[ExI] Repeated Experience (was Affecting Past Experience)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 25/07/07, Lee Corbin <lcorbin at rawbw.com> wrote:

> Most people beielive that repeated experience should be completely
> identified with the original experience, but I consider the arguments
> against this to be strong. For one thing, what if the experience is only
> infinitesimally different? Sure, then it can be counted as infinitesimally
> more valuable (and so on). But it seems awkward.

It is awkward, but you can't escape the awkwardness in any personal
identity scenarios, since at some point you have to allow either a
continuous or discontinuous distinction between self and non-self.

> Then there is the argument from measure: on the theory (often used in
> MWI) that your "measure"---or the sum of your observer moments
> throughout the multiverse---is desired to be very large and is not
> desired to be very small, then it follows that you might be apprehensive
> concerning the following experiment:
>
>     You know (because the computer OS has told you so) that
>     your life actually consists of one-and-a-half runs. That is, the
>     original execution of your life was stored, and is/was/will-be
>     being replayed up to the half way point.  The OS now gleefully
>     informs you that you are arriving at the one-half point in your
>     life.
>
>     Should you be at all concerned?  After all, clearly the OS told/
>     is-telling both you and the next run of you (or you and the past
>     run).  There is the nagging idea that *this* may be the 2nd run,
>     and you're about to terminate forever (e.g. this will be the last
>     runtime you ever get).

The significant point I would like to make here is that the missing
half of the second run would have been no better qualified to continue
your experiences if you happened to be enjoying life in that run than
the second half of the first run is.

>    Now actually, the pointer (*this) in my opinion must refer equally
>    to this point in both runs. But to me, I am faced with the prospect
>    of  my runtime suddenly getting cut in half.  This is exactly how the
>    MWI devotee feels regarding a sudden fifty-fifty chance of
>    imminent death:   in half the universes he's okay, and in the other
>    half he dies immediately.  For me, I have a sort of fancy
>    "Many Worlds Normalization Principle" which asserts that with
>    very few exceptions, one ought to regard our feelings the same
>    whether or not Many Worlds is true.  In particular, having a 50/50
>    chance of death---which ordinarily of course makes people worry
>    greatly---should be regarded as a 50% reduction in measure over
>    a sheath of worlds.

There are several reasons to avoid situations in which you have a 50%
chance of dying, even if you believe that the MWI will save you in
some worlds: you might end up in pain or crippled; your friends and
family will end up grieving in half the worlds; and - descriptive
rather than prescriptive - you are more likely to find yourself in a
world where you have increased your measure by avoiding death.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou