[ExI] any exact copy of you is you + universe is infinite = you are guaranteed immortality

[Lee Corbin]

TheMan writes

> Premise 1) If an exact copy of you is made at the
> moment when you die, and that copy is then brought
> back to life, you will go on living as that copy.

Yes, that's true, but it's true whether or not a particular
you dies.

> Premise 2) If universe is infinite, there must be an
> infinite number of exact copies of you at every
> moment, thus also when you die, copies of which some
> (an unfinite number, to be exact) will happen to be
> brought to life.

Yes, true, though again you seem to be inferring a
causality between "you die" and copies trillions of
light years away being "brought to life". In reality,
you are a set of patterns, and you get run time
wherever something sufficiently similar to you gets
run time.

> Conclusion of premise 1 + premise 2 = you will live
> for ever, no matter what happens to you. You don't
> need to take care of your body, you don't need
> supplements,

---you don't need to worry about oncoming traffic---

> you don't need cryopreservation, and you
> don't need any other specific longevity methods in
> order to achieve immortality. You are immortal anyway.

I think that your measuring rod is incorrect. You seem
to be asserting that since the number of copies of you
is infinite, then plus or minus one more doesn't make
any difference.  But there *is* a difference!  If you
die *here* then you also must die in a certain fraction
of similar situations, also infinite in number. So we 
must abandon numerical or cardinal identity and 
speak of measure instead. 

(I assume that you understand that if you die "here"
then since similar circumstances occur everywhere
---within a large enough radius of spacetime---
then the same circumstances obtain in a definite
*fraction* of spacetime.)

> And compared to the eternity in paradise that
> follows after that, the time of hassles up until then
> is nothing. So, no worries.)

It is absurd not to worry about a loved one. If the
fraction of solar systems similar enough to this one
to contain a copy of your loved one, then you
should lament their passing. And of course, this
will include yourself, normally.

> Isn't this an inevitable logical conclusion of the two
> premises above? 

No, for the reason given. For you to die in a fraction
of universes cuts down your total runtime by that same
fraction. 

> Are the two premises correct? 

Yes, but only if you realize that you are already living
in your copies whether or not your local instance
terminates.

Lee