[ExI] Repeated Experience (was Affecting Past Experience)
Vladimir Nesov
robotact at mail.ru
Thu Jul 26 23:45:04 UTC 2007
Friday, July 27, 2007, Lee Corbin wrote:
LC> Vladimir writes
LC> Naturally, I should not worry if I know that the Earth is going
LC> to be thoroughly cooked by a gamma burst 15 minutes from now:
LC> I can't do anything about it. Still, I would consider it an event
LC> worth taking note of, and it definitely would affect my priorities.
(Only as a side effect of heuristic that attracts attention to
processes that can significantly affect you.) - in this case
discussion is about fuzzy definition of 'should' in "should worry".
LC> In order to make this a real choice, we have to introduce the
LC> possibility that through strenuous effort (say, for example,
LC> praying very hard to the OS) you can avert the midlife termination
LC> of the 2nd run. This, then, brings it back into the normal or usual
LC> range of "worry" (not that it's especially rational). One would,
LC> for example, worry that one had not done quite enough praying.
Sounds like Pascal's wager in original scenario, since feedback of
this kind wasn't considered.
>> Objective many worlds perspective is equivalent
>> to subjective reformulation of mind operation in the following terms.
>> Mind is an algorithm that selects an
>> action of an agent, or equivalently mind anticipates an action of an
>> agent, and anticipated action is performed.
LC> This is very hard to follow, sorry. For one thing, I understand
LC> that "mind" has no equivalent in German. (That's probably a
LC> very good thing, German metaphysics are already unendureable,
LC> so thank God they never stumbled upon "Mind". I'm sure you
LC> know how philosophers have spent so much time and killed so
LC> many trees over the Mind/Body problem!) At any rate, it's
LC> a sign that perhaps the term is not needed, and can be replaced
LC> with other phraseology.
I'm just inventing a bicycle here. Agent is a body which interacts
with universe, mind is an algorithmic process running in its 'brain'.
Mind isn't a person, but a framework for anticipation, predicting
among other things processes attributed to self, in particular actions
which are in result executed by agent (body). Person seems to
correspond to agent+self.
>> Mind also anticipates performance of universe (grounded to senses,
>> whatever). It doesn't know with certainty what will happen, but it
LC> by 'it' I guess you me you, me, or someone
Since mind itself is mechanical and without personality, I refer to it
as 'it'.
>> must select a single action for an agent, so it holds a measure over
>> possible states of the universe, selecting an action of agent with
>> greatest measure.
LC> Is this measure over the many-worlds, or over some state-space
LC> in our possibly infinite physical universe?
General case (which doesn't prohibit zero measure for vast classes of
universe).
>> MWI trick is that performing a quantum suicide experiment is
>> expected under some circumstances to be selected by a rational
>> mind [person?] over not performing an experiment.
LC> I really don't recall debating with anyone recently who held
LC> that quantum suicide is a good idea; that is, were the options
LC> truly available (and I guess they are) then I don't know anyone
LC> who'd do it. Hmm. Of course! I guess it's not surprising that
LC> I don't know someone like that.
Well, with not-that-bad chance there should be at least some successful
adopters in that case :). But as I see it the gist of quantum suicide
is that if you are ideally egoistic you shouldn't care.
>> In subjective interpretation of MWI it corresponds to agent
>> having a theory of its mind's operation, so that agent can
>> manipulate decision making procedure of its mind, allowing
>> otherwise irrational decisions.
LC> Although we may have trouble understanding each other here,
LC> I don't usually find "subjective" accounts to be very valuable,
LC> although there are exceptions. It's a lot easier, anyway, to
LC> concentrate on the objective, I think.
When discussion involves observers it's inevitable... Also viewing the
same issue from both points of view can help in consistency checking
(which is what I tried to do for MWI from subjective point of view).
--
Vladimir Nesov mailto:robotact at mail.ru
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