brain that
existed. And this copy was always in the same location
as the original. Now my inclination seems to shift to
believing that copy would be me. But am I justified in
shift my view at this point? Hmmm... ~Ian


http://iangoddard.net 

"Our greatest illusion is to believe that we are what
we think ourselves to be." -- Henri Amiel




 
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