[ExI] How could you ever support an AGI?

Richard Loosemore rpwl at lightlink.com
Fri Mar 7 02:56:36 UTC 2008


ABlainey at aol.com wrote:
> In a message dated 06/03/2008 21:55:36 GMT Standard Time, 
> rpwl at lightlink.com writes:
> 
> 
>> This line of argument makes the following assumption:
>>
>>    *** Any AGI sufficiently intelligent to be a threat would start off
>> in such a state that its drive system (its motivations or goals, to
>> speak loosely) would either be unknowable by us, or deliberately
>> programmed to be malicious, or so unstable that they would quickly
>> deviate from heir initial set.
> 
> 
> Unknowable by us, most probable. We would have to control each and every 
> piece of data it receives and calculate every reaction to that data in 
> order to know with certainty its motivations (motivation in these terms, 
> logically determined actions in my terms). A mathematically 
> insurmountable task.
> Deliberately malicious. I don't agree that this would need to be so. If 
> anything this is a concern that _is_ a possibility. Hackers are 
> generally new adopters of all technology and such juvenile tinkering 
> could well result in deliberately malicious programming or simply 
> through pure ignorance, derailing a friendly AI. I don't need to 
> highlight the possible military implications regarding desirability of a 
> malicious AI.
> Unstable may not be the clearest term I would use. Certainly unstable 
> from our point of view, but more probably the learning curve of the AI 
> would be so stochastic that we cannot calculate the outcome. This would 
> be true of its learned logic, knowledge base and any psydo-emotions 
> which it may have. The end result is a chaotic erratic system (from our 
> eyes) which would be impossible to predict.
> 
>> This assumption is massively dependant on the actual design of the AGI
>> itself.  Nobody can state that an AGI would behave in this or that way
>> without being very specific about the design of the AGI they are talking
>> about.
> 
> 
> Agreed, as per above.
> 
>> The problem is that many people assume a design for the AGI's motivation
>> system that is theoretically untenable.  To be blunt, it just won't
>> work.  There are a variety of reasons why it won't work, but regardless
>> of what those reasons actually are, the subject of any discussion of
>> what an AGI "would" do has to be a discussion of its motivation-system
>> design.
>>
>> By contrast, most discussions I have seen are driven by wild,
>> unsupported assertions about what an AGI would do!  Either that, or they
>> contain assertions about ideas that are supposed to be real threats (see
>> the list above) which are actually trivially easy to avoid or deeply
>> unlikely.
> 
> 
> Pointing back to my earlier post I stated:
> /An Intelligence of this magnitude with a global reach into just about 
> every control system on the planet could and probably will do major 
> damage. Although probably not through design or desire, but just through 
> exploration of ability or pure accident.
> /Even if the AGI were boxed in or only had limited external contact, I 
> can't imagine how we could keep it cooped up for very long.
> 
> I can't see how you can reduce the list of threats to '/Trivial.'/ How 
> do you propose we 'easily' avoid them?  /


Unfortunately, I think I was not clear enough, and as a result you have 
misunderstood what I said in rather a substantial way.

When you build an AGI, you *must* sort out the motivation mechanism 
ahead of time, or the machine will simply not work at all.  You don't 
build an AGI and *then* discover what its motivation is.

If you do not understand the motivation system before you build it, then 
it will not work, as simple as that.

The reason why many people do talk as if a future AGI will have a 
"surprise" motivation system is that today's AI systems are driven by 
extremely crude and non-scalable "goal-stack" control systems, which are 
great for narrow-AI planning tasks, but which become extremely unstable 
when we imagine using them in a full-blown AGI.

But when people imagine an extended form of goal-stack drive system 
controlling a future AGI, they fail to realise that the very same 
instability that makes the AGI seem so threatening will also make it so 
unstable that it will never actually become generally intelligent.

The bottom line:  you cannot make statements like "An ...[AGI]... could 
and probably will do major damage", because there is no "probably" about 
it.  You either set out to make it do damage and be intelligent at the 
same time (an extremely difficult combination, in practice, for reasons 
I have explained elsewhere), or you don't!  There is no surprise.

For someone to talk about discovering an AGI's motivation after the fact 
would be like a company building a supersonic passenger jet and then 
speculating about whether the best way to fly it is nose-forward or 
nose-backward.



Richard Loosemore








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