[ExI] Many Worlds (was: A Simulation Argument)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 17/01/2008, Lee Corbin <lcorbin at rawbw.com> wrote:

> > For even if it could somehow be guaranteed that you
> > never died in any branch in which you are presently alive, the process
> > of differentiation means you and your near-copies would occupy an
> > ever-thinning slice of the multiverse.
>
> Why would my near-copies occupy a much smaller slice over time?
> I'd still be me, even in those branches where Al Gore won, or where
> I won the lottery (I don't play).

That would be the case if you look at the next few years, but not over
a longer period. When you're born all the versions of yourself in the
multiverse are much the same, but by the time you reach adulthood they
have greatly diverged. There is a period of greater stability once
you're an adult but the changes due to posthumanist scenarios might be
at least as great as those of childhood. This means that, ignoring
duplications and deaths, the total number of copies of you in the
multiverse will remain the same, but they will become segregated into
increasingly smaller measure sets of near-copies.






-- 
Stathis Papaioannou