[extropy-chat] Islamic morons win yet again Resend 2

[Keith Henson]

At 03:17 PM 10/1/2006 +0100, you wrote:

> >
> > I am sure they are.  But the model predicts that as long as the future
> > prospects are good, the IRA or some other terrorist organization will not
> > get popular support.
> >
>That is why I am saying that NI is a bad example for you to use. The
>NI troubles were not a 'war' and killed a tiny percentage of the
>population.

Agreed, but I don't distinguish between war, terror, riots and other such 
social disruptions.

>The same falling birth rates applied in many places where
>there were no 'troubles'.

The causal arrow is that the falling birth rates and economic growth 
contributed to a rising income per capita and *that's* what pulled the 
motivation.  Obviously if there are no terror groups, then rising income 
per capita isn't going to shut off support for them.

>So NI is not an example that supports your theory that nations go into
>'war' mode and fight until they have killed sufficient people that the
>survivors can live better

The theory is not at all about nations and modern wars.  The theory is 
about human psychological traits that evolved during the long time that 
human ancestors lived in hunter-gatherer groups.  It happens that those 
traits still exist in humans and contribute causally to modern wars and 
related social disruptions.

>. Even though the war itself will destroy
>resources that support people. Think 'scorched earth'. Terrorism never
>kills in sufficient numbers to fit into your theory.

Agree on all your points.  See the corn farmer example in the EP, Memes and 
the origin of war paper for an example of how war can be ill adapted to 
societies more advanced than hunter gathers.

>I don't think you really want to weaken your claim to say that
>sometimes small groups of people start killing when they feel a bit
>miserable and stop killing when they cheer up. But that seems to be
>the direction you are heading. That claim is correct, of course, but
>not of great significance.

It seems to me that a predictive theory of when and where wars are likely 
to start would be of considerable significance.  If for no other reason 
than being able to get out of the way.

Keith Henson