[ExI] [extropy-chat] What should survive and why?

[Heartland]

Stathis to Heartland:
>>    One of the problems in this debate is that the terminology can seem to
>>    imply the conclusion which is at issue in the first place. This is
>>    where I find the concept of the observer moment useful. An observer
>>    moment, or OM, unambiguously specifies an instance of conscious
>>    experience. Even if all hell breaks loose with duplications, we can

Eugen to Stathis:
> It's hardly a moment, though. "Conscious experience", whatever that means.
> implies a trajectory segment long enough for higher-order processes to
> happen, which puts it into some 100 ms country.

What Eugen points out is, of course, exactly what I've been trying to point out
to you (Stathis) and others several times before by saying that any process  (and
minds are undoubtedly processes, not patterns) is undefined across time intervals =
0. This means that there's no such thing as a "snapshot of process." Using your
terminology, there's no such thing as observer *moment.* If anything, there can
only be observer *intervals.*


Heartland:
>>> It seems that you first assume, "I don't die every night" and then
>>> tailor your
>>> definition of death and all the other statements about survival to
>>> fit that
>>> assumption. It should be the other way around. Only after you find
>>> out what death
>>> is first you can begin answering questions such as, "When do I die?"

Stathis:
>> That's the very question I'm asking: how would you define death?
>> Given that we can agree on whether or not criterion X has occurred,
>> how do we then move on to decide whether or not X is a good
>> criterion for death?

First we should decide what death means and that will inform us when death occurs,
not the other way around. (Lee, I completely disagree with you on this point too.) 
Definition of death should
follow from a definition of life. Life is a physical (dynamic) process (its 
activity, to be precise), not a (static) pattern. Absence of that activity is death 
even though I realize this is not immediately obvious.

Lee to Stathis:
> Notions such as "maybe we die every instant" or "maybe we die
> whenever our EEGs go flat", are misconceived, and very harmful
> for understanding.  Let's get serious!  You can't get out of paradoxes
> by making up definitions!

Paradoxes indicate that there's something wrong with your definitions, assumptions
or derivation. Correcting definitions so they don't lead to paradoxes later is
exactly the right course of action.


Stathis to Lee:
>>>> The alternative situation
>>>> is to have memories removed and false memories implanted while you
>>>> are asleep. If this were to happen to a sufficient extent tonight,
>>>> then it would be equivalent to death.

Heartland:
>>> Wouldn't you agree that this is an arbitrary definition of death?

Stathis:
>> The arbitrariness of the definition of death - yours and mine - is
>> what is at issue.

Yes. You and many others define it in terms of likeness. I define it in terms of 
utility. I argue that utility has priority over likeness as the latter is a 
consequence of the former. Survival should be about preservation of our ability to 
derive benefit rather than about preservation of likeness.


Heartland:
>>> Wouldn't you agree that this is an arbitrary definition of death? After all,
>>> every
>>> portion of Lee's body would function properly and without
>>> interruptions, including
>>> the brain. Would it really make sense to say Lee died during the
>>> night even though
>>> Lee's body (all of it) has remained in perfect health throughout the
>>> night? Would
>>> you be successful in convincing any practicing physician to issue a
>>> death certificate for the "deceased?"

Stathis:
>> Losing all your memories and personality would be like the end stage
>> of dementia. If you knew you were going to wake up tomorrow in this
>> state it might be a little bit better than not waking up at all, but
>> not much better. The status of these patients in hospital is similar
>> to the status of patients in a persistent vegetative state, except
>> that there is sometimes a hope that the latter might recover.

But the guy who wakes up can still score 136 on an IQ test and remember exactly 
what happened 20 years ago. His body and mind are still healthy, yet you argue that 
death certificate should have been issued.


Stathis to Lee:
>>>> So you could physically die but survive mentally,

Heartland:
>>> Then I'm afraid you believe in soul. Mental supervenes on the
>>> physical. If the
>>> physical is no more, the mental is no more too.

Stathis:
>> I believe that the mind can survive in different hardware.

Okay, that's better.

Stathis:
You have agreed to as much when you allowed that swapping out the atoms in
>> your brain for "different" atoms does not necessarily kill you.

Yes.

Stathis:
>> However, you claim that even brief interruption of the activity in
>> the brain *does* kill you. If the mental supervenes on the physical,
>> and the same atoms are going about their business in the same way a
>> moment later, then the same mental process should be being
>> implemented despite the interruption.

Obviously you're using the word "same" as in "same type," not as in "same
instance." You're not showing inconsistencies within my own argument, but merely
pointing out that this argument is inconsistent with your beliefs. What I'm saying
is supposed to be inconsistent with your beliefs. :-)


Stathis:
That is, if the
>> post-interruption physical state is exactly the same as if it would
>> have been had there been no interruption, and yet the interruption
>> gives rise to a different person, then the difference must be due to
>> some non-physical factor. Worse than that, the difference must be
>> due to some non-mental factor as well, since if the physical state
>> is the same the mental state must also be the same. So the
>> interruption causes a non-physical, non-mental change which results
>> in one person dying and another being born in their place. Even if
>> this were coherent (and I don't believe it is), it would imply the
>> existence of a soul.

Here's the deal. If you assume "same" to mean "same type," you can accuse me of a
belief in soul and be "right" within your own framework of assumptions. If I assume
"same" to mean "same instance," I can show you (and I think I did) that you
believe in souls too and I'm going to be "right" as well. Of course, I knew from
the beginning that we would be locked in the stalemate like this which is precisely
why I offered you "master and servant" scenario to think about right at the
beginning of our discussion hoping you would reevaluate your ideas about what it
means to survive. Should survival reduce to preservation of some degree of my
likeness (type), as Lee suggests, or should it reduce to preservation of my 
(current instance's)
ability to derive benefit which is what I advocate? In other words, what should 
survive and why?

H.