[ExI] Qualia/Consciousness re:subjective and objective

citta437 at aol.com citta437 at aol.com
Tue Dec 18 17:59:44 UTC 2007

"Narrower definitions
Daniel Dennett identifies four properties that are commonly ascribed to 
qualia. According to these, qualia are:
ineffable; that is, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any 
other means than direct experience.
intrinsic; that is, they are non-relational properties, which do not 
change depending on the experience's relation to other things.
private; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are 
systematically impossible.
directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; that is, to 
experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all 
there is to know about that quale.
If qualia of this sort exist, then a normally-sighted person who sees 
red would be unable to describe the experience of this perception in 
such a way that a listener who has never experienced color will be able 
to know everything there is to know about that experience. Though it is 
possible to make an analogy, such as "red looks hot", or to provide a 
description of the conditions under which the experience occurs, such 
as "it's the color you see when light of 700 nm wavelength is directed 
at you," supporters of this kind of qualia contend that such a 
description is incapable of providing a complete description of the 
Another way of defining qualia is as "raw feels". A raw feel is a 
perception in and of itself, considered entirely in isolation from any 
effect it might have on behavior and behavioral disposition. In 
contrast, a "cooked feel" is that perception seen as existing in terms 
of its effects.
According to an argument put forth by Saul Kripke in "Identity and 
Necessity" (1971), one key consequence of the claim that such things as 
raw feels can be meaningfully discussed — that qualia exist — is that 
it leads to the logical possibility of two entities exhibiting 
identical behavior in all ways despite one of them entirely lacking 
qualia. While very few ever claim that such an entity, called a 
philosophical zombie, actually exists, the mere possibility is claimed 
to be sufficient to refute physicalism. Those who dispute the existence 
of qualia would therefore necessarily dispute the existence of 
philosophical zombies.
There is an ancient Sufi parable about coffee that nicely expresses the 
concept: "He who tastes, knows; he who tastes not, knows not."
John Searle has rejected the notion that the problem of qualia is 
different from the problem of consciousness itself, arguing that 
consciousness and qualia are one and the same phenomenon."

How can a robot function with consciousness or a sense of qualia? To 
send a robot to Mars is already feasible. What is missing is an 
apparatus which discern subjective from objective facts. Memory is a 
property of a computer-like brain and human brain value the past as if 
it is the present fact. There exist a gap between synaptic connections 
where neuron's reactions show a time lapse of some mm/second. See the 
function of the amygdala and hippocampus that's genetically involved in 
emotions and feellngs. These two regions of the brain has direct 
connection outside while the neo-cortex, center for memory and speech 
do not have direct connection outside. Their main functon is to 
interpret what is seen or felt according to what is stored in the 
memory center. Consciousness/qualia is subject to these quantum 
interactions between neurons so much so that stimulati received from 
the amygdala and hippocampus which secretes hormones and neuro-amines 
to kick up the response mechanism of fear or fight and flight reactions 
subject to the memory/image interpreted by the neo-cortex.

When the subjective and objective processes meet depends on a lot of 
random processes in the micro and macro world of interacting forces of 

More new features than ever.  Check out the new AOL Mail ! - 

More information about the extropy-chat mailing list