[ExI] any exact copy of you is you + universe is infinite = you are guaranteed immortality
mabranu at yahoo.com
Sat Jun 16 01:46:56 UTC 2007
Lee Corbin writes:
> TheMan writes
> > Premise 1) If an exact copy of you is made at the
> > moment when you die, and that copy is then brought
> > back to life, you will go on living as that copy.
> Yes, that's true, but it's true whether or not a
> you dies.
As long as my copy and I keep having the exact same
experiences, I guess you could say I'm both me and my
copy. But subjectively, I can only have the experience
of being one person at a time, and then it doesn't
matter if I'm one or two. And since there are
infinitely many copies of me whichever ways I live (or
die), I can afford to die any number of times and
there will still always be copies which I can continue
living as. I will still, subjectively, have no more
and no less than _one_ continuous experience of
living, just as in any scenarios where I always do my
best to live as long as possible in each body. And I
only care about my subjective experience of living
(that is, as long as the number of copies of me
doesn't get so low that my future existence starts
being threatened - which should never happen if there
is an infinite number of copies of me. Whichever way I
die, it won't divide the infinite number of copies of
me by an infinite number, only by an (admittedly
usually very large) finite number. This is because the
likelihood of me dying is not infinitely small at any
> > Premise 2) If universe is infinite, there must be
> > infinite number of exact copies of you at every
> > moment, thus also when you die, copies of which
> > (an unfinite number, to be exact) will happen to
> > brought to life.
> Yes, true, though again you seem to be inferring a
> causality between "you die" and copies trillions of
> light years away being "brought to life".
I don't. I understand that _they_ live whether I die
or not, but if I don't die, they are not me, because
it's only if I die that I become identical to them
(=become them). Part of their identity is being
someone who has died. So, as long as I don't die, I
won't be them, as I won't be identical to them. I
think of them as a path that I can use or not use for
my personal subjective personhood continuity. Whether
I choose to live as them or go on living here, I will
subjectively experience exactly one personhood
continuity, no more, no less. That is, until I aquire
technology that enables me to have the experience of
having several personhood continuities
simultaneously(that'll be cool!).
> you are a set of patterns, and you get run time
> wherever something sufficiently similar to you gets
> run time.
I _subjectively_experience_ only one run time - my
subjective personhood continuity. If I have run time
at other places, that's not something I experience, at
least not that I'm aware of. And as I don't experience
any benefits from my copies' run time, why care about
their run time?
> > Conclusion of premise 1 + premise 2 = you will
> > for ever, no matter what happens to you. You don't
> > need to take care of your body, you don't need
> > supplements,
> ---you don't need to worry about oncoming traffic---
> > you don't need cryopreservation, and you
> > don't need any other specific longevity methods in
> > order to achieve immortality. You are immortal
> I think that your measuring rod is incorrect. You
> to be asserting that since the number of copies of
> is infinite, then plus or minus one more doesn't
> any difference. But there *is* a difference! If
> die *here* then you also must die in a certain
> of similar situations, also infinite in number.
Yes, that way, there may be a difference, but even if
the number of copies of me decrease with an infinitely
large fraction of infinity every time I die, won't
there still always be an infinite number of copies of
me left? Anything else would suggest that some
scenarios in universe only have a finite number of
copies of them, which, statistically, is infinitely
unlikely, because the amount of possible infinite
numbers (of copies, or of anything whatsoever) is
infinitely greater than the amount of possible finite
numbers (of that same thing). Since any given
phenomenon can have any number of copies, it is
statistically infinitely unlikely that its number of
copies would happen to be within the span of finite
numbers, as that span is infinitely smaller than the
span of infinite numbers. I mean, if you drop a tennis
ball from a plane into an infinitely big ocean, it is
infinitely unlikely to hit a ship if there is only a
finite number of ships and each of the ships has a
> must abandon numerical or cardinal identity and
> speak of measure instead.
> (I assume that you understand that if you die "here"
> then since similar circumstances occur everywhere
> ---within a large enough radius of spacetime---
> then the same circumstances obtain in a definite
> *fraction* of spacetime.)
Definite? Shouldn't that fraction of spacetime be an
infinite number of times smaller than the whole of
spacetime? I thought that so many combinations of
particles are possible in universe that universe has
infinite times more spacetime than the (admittedly
also infinite) amount of spacetime where I die (or
live, for that matter).
> > And compared to the eternity in paradise that
> > follows after that, the time of hassles up until
> > is nothing. So, no worries.)
> It is absurd not to worry about a loved one.
Why? Isn't it actually pretty impractical to let one's
ability to experience happiness (or the degree to
which one can experience happiness) be dependent on
whether a particular other person happens to be within
one's proximity in spacetime or not? A really advanced
civilisation should be free from that dependency, and
have replaced it with more practical ways of creating
the same - or greater - happiness.
By choosing to die sooner rather than later, one can
get to that kind of advanced civilisation sooner
rather than later, and they may equip one with that
better happiness ability. If they don't, one can
choose to die soon again, and again etc, until one
finds oneself in a civilisation that does give one
that independent happiness ability. This is
recommended in the Impatient Person's Guide to the
Universe. But you are free to choose the longer way!
> If the
> fraction of solar systems similar enough to this one
> to contain a copy of your loved one, then you
> should lament their passing. And of course, this
> will include yourself, normally.
I don't get what you mean here. Why would it include
> > Isn't this an inevitable logical conclusion of the
> > premises above?
> No, for the reason given. For you to die in a
> of universes cuts down your total runtime by that
But if universe is infinite, I still have infinite run
time, don't I? What does it matter for _me_, this one
particular personhood continuity that I experience as
me, if I cut down the total run time of my copies, as
long as it's still infinite?
> > Are the two premises correct?
> Yes, but only if you realize that you are already
> in your copies whether or not your local instance
I was talking about copies of me that are only similar
to me after I have died. They may not at all have
lived like me up until then. They may come into
existance as a result of quantum fluctuations after I
die, or they may be created by someone in another
galaxy after I die. These copies may be exact copies
of only the way I am _after_ I have died, and then
they may be brought to life. They do not have to be,
of ever have been, like I am now. The only way for me
to make use of these particular "copies of the dead
me" - the extra run time that they may give me by
being brought to life - is to die! If I don't die,
they will not be me. Why not use them? Why couldn't
that be just as smart as using the copies that I will
have access to by going on living here?
The fish are biting.
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