[ExI] Many Worlds (was: A Simulation Argument)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 17/01/2008, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:

> So even before the quatum toss, there are already two separate
> instantiations of you, eh? This will not bother Stathis, who  (I
> gather) doesn't see any problem with starting out with infinite
> variations that just get infiniter. But it disagrees with most of
> what I've read about MW, such as Michael Price's FAQ:
>
> <Can we regard the separate worlds that result from a
> measurement-like interaction (See
> <http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm#measurement>"What is a
> measurement?") as having previous existed distinctly and merely
> differentiated, rather than the interaction as having split one world
> into many? This is definitely not permissible in many-worlds or any
> theory of quantum theory consistent with experiment. >

Yes, that passage was one of the ones I had in mind when I said that
the accounts of the "splitting" are vague or contradictory depending
on what you read. I had the impression that Deutsch favours
differentiation rather than duplication, but I can't find anywhere
where he says this directly.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou