[ExI] Pure Philosophy Dispute: Are Categories Objective?
Damien Broderick
thespike at satx.rr.com
Fri Jun 22 06:20:14 UTC 2007
This is the debate over the ontological status of "natural kinds". A
very enduring topic.
The following (derived from my dissertation, and hence not
referencing especially recent work) will probably bore everyone silly, but hey:
==================
... concept-nodes may be linked by pathways characterised by mutable
`weights', or differential probabilities of access. A plausible
version is sketched by the sociologist of science, Barry Barnes
(1983). For Barnes, two apparently conflicting features of any viable
model of mind and memory are indisputable: first, we learn in an
empirical context, a real physical environment; second, such learning
`always initially occurs within a social context; to learn to
classify is to learn to employ the classifications of some community
or culture, and this involves interaction with competent members of
the culture' (p. 21).
Concept-building within these constraints--the natural and
the social--occurs, according to Barnes, via two processes: ostension
(just pointing at the object or process you're interested in, and
giving it a name), and generalisation (p. 22). The trouble with
ostension is well recognised. How do you know what she's pointed at,
if you don't known what she's pointing at? Still, for Barnes it
remains the indispensable bottom line. `A potentially infinite series
of questions [concerning usage...] terminates in actual situations
only because ostensibly given indications of usage lead out of the
morass.' These indications, he assumes, are grounded in hard-wired
determinants: `we possess an incompletely understood perceptual and
cognitive apparatus with at least some rudimentary inherent
properties for making learning possible'. Linguist Steven Pinker,
too, argues that we swiftly home in on the meaning of unknown words
when we see them applied `because we are not open-minded logicians
but happily blinkered humans, innately constrained to make only
certain kinds of guesses... about how the world and its occupants
work' (Pinker, 1994, pp. 153-4). As Barnes remarks emphatically (p. 38)
We should not shrink from admitting that cognitively we
operate as inductive learning machines (Hesse, 1974). This crude
formulation stresses that basic inductive propensities are inherent
in our characteristics as organisms.... We are congenitally inductive.
Generalisation controls the way terms are linked together. `They are
what make us regard a form of culture as a body of knowledge rather
than a mere taxonomy' (p. 23). These links take the form of what
Barnes terms a Hesse net (ibid.; see Hesse, 1974). Each
generalisation has an associated (and constantly updated)
`probability' (p. 24). `Under every concept stands a number of
specific instances thereof. These instances I shall call the tension
of the associated concept' (ibid.). (Presumably there is an `elastic
force' pun here, which is somewhat regrettable in what is basically a
cybernetic metaphor.) In a clarifying footnote, he comments
I use the term `tension' in deliberate allusion to
`extension' as used in philosophical semantics. In the extension of a
term are thought to be included all the entities to which it properly
applies, or of which it is true. In the tension of a term are
included only past instances of use--a finite number of instances. To
talk merely of the tension of a term is to accept that its future
proper usage is indeterminate. To talk of the extension is to imply
that future proper usage is determined already.
So although Barnes is prepared to ground his theory of
concept-formation in a real world susceptible of ostension, he is
adamant that social determination controls the categories within
which concepts are placed. Yet, unlike Saussurean analysts, Barnes
insists--correctly, in my view--on a dimension of similarity as well
as one of difference, though one lacking any coercive or
`essentialist' implication (p. 26):
An assertion of resemblance... involves asserting that
similarities outweigh differences. But there is no scale for the
weighting of similarity against difference given in the nature of
external reality, or inherent in the nature of the mind. An agent
could as well assert insufficient resemblance and withhold
application of the concept as far as reality or reason is concerned.
It follows that the tension of a term such as `dog' is an
insufficient determinant of its subsequent usage. All applications of
`dog' involve the contingent judgment that similarity outweighs
difference in that case....
And judgment is, of course, a socially situated act.
Knowledge in Context
Barnes proceeds to several implications: delocalisation (to know a
goose, it also helps to know a swan); hence, there are no
free-floating `atomic' concepts (p. 29); the application of a term is
a judgment, as we have noted, since `the tension of a term represents
a conventional relationship of sameness between the instances within
it', and this can always be revised (pp. 30 1); proper usage is
agreed usage, so that a creature might be at one time deemed a moth,
at another a butterfly: `Cases such as these are sometimes thought to
result from an inadequate knowledge of the "real meanings" of terms
themselves; and occasionally the achievement of
consensus in these cases is conceived as a "discovery" of the "real
meaning". But such consensus merely marks the successful negotiation
of an extension of usage'; and equivalence, which is to say that
`different Hesse nets are always equivalent' (p. 33), since
`"Reality" does not mind how we cluster it; "reality" is simply the
massively complex array of unverbalized information which we cluster.
This suggests that different nets stand equivalently in relation to
"reality" or to the physical environment', and also `as far as the
possibility of "rational justification" is concerned'(p. 33). In
short, `alternative classifications are conventions between which
neither "reality" nor "pure reason" can discriminate. Accepted
systems of classification are institutions which are socially
sustained. (p. 33)'
In my own view, this strong relativist position is surely
inconsistent with an implacable universe warranting ostension. Barnes
offers in support of his case the instance of Karam animal taxonomy,
which places cassowaries (a kind of flightless bird) in the special
taxon kobtiy, outside that of flying beasts like other birds and bats
(pp 34 37), and compares that categorisation with the zoological
taxonomy used in an advanced industrial Hesse net:
How can the pattern of either net distort reality? Rather,
reality provides the information incorporated in both nets; it has no
preference for the one or the other. (p. 35)
However bracing this might be as a corrective to imperialistic
anthropology, it is nonsense if taken literally. DNA sequences, for
example, are not `randomly' or `purely culturally' associated with
the genomes of each taxa, but contain clear natural-historical
markers endorsing the phylogenetic claims of one over the other--that
is, the history of their natural selection. (These deep links might
be of no interest or use to humans, of course, and for most of
history they have been altogether inaccessible, but they remain coded
as the DNA `text' or `recipe': an almost indelible inscription).
Animals and plants, whose phenotypes are the expression of
the interaction between environment and coded genotype, are the
`naturally-chunked' perceptual fields, or `natural kinds', which
humans are prone to tag with lexemes (whatever further totemic or
commercial significance they may be given). This perspective--that
human language, prior to the legitimate claims of cultural
relativity, is founded in its capacity for adaptation to an
indefinitely complex interacting universe--gives the lie to Barnes's
easy assertion: `"Reality" does not mind how we cluster it.' Reality
might not mind, but finding the correct clustering certainly matters.
The relativist view has been canvassed by John Dean, who
found within our own botanical science two rival taxonomies for the
plant Gilia inconspicua, and noted that both `are built upon
perceptible, systematizable, stable distinctions between individual
plants. In this sense the natural order sustains both taxonomies;
neither can be said to be erroneous' (Dean, 1979, p. 226; see
especially his taxonomic discussion, pp. 211-28). This view does not
convince me that `reality does not mind how we classify it'; it
simply reminds us that the reality we notate on our low-dimensional
grids is multidimensional. Reality is not, however, utterly or even
very indeterminate: it would be very strange to classify Gilia
inconspicua as a variety of possum or igneous rock, or to attempt to
breed it in the wild with an elephant. True, one might throw it in
with anything imaginable for, say, totemic purposes, but that is a
different point entirely. Ironically, the arch-conventionalist Pierre
Duhem looked to the emergence of naturally-chunked classification:
`The more a theory is perfected, the more we apprehend that the
logical order in which it arranges experimental laws is the
reflection of an ontological order' (cited Lakatos, 1978, p. 21).
Taken together, these converging models from artificial
intelligence research and the sociology of scientific knowledge offer
a useful springboard to the further examination of semiosis: the ways
in which humans recognise, construct and manipulate logics and
contexts in the service of signification.
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