[extropy-chat] Fragmentation of computations

Lee Corbin lcorbin at rawbw.com
Tue Mar 27 13:59:18 UTC 2007

Stathis wrote

> Yes, I am supposing for the sake of argument that the completely looked up states are 100% zombies. At the other end we have the 
> completely computed states which are 100% conscious (or whatever your favourite term for this is - I think we all know what I'm 
> referring to). In between, we have a possible spectrum of partly computed states, ranging from (1 square looked up, the rest 
> computed) to (50% squares looked up, 50% computed) to (1 square computed, the rest looked up).


> You've agreed that these intermediate cases won't have intermediate levels of
> consciousness, hence they must all be either fully conscious or fully zombies.

I'm sorry, there has been some miscommunication. I have agreed that (of course!)
no aberrant thoughts would occur---that is, no new brain states.

Now since you've admitted (at least the two of us agree!) that one might be 100%
zombie at time t1, and 100% truly-having-experiences at time t2, then you
admit that these periods could change back and forth with exceeding rapidity.
That is, you might be a zombie for a thousandth of a second, and conscious
the next thousandth.  I'm really saying no more than this.  It amounts---when
averaged out---to being only fractionally "there" during some larger period
of time.

If taken to the limit, then this particular 50/50 example would mean to me
that one state would be computed, then the next looked up, then the next
computed and so on. Just as "being a zombie for 1 hour" and then "being
completely conscious for 1 hour" can alternate meaningfully, then so can
each, what?, billionth of a second.


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