[extropy-chat] Back to Causes of War
Keith Henson
hkhenson at rogers.com
Tue May 1 22:11:05 UTC 2007
At 09:35 AM 5/1/2007 -0700, you wrote:
>Keith---in that amazing post that could launch a thousand threads---wrote
snip
> >
> > We are just working from such different data bases that I think I should
> > not respond again until you have read the Azar Gat paper. Let me know
> > when you have.
> >
> > http://cniss.wustl.edu/workshoppapers/gatpres1.pdf
>
>Okay, I read it. And it didn't take 15 minutes: I had to ponder a lot of the
>paragraphs :-)
>
>For me, the most striking thing about the paper was his relentless
>illustration
>of the *normal* condition of human tribes, namely to be at constant war
>with one another.
snip
Not entirely constant. Modulated by conditions, since war is, as he points
out, only one conditional strategy.
>What Gat does is very thoroughly detail the behavior of human groups
>in the EEA and in modern primitive societies still struggling under non-
>colonial control by the civilized powers.
>
>The real question (not addressed at all by this paper whose focus is
>entirely as I just stated) is Why are modern nations so *peaceful*?
It is the converse of Gat's discussion, bottom of page 7 and top of page 8.
******
"The main point of all this is that resource competition and conflict
existed in most
hunter-gatherer societies; but how significant they were, how they ranked
in comparison to
other possible reasons for conflict, and what resource specifically was
mostly in conflict -
depended on the particular conditions of the human and natural environment
in question.
Scarcities and stresses, and hence the causes and occurrence of conflict,
varied. The
concept of 'territoriality', which was brought to the fore in the 1960s by
Ardrey (1966),
Page 8
Lorenz (1966), and Tinbergen (1968), has been more subtly defined in this
light. Like
aggression, territoriality is not a blind instinct. It is subservient to
the evolutionary
calculus, especially in humans, whose habitats are so diverse. Among
hunter-gatherers,
territories vary dramatically in size - territorial behaviour itself can
gain or lose in
significance - in direct relation to the resources and resource
competition. The same
applies to population density, another popular explanation in the 1960s for
violence. In
other than the most extreme cases,
_it [violence] is mainly in relation to resource scarcity and hence as a
factor in resource competition_
that population density would function as a trigger for
fighting. Otherwise, Tokyo and the Netherlands would have been among the
most violent
places on earth."
******
(In carefully rereading this, I need to acknowledge that Gat anticipated my
formulation of "income per capita.")
>And the original main purpose of this thread and its predecessors was
>to address the causes of all wars, not just primitive fighting.
>
>I *will* summarize what I have written here on the topic. First, civilized
>societies are not necessarily more peaceful, even the literate ones! E.g. the
>Maya or the proto-nations and nations of Western Europe 500 AD -
>1500 AD Sometimes peace was establish in the old days---as in
>approximately 100 AD - 180 AD---when some fairly reasonable empire
>could maintain it (by force).
>
>Second, a sea-change seems to have overcome the West around 1700 or
>1800: gone were the constant wars of preceding generations. Especially
>per capita, wars became fewer and fewer over time. Go graph the number
>of wars and the amount of blood shed between England and France: it
>monotonically decreases from 1000 AD to 1815, and then stops altogether.
>(Of course there were fluctuations, but my point is that the wars really did
>become fewer over the centuries and of less severity.) What caused this
>sea-change?
You need to consider what else happened over this time. There was a huge
growth of income over this period of time, and some of the time even a
growth in income per capita.
>My answer is that it simply became more profitable to maintain peace than
>to try to plunder adjacent nations. For one thing, there was less comparative
>plunder than ever before (compared to the wealth of generating your own),
>and another thing, the dang wars just got too expensive and the ability of
>the other nation to inflict reciprocal damage kept growing. So an era
>of game-theoretic cooperation has emerged.
>
>Three, the causes of modern era war are too numerous to allow generalization.
