[extropy-chat] Probability of identity

Heartland velvethum at hotmail.com
Tue Oct 10 18:20:20 UTC 2006

Jef wrote:
"So, the logically consistent way to look at the above situation must be
from the third party point of view: That the future scenario would
contain one individual indistinguishable from you, and 99 new
individuals being tortured."

Indeed. Hopefully, these sort of thought experiments begin to show why patternist 
view is logically inconsistent.

Jef wrote:
"So the question (which must remain in the third person POV)is whether
you would prefer a future with (A) your agency contained within the body
of a frog, or (B) the creation of 99 individuals (who happen to be very
similar to you) who are being tortured."

Clearly, the best solution from the original instance POV (that is, you) would be 
to preserve the first instance of you and send all the 99 new instances to Hell. 
Since all the 99 instances of your pattern are materially different, they won't 
affect subjective experience of the first instance, meaning, there is exactly zero 
chance that this original instance will feel any pain being suffered by new 99 
instances. Materially (and, therefore, subjectively), the original instance 
continues his/her life as if nothing happened. Obviously, if the original instance 
has a capacity for compassion, it will certainly feel very sad about the awful fate 
of 99 people suffering, but the point is that it will not experience their pain 


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