[extropy-chat] Agency as Prime Determinant of Personal Identity

[Heartland]

Slawomir:
>> Right now, it seems like you, Lee, claim that it is "M" in VBM (Values, Beliefs, 
>> Memories) that deserves the most attention while Jef insists that the "VB" part 
>> is more crucial. These are interesting choices and each perspective demands 
>> different conclusions. However, before you devote a lot of time and energy on 
>> getting tangled up in details, I would like to point out that these choices are 
>> completely arbitrary.
>>
>> Choosing arbitrary criteria for what constitutes a person is a widespread 
>> problem....

Lee:
> When we attempt to go beyond today's capabilities, as the SF writers
> always do, we must *smoothly* extend the meanings we use daily
> into these new directions.  They must be compatible with our old
> meanings, even if they now apply to new things.
> In daily life, we all know what it means to die: you don't get to live
> anymore. No one is around who acts like you, talks like you, remembers
> what you remembered and so on.  Any sensible notions of what *future*
> survival and "personal identity" mean must maintain these fundamentals.


Yes! Nobody should attempt to form arguments about things like that without clear
understanding of the difference between life and death. This difference is not
arbitrary and never will be. The rest of the argument should follow *from*
non-arbitrary definition of life, and never *to* some new definition of life that's
implied by arbitrary assumptions that "felt" right at the time. A non-arbitrary
definition of life should be our starting point, not the finish line.

Lee:
> So it's not arbitrary:  our concept even when applied to new items must
> still make sense according to the old.  So to claim, for example, "Oh, I'll still 
> be alive if enough people read my books and belief my ideas"
> is nonsense, because we all know that despite all the effort, Jesus is
> no longer alive and kicking (was crucified or something, as everyone
> knows).

*nods*

(This is a good example of the type of argument that implies some new definition of
life.)

Slawomir:
>> I strongly believe that there should be *no room* for arbitrary choices at any 
>> point along the chain of logical inference. If X is more important than Y, then, 
>> before I can accept any conclusions *based* on X, I need to see the argument 
>> that comes before that which explains why X should matter most.

Lee:
> I agree.

I'm glad to hear that.

Slawomir:
>> Would it be possible to see such an argument from you, Jef or Lee?

Lee:
> Hopefully, despite my severly limited time the next day or two, I have
> made such an argument above.

Not yet, Lee. So far you've identified the correct criterion (capacity to preserve
life) by which we should judge importance of X vs. Y. Next part is the evaluation
of your X (memories) with respect to that criterion. In other words, using a
non-arbitrary definition of life (this is crucial) please show me how "preservation
of memories" implies "preservation of life?"

Slawomir