>Keith sometimes said that population pressure causes war,
That not exactly the case.
"All wars arise from population pressure." (Heinlein 1959 p. 145)
"Major Reid (Heinlein's character in Starship Troopers)was on the mark if
you take "population pressure" to mean a falling ratio of resources to
population (roughly income per capita in modern terms). There are sound
evolutionary reasons why falling resources per capita (or the prospect of
same) usually drives human populations into war. Wars and related social
disruptions are here seen to be the outcome of a behavioral switch
activated by particular environmental situations and mediated by xenophobic
memes.[1]"
>and it is true that
>high population growth in modern nations *facilitates* war, but it doesn't
>cause it. For example, the high birth rates in Germany, England, and France
>before WWI made for aggressive nations in two ways: first, young people
>are usually quite willing and able to go to war (until 1950 or so in the
>West);
>they have the vitality and the group instinct I submit, and second, they
>provide enough cannon fodder to make the wars a go.
>
>Keith sometimes said that it was 'grim prospects' that caused war.
Again not exactly that simple. Grim prospects are sensed. They are *part*
of a causation chain.
In the EEA (and even today) it was usually population growth that led to
grim prospects.
Sensing grim prospects turned up the average population gain on xenophobic
memes.
High levels of xenophobic memes caused war violence.
>Certainly
>that is a factor, maybe a major factor, in the EEA as Professor Gat documents.
>And *sometimes* it is a contributing factor in modern wars, if taken not too
>literally. Again WWI affords a great example: the English were scared to
>death that the Germans would overtake them economically (1914 in fact
>was the very first year in which this occurred---see "The Illusion of
>Victory",
>a rather new book by Thomas Fleming). And the Germans were scared to
>death that Russia and the Slavs in general were going to surpass them in a
>variety of ways. Paul Johnson in "Modern Times" states this as a attitudinal
>fact among the German intelligencia apparently stemming from various
>wacked-out German philosophers.
I should add that fear of others *is* the result of xenophobic memes (such
as the English fearing the Germans or the Germans fearing the Russians and
Slavs).
>But throughout pre-modern times in the last millenium, a typical cause of
>war was one prince's avarice towards the domains of his neighbors. Most
>of the English-French wars were of this kind, for example, as were the
>endless wars between the various Italian city states. Another typical
>cause was vast population movement---the Avars or the Huns or someone
>would be on the move (chased by another tribe even more formidable) and
>the poor Romans or anyone else within range had to bear the consequences.
>
>Yet none of these explanations account for all modern wars---exceptions
>can be found for any and all of them. E.g. the Great Patriotic war, which
>included the largest and most deadly battles ever fought, was caused
>entirely by one man's irrational urges and his warped philosophy.
I think you put too much causation on particular people and too little on
the situation that allowed their madness to flourish.
Consider forest fires as an analogy. You can classify fires by how they
were started, lightening, careless campers, power lines sparking and
aircraft crashes. You can also say a lot about the influence of the
weather, with forest fires being more likely when the temperature is high,
the humidity low and gusty winds.
But the ultimate reason you get a forest fire is the slow accumulation of fuel.
The ultimate reason you get a war is the slow accumulation of people (in
excess of what the economy can support). Slow it down till the economic
growth is as high or higher than the population growth and no wars.
Since you read Gat's excellent paper, I should get you to read
"Evolutionary Psychology, Memes and the Origin of War." It should not take
longer than Gat's paper to read.
http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2006/4/17/194059/296
There is a close print version in _Mankind Quarterly_ last summer.
Incidentally, where you mention "young people are usually quite willing and
able to go to war," this is the "excess males" causation theory of war. I
forget what the proposed threshold was, but China (due to selective
abortion) is way above the point these researchers said would cause a
war. The EP model say China will not be inclined to start a war as long as
its population is experiencing a growth in income per capita.
Of course, China could get into a war if it were attacked. Before you say
that's impossible, consider Pearl Harbor.
Keith Henson
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