[ExI] Models vs. Reality

Lee Corbin lcorbin at rawbw.com
Wed Aug 22 02:24:15 UTC 2007


I've always been very annoyed by the creeping practice in physics
and in other discourse of remarks referring to theories by default,
and not referring to the realist's world "out there".

For example, it often happens that a description of a physical
entity will slowly slip to a description of a description, as might
happen if someone becomes less conscious of studying, say,
planetary orbits and become more conscious of studying
the mathematical abstractions of planetary orbits.

Here is a typical instance, taken from the extremely carefully
written book "How is Quantum Field Theory Possible?" (a
Kantian question that raises the possibility of "Transcendental
Investigation", if you really must know).  In an effort to define
"physcial system", "single systems", and "states", and so on,
in the context of physics, this is offered:

     A *state* of a physical system give the abstract
     summary of all its characteristics.

I'm sure that I am not the only one who blithely continues to
talk about (to refer) the thing-in-itself rather than about the
"abstract summary". Besides, couldn't this be intrinsically
problematic? Suppose that we were to believe some physical
system contains uncountably much information, e.g. uncountably
many real numbers. Then a *description* on the ordinary 
meaning of words could not keep up, consisting of merely
countably many statements.

Yes, when I refer to the "state of a quantum system", then
of course I am aware that it's the "quantum state" that we 
wish to talk about. But when I ordinarily refer to the *state*
of a system, I mean the state or situation OF THE SYSTEM.
Don't you?

When Will Rogers complained that he did not belong to any
organized political party, he certainly wasn't alluding to the
notion that he did not belong to an abstract summary of one.

Lee




